So what's going on in Moldova? Can Maia Sandu win in the second round?
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So what's going on in Moldova? Can Maia Sandu win in the second round?
https://www.reddit.com/r/moldova/
https://www.skyscrapercity.com/threa...-2020.2284031/
I'm not going to debate this on a nose posting forum
No offense, but apart from Aspirin there isn't anyone here who is informed enough about the local political landscape to be able to have a decent discussion without having to write an extensive introductory essay to the scene prior to that.
If you just want TL;DRs, those are the sources.
I'm reasonably well informed on the overall political and social aspects of Moldova. I do not follow particular politicians in Moldova but I know quite a few of them.
You can skip the introductory essay, just answer the OP question and provide some justification for your opinions.
Title: Presidential elections in Moldova
The Apricity Regional: Romānia
https://i.gifer.com/RSn.gif
Alright, so then you have the answer to the first question.
On the second one, she currently loses by about 6%, if we assume that all the votes from Usatii and Ivanov will all go to Dodon.
However, it is not as simple as that, since part of Usatii's electorate is against the system and especially Dodon. They were just better captured by Usatii than Sandu, because they tend to be more Russophone (Sandu only later in the campaign started to pander to this demographic) and more blue collar. Sandu will have talks with Usatii tomorrow, where she will ask for his support in exchange of her promise to strive to disolve the parliament, among other things. If they agree the terms, then it's possible that he will tell their voters to vote against Dodon in order for them to get a good representation in the parliament. He will likely not clearly state his support for Sandu, because he's on a pro-Russian to Centrist segment, so doesn't want to scare off his electorate, which could be detrimental in the parliamentary elections.
Ivanov (Sor) is not as one sided as it may seem. A lot of the voters of the Sor party don't hold pro-Russian/Eastern preferences, especially those in Orhei. In fact it was one of the more classical pro-EU districts in elections, prior to the emergence of the Sor party. Sor is simply efficient on local level and people seem to be satisfied with that. But because of said sympathy towards the party, those people could also partially vote for Dodon, if they were asked too. Some of them are like zombies. But Sor himself is refugeed in Tel Aviv and not Moscow, so it's not guaranteed that he'll want to support Dodon.
So as things stand, chances are even. If the diaspora votes in higher numbers without being prevented from doing so (yesterday they beat the record for not only the 1st, but also the 2nd tour in 2016) and share of voters in the 18-40 age category is higher (that's usually the case with 2nd round), then Sandu's chances will be stronger. There's also the possibility of organised transportation of voters in Russia through blackmail to vote for Dodon. For example yesterday, only 5k people voted there, and the majority for Usatii. If that number say triples, then it would be obvious that it didn't do so naturally. Another wildcard is Transnistria, where in the 1st tour there were proofs of people selling their votes for money, so there's the risk of illegalities from that side. If people will be transported en masse, then there's a serious case for fraud.
https://stiri.md/article/politica/pr...-pot-lua-banii
https://stiri.md/article/social/aleg...-banii-promisi
https://stiri.md/article/social/prob...transnistreana
У всех настоящих румын и молдаван круглая голова. Вот как найти надежного политика.
I'm adding two snapshots relevant for these elections
1. the results in round 1 of the presidential elections (from this Sunday)
https://i.postimg.cc/dQBWSVQd/ecddcf...faea6eaa56.png
2. the current seat distribution in the Moldovan parliament (after 2019 elections)
https://i.postimg.cc/cCsF4Vhr/RMparties.png
Obviously, Maia Sandu starts with a large deficit in the round 2 (at least 10% IMO). One big wildcard though is the electorate of the PDM, which has split this year. We don't know how its votes distribute in these elections, or even how big its electorate remains, because the two succeeding parties did not register candidates in the presidential elections (which is another shady move in support of Dodon).