Arguments for the Existence of God

[Petros Agapetos]

Anselm's ontological argument can be summarized as follows:

P1. It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak, true by definition) that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible being that can be imagined).

P2. God exists as an idea in the mind.
A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.

P3. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (that is, a greatest possible being that does exist).

P4. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)

C. Therefore, God exists.

Anselm presented a further argument in the same vein:

1. By definition, God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.

2. A being that necessarily exists in reality is greater than a being that does not necessarily exist.

3. Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.

4. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God.
Thus, if God exists in the mind as an idea, then God necessarily exists in reality.

5. God exists in the mind as an idea.
Conclusion. Therefore, God necessarily exists in reality.

This contains the notion of a being that cannot be conceived not to exist. He argued that if something can be conceived not to exist, then something greater can be conceived. Consequently, a thing than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot be conceived not to exist and so it must exist. This can be read as a restatement of the first argument.

[Petros Agapetos]

An Ontological Counter-proof for the non-existence of God

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)
4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist.
6. Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist. (axiom S5)
7. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

Do you find this ontological counter-argument convincing? Do you think the argument is sound?

The way to counter-argue logical arguments is to first ascertain whether it is deductive or inductive, whether valid or not, and if it is valid, to determine which of the premises is wrong (by offering reasons).

Do you think this argument is valid?
In other words, If I grant all the premises, is it possible for the conclusion to be not true?
Which premises do you find flawed?

[Petros Agapetos]

You clearly don't understand the argument, nor are you able to say things beyond typical talking points you would hear on something like TheAtheistExperience. Because you are an autist. A shitty little pretentious autist.



You are the only one who doesn't understand shit you frog-faced little autistic moron. I would slap you until you stopped croaking IRL.



What you owe everyone is not pretending to understand things you don't understand and being able to take criticism.



You are not only my student but I will also make you my BITCH when this is over.



Which is even worse, because you clearly don't understand a thing.

Do you find this ontological counter-argument convincing?

Of course not because you don't fucking understand logic, frogface. Stop butchering this shit and fix your autism.

My IQ is 130. What's your's, moron?

I told you, I am not a "Johnny-come-lately" to this subject, so don't dare to lecture me, you ignorant, gullible, foolhardy nothing with no education nor common sense. It's becoming more and more evident to me that you need to grow up and learn how to communicate with people like a civilized human being.

If you care to really know what I understand, go back to page 1 and start reading again. Clearly, it is you who doesn't understand anything about the sophisticated arguments for the existence of God, because you are a gullible simpleton. And I get that. As for the rest of your charges, frankly, I don't find them worthy of an in-depth response, It's pointless.

PS. And get the hell out of my threads if you don't like them, and don't quote me again, or I am gonna have to start thumbing your comments down.

[Petros Agapetos]

Ontological arguments are arguments, for the conclusion that God exists, from premises which are supposed to derive from some source other than observation of the world—e.g., from reason alone. In other words, ontological arguments are arguments from nothing but analytic, a priori and necessary premises to the conclusion that God exists.

The first, and best-known, ontological argument was proposed by St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th. century C.E. In his Proslogion, St. Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists—can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived—i.e., God—exists.

[Petros Agapetos]

Objections to ontological arguments take many forms.
Some objections are intended to apply only to particular ontological arguments, or particular forms of ontological arguments; other objections are intended to apply to all ontological arguments. It is a controversial question whether there are any successful general objections to ontological arguments.

One general criticism of ontological arguments which have appeared hitherto is this: none of them is persuasive, i.e., none of them provides those who do not already accept the conclusion that God exists—and who are reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc.—with either a pro tanto reason or an all-things-considered reason to accept that conclusion. Any reading of any ontological argument which has been produced so far which is sufficiently clearly stated to admit of evaluation yields a result which is invalid, or possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. non-theists will accept, or has a benign conclusion which has no religious significance, or else falls prey to more than one of the above failings.

For each of the families of arguments introduced in the earlier taxonomy, we can give general reasons why arguments of that family fall under the general criticism. In what follows, we shall apply these general considerations.

(1) Definitional arguments:
These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from ‘By definition, God is an existent being’ to ‘God exists’ is patently invalid; while the inference to ‘By definition, God exists’ is valid, but uninteresting. In the example given earlier, the premises licence the claim that, as a matter of definition, God possesses the perfection of existence. But, as just noted, there is no valid inference from this claim to the further claim that God exists.)

(2) Conceptual arguments:
These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely within the scope of hyperintensional operators (e.g. ‘believes that’, ‘conceives of’, etc.). Often, these operators have two readings, one of which can cancel ontological commitment, and the other of which cannot. On the reading which can give cancellation (as in the most likely reading of ‘John believes in Santa Claus’), the inference to a conclusion in which the ontological commitment is not cancelled will be invalid. On the reading which cannot cancel ontological commitment (as in that reading of ‘John thinks about God’ which can only be true if there is a God to think about), the premises are question-begging: they incur ontological commitments which non-theists reject. In our sample argument, the claim, that I conceive of an existent being than which no greater being can be conceived, admits of the two kinds of readings just distinguished. On the one hand, on the reading which gives cancellation, the inference to the conclusion that there is a being than which no greater can be conceived is plainly invalid. On the other hand, on the reading in which there is no cancellation, it is clear that this claim is one which no reasonable, etc. non-theist will accept: if you doubt that there is a being than which no greater can be conceived, then, of course, you doubt whether you can have thoughts about such a being.

(3) Modal arguments:
These are arguments with premises which concern modal claims about God, i.e., claims about the possibility or necessity of God's attributes and existence. Suppose that we agree to think about possibility and necessity in terms of possible worlds: a claim is possibly true just in case it is true in at least one possible world; a claim is necessarily true just in case it is true in every possible world; and a claim is contingent just in case it is true in some possible worlds and false in others. Some theists hold that God is a necessarily existent being, i.e., that God exists in every possible world. Non-theists do not accept the claim that God exists in the actual world. Plainly enough, non-theists and necessitarian theists disagree about the layout of logical space, i.e., the space of possible worlds. The sample argument consists, in effect, of two premises: one which says that God exists in at least one possible world; and one which says that God exists in all possible worlds if God exists in any. It is perfectly obvious that no non-theist can accept this pair of premises. Of course, a non-theist can allow—if they wish—that there are possible worlds in which there are contingent Gods. However, it is quite clear that no rational, reflective, etc. non-theist will accept the pair of premises in the sample argument.

[Insuperable]

Excuse me, did you just say, arguments for the existence of God are bullshit?
If you don't like arguments, reason or evidence, then what do you accept in deciding there is a God or not?
Then what reason or evidence would convince you there is a God, if you don't accept reason and evidence as reliable paths to truth.
Faith is not a reliable path to truth. Faith is gullibility. It is the excuse that people give for believing something for which they have no sufficient reason or justification.
Faith is the lack of certainty, the gap of believability... This is not an adequately reliable method of discerning truth from falsehood.

No human logic can explain either something just existing eternally or infinite regression so that in an instant we can be sure of God's existence or non-existence. I believe that the eternal source is the reason behind our existence. I believe that source is God based on the beginning of time, space and matter, at least from our current understanding. Based on consciousness, water anomaly and so on. I just believe God exist based on those and other things when wrapped all together and not taken in consideration individually. I don't claim that God exists, I just believe and that is not irrational.

[Petros Agapetos]

No human logic can explain either something just existing eternally or infinite regression so that in an instant we can be sure of God's existence or non-existence. I believe that the eternal source is the reason behind our existence. I believe that source is God based on the beginning of time, space and matter. Based on consciousness, water anomaly and so on. I just believe God exist based on those and other things when wrapped all together and not taken in consideration individually. I don't claim that God exists, I just believe and that is not irrational.

Your position is described as agnostic theist: a believer in God, who does not claim to know that God exists, but nonetheless believes it. Agnostics are my favorite theists, because they don't claim to know the unknowable (at least as far as we can tell currently). Thanks for sharing your thoughts.

[Insuperable]

An Ontological Counter-proof for the non-existence of God

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)
4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist.
6. Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist. (axiom S5)
7. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

Do you find this ontological counter-argument convincing?[/QUOTE]

[Insuperable]

Your position is described as agnostic theist: a believer in God, who does not claim to know that God exists, but nonetheless believes it. Agnostics are my favorite theists, because they don't claim to know the unknowable (at least as far as we can tell currently). Thanks for sharing your thoughts.

Are you an Agnostic Atheist? That is not better than being Gnostic Theist. All people should be either Agnostic Theists or Gnostic Atheists.

[Petros Agapetos]

Are you an Agnostic Atheist? That is not better than being Gnostic Theist. All people should be either Agnostic Theists or Gnostic Atheists.

Well, it depends on the definition of God. Some concepts of God cannot refer to anything really existing because of how they are defined.

If we are talking about the God of classical theism :the all-powerful, all-merciful, all-just, I think there are internal contradictions, for example, mercy is the suspension of justice, so it is logically impossible for God to be both all just and all merciful simultaneously. But you can redefine the properties of the God of classical theism in a way as to make it logically possible. It basically depends on whether the God is falsifiable or not. If something cannot be proven wrong, there is no good reason to accept it, if you are skeptical.

When it comes to the God of Christian theism, I am actually a Gnostic Atheist (I claim to know that God does not in fact exist), but for a more generic definition of God, I am agnostic. I cannot disprove something that is unfalsifiable. So I am agnostic towards God claims that cannot be proven wrong.