Meta-Ethics

[Petros Agapetos]

There are three branches of Ethics:

- Applied Ethics = addresses specific ethical questions and problems

- Normative Ethics = examines the rules and principles that guide our behaviour, develops general moral theories: virtue ethics, utilitarianism, consequentialism, etc.

- Meta-Ethics = what is the meaning of moral statements. Can moral statements be true or false. Are there objective moral facts? Is morality universal or relative? Meta-Ethics does not address specific moral questions and problems, but rather deals conceptual analysis of moral theories.

[Petros Agapetos]

Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism

Cognitive is the view that moral statements are truth-apt. "Abortion is wrong" is equivalent to "Abortion has the property of 'wrongness' ".

Non-Cognitivism denies that moral statements are truth-apt. "Abortion is wrong" is equivalent to merely expressing emotional disapproval of abortion, or it expresses a command not to abort (i.e. "don't abort!").

Cognitivism: Moral statements express propositions.
Non-Cognitivism denies this.

Are you a moral cognitivist?

[Petros Agapetos]

Are any moral statements true?

If the answer is yes, then what makes them true? Are moral properties objective independent of people's opinions?
If the answer is no, then nothing has the property of being right/wrong or good/bad. This is called "Error Theory". Under Error Theory, all ethical claims are false.

The Error Theorist has to defend two claims:

1) Moral statements should be taken at face value
2) We have good reason to believe that there are no objective moral values

[Petros Agapetos]

Subjectivism (Individualist Subjectivism) - a form of relativism
Moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes of the individuals who utter them. The truth of falsity or moral statements is relative to the individual.

Cultural Subjectivism (Cultural Relativism)
Moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes of the culture as a whole. Something is right or wrong only relative to a particular culture.

Both of the above are versions of relativism. Relativism asserts the rightness or wrongness of moral claims are only evaluable with respect to a point of view or frame of reference.

Are you moral relativists? There are two ways to be relativist, individualist relativism and cultural relativism. If you are relativist, which of these describes you better?

[Petros Agapetos]

If however one holds that moral properties are objective and independent of people's opinions, then the following positions apply:

Moral Realism says:
some moral statements are true, and they are true in virtue of mind-independent features of the world. It asserts that "wrongness" is a mind-independent property of certain actions.

Are moral properties natural properties? What's the distinction between natural and non-natural properties?

Moral Naturalism vs. Non-Naturalism
What is a natural property? A first approximation: natural properties are those that feature in a scientific description of the world, those we come to know about through empirical study. We use our senses to come to recognize natural properties (a posteriori, part of the fabric of the natural world).

Moral Nauralism states that moral properties are natural (like pleasure and pain are natural).
Moral Non-Naturalism denies this, and moral properties don't figure into a scientific picture of the world.

Are you a moral realist? Are you a moral naturalist or non-naturalist?

[Petros Agapetos]

Non-Cognitivism - moral statements express emotional attitudes.

According to Emotivism, moral statements don't report anything. They're simply expressions of emotion.

Prescriptivism: Moral statements are imperative and express commands, i.e. "Abortion is wrong" = "Don't abort!".

Quasi-realism begins with the observation that we often tend to act as though moral statements are true or false. People seem to treat moral statements as if true or false whether they can be true or false. Quasi-realism says that even though moral statements have no truth-value, it's perfectly reasonable to act as though they do.

[Petros Agapetos]

The is-ought problem states that we cannot derive normative statements which are about how the world ought to be from descriptive statements, which are about how the world is. We cannot derive values from facts. The only way to derive our normative conclusion is to add a normative statement to descriptive premises.

The fact-value distinction states there is a fundamental metaphysical gap between facts and values.

Moral Realism

1) Moral statements express propositions. So it is a form of congnitivism.
2) Some moral statements are true
3) Moral statements are true and false in virtue of mind-independent properties of the world. Moral values are out there in the world. They are not just human constitutions.

Why be a moral realist?

1) Moral realism accords best with common sense. Moral statements seem to work like factual statements.
2) Moral realism accounts for the special force of moral judgments. Rationally compelling force to the claim that slavery is wrong.
3) I might be wrong about some of the moral views that I hold. We can make moral statements because there are moral facts.
4) Societies seem to exhibit progress, particularly in the convergence of values. There is convergence on empirical claims such as the story of the origin of life (accepted by every educated person). The moral realist suggests that the best explanation for moral convergence is that people are recognizing moral facts.

Are you a moral realist? Which reasons (of the above four) do you give for your realism?

[Petros Agapetos]

What distinguishes Natural from non-Natural properties?

1) Natural properties are those that figure in a mature scientific description of the world.
Problem: What is science? Which sciences? It's difficult to characterize exactly what science or a scientific description is.

2) Natural properties are those directly or indirectly observable by the senses.

3) Natural propositions are those that exist in space and time.

[Petros Agapetos]

Moral Non-Naturalism

Moral properties are not reducible to natural properties, they are something 'over and beyond' natural properties. Moral properties supervene on natural properties. Property A supervenes on property B just in case there can be no change in the property A without changing property B. If two events differ in their moral properties, they must also differ in their natural properties.

If we allow that moral properties may differ without change in natural properties, then moral properties float free in a domain of their own. Moral properties have a strong dependence on natural properties, but are not one and the same.

[Petros Agapetos]

I am a moral realist and non-naturalist.
I am against cultural relativism.
I am not an absolutist on any point.
I am a moral cognitivist: Moral statements express propositions.

Please list your positions on ethics and meta-ethics.
Are you relativist or absolutist? What version of relativism do you find acceptable?
Are you a moral cognitivist or non-cognitivist?
Are you a moral naturalist or non-naturalist?