Meta-Ethics

[Petros Agapetos]

Do you consider yourself to be a moral relativist? Why and why not?

[Also]

I am a moral realist and non-naturalist.
I am against cultural relativism.
I am not an absolutist on any point.
I am a moral cognitivist: Moral statements express propositions.

That doesn't seem to fit very well with atheism. Atheists tend to have a scientificist base (wheter declared or not) that should lead to naturalism, although I don't think this is contradictory in itself.

[Petros Agapetos]

That doesn't seem to fit very well with atheism. Atheists tend to have a scientificist base (wheter declared or not) that should lead to naturalism, although I don't think this is contradictory in itself.

So, is it your impression that atheists tend to be moral realists but of the naturalist variety? - that is, believing that moral properties are the same as natural properties? The implication here is that scientific knowledge alone is sufficient for morality, which is a conclusion I tend to disagree with due to the famous is-ought problem of David Hume.

[Also]

So, is it your impression that atheists tend to be moral realists but of the naturalist variety? - that is, believing that moral properties are the same as natural properties? The implication here is that scientific knowledge alone is sufficient for morality, which is a conclusion I tend to disagree with due to the famous is-ought problem of David Hume.

No. I think atheists tend to (or should at least) be at most moral subjectivists if not deny moral statements mean anything, what you call moral non-cognitivism, like logical positivists did.

I'll attempt to explain why, atheists usually reject assertions that are out of the empirical scope, moral statements are out of that scope too as you recognize the 'is-ought' distinction and science can only deal with desprictive statements not normative statements, thus they should either hold moral statements express only subjective preferences and desires or outright dismiss moral statements as having any meaning. I think it is both the fact that you claim to be a moral objectivist and a non-naturalist that is unusual for an atheist.

If you do think moral realism is true and that empirical knowledge can't validate moral statements, even in principle, then it means you believe in something beyond the natural, which is probably why you declare you are a non-naturalist, so far so good. But then I wonder, what makes you believe in something unscientific like the objectivity of moral statements and how is your argument for moral objectivity, whatever it is, qualitatively different from an argument for God's existence?

[Also]

... delete this ... posted by mistake

[Petros Agapetos]

No. I think atheists tend to (or should at least) be at most moral subjectivists if not deny moral statements mean anything, what you call moral non-cognitivism, like logical positivists did.

I'll attempt to explain why, atheists usually reject assertions that are out of the empirical scope, moral statements are out of that scope too as you recognize the 'is-ought' distinction and science can only deal with desprictive statements not normative statements, thus they should either hold moral statements express only subjective preferences and desires or outright dismiss moral statements as having any meaning. I think it is both the fact that you claim to be a moral objectivist and a non-naturalist that is unusual for an atheist.

If you do think moral realism is true and that empirical knowledge can't validate moral statements, even in principle, then it means you believe in something beyond the natural, which is probably why you declare you are a non-naturalist, so far so good. But then I wonder, what makes you believe in something unscientific like the objectivity of moral statements and how is your argument for moral objectivity, whatever it is, qualitatively different from an argument for God's existence?

I think there are such things as objective moral values and duties.
My foundation of morality is well-being, that is, my moral reference is human flourishing. I am Hedonist-Consequentialist.
I get my morality from a rational consideration of the consequences of my actions. I get them from a foundation that says "my actions have consequences on other people, and if we are going to share space together we need to recognize that my right to swing my arm ends at your nose; my rights end when your rights begin. You might argue the kind of moral theory I tend to exercise is relative to well-being therefore not absolute. I think there are metaphysical problems with relativism, which I can get to, if you'd like. I therefore question whether I am a moral absolutist?

Does one being a moral realist imply he is an absolutist? I think not.
Does one being a moral objectivist imply he is an absolutist? I question this.

What do you think?

[Petros Agapetos]

Objective morality is the idea that a certain system of ethics or set of moral judgments is not just true according to a person's subjective opinion, but factually true. Proponents of this theory would argue that a statement like "Murder is wrong" can be as objectively true as "1 + 1 = 2." Most of the time, the alleged source is God, or the Kantian categorical imperative; arguably, no objective source of morality has ever been confirmed, nor have any a priori proofs been offered to the effect that morality is anything other than subjective.

The moral principles that people claim to be "objective" usually coincide very well with what they feel subjectively to be true. When pressed to provide justification, the person in question will usually just fail to understand that morality might not be objective, and might consequently grow increasingly doubtful or hysterical as the subjective bases of their arguments are progressively revealed, as has been observed in recent times.

[Petros Agapetos]

Absolute morality postulates that what is moral and what is immoral is independent of circumstances and unchanging. It is very popular with religion believers because it fits their use of holy texts to determine morality. The opposite view is moral relativism.

Assuming absolute morality is the only form of morality is a popular assumption by apologists:

"But how do they define immoral? Well, the only way to do that is to appeal to moral absolutes—which are found in God’s Word."

It is unclear that God can establish an absolute morality, since apologists have not established any such ability. Divine command theory is sometimes mentioned, but this is just begging the question that God can do this. It seems like God's opinion on morality is just as valid as a human's view (or Satan's).

The Abrahamic God is a bad choice for the foundation of morality because God commanded atrocities in the Old Testament, fails to address the problem of evil and his own poor designs, continues to allow hell to exist and is generally unworthy of being a moral arbiter. Most humans are more moral than this God.

It is ironic that theists who claim that morality is absolute often disagree among themselves about what morality actually entails. If absolute morality was true and was knowable, we would expect most or all theists to agree. Since they don't, it raises some serious questions as to the knowability of morality. If absolute morality is not knowable by humans, what good is it? This view is known as moral non-cognitivism.

Even if morality is absolute, it is also an unjustified assumption that morality is universal. What God wants one person to do is not necessarily what other people should do.

[Petros Agapetos]

Moral relativism on the other hand postulates that morals can be somewhat flexible, dependent on circumstances, and develops as education and understanding progresses. This acknowledges that cultural differences across different times and different regions may mean that what people consider moral can change. This change, particularly over time, is sometimes known as the moral zeitgeist, from the German "spirit of the times". Hence once slavery was accepted in parts of the western world, it now is not - or at least it has been outsourced to poorer countries and prisons. Moral relativism isn't without criticism as it is viewed as lending justification to clearly immoral acts by effectively saying "well, they do things differently over there".

[Petros Agapetos]

The Metaphysics of Relativism - Is Relativism valid?
P1. Positive Thesis = A claim is only evaluable with respect to a point of view
P2. Negative Thesis = There are no absolute truths
P3. Relativism = Positive Thesis + Negative Thesis
P4. Relativism is true if and only if both its positive and negative theses are true
Conclusion. Relativism is true

Is the argument for the truth of relativism valid?
We apply the validity test: assume the premises true and the conclusion false and observe whether a contradiction arises. If a contradiction does arise, then the argument is valid because a valid argument is one in which it is impossible for the premises to be true while the conclusion false. If we grant the premises true then Relativism = Positive + Negative theses such that both are true. If we grant the conclusion false, then Relativism is false, which implies that at least one of its theses is false, because the argument for the truth of relativism is valid.

If the negative thesis is true, then there are no absolute truths. If there are no absolute truths, then it cannot be stated as a matter of absolute truth that there are no absolute truths. The negative thesis contradicts itself. If there are no absolute truths, then the claim that a claim is only evaluable with respect to a point of view cannot be absolutely true. The negative thesis contradicts the positive thesis. If the positive thesis is true, then a claim is only evaluable with respect to a point of view, that is, points of view don't have any intrinsic truth or validity, and that truth itself is only applicable in a particular frame of reference or framework of assessment contingent on opinion. If the positive thesis is true, then the negative thesis 'there are no absolute truths' is left incomplete, since the relevant frame of reference or point of view is not specified. The positive thesis contradicts the negative thesis.

The positive and negative theses contradict each other, therefore granting the premises (positive and negative theses) true leads to a contradiction. Assuming the conclusion to be false leads to relativism being false which implies at least one of the thesis is false, which resolves the contradiction, since the contradiction only arises when both the positive and negative theses are true simultaneously. Since granting the premises true leads to a contradiction, while granting the conclusion false leads to no contradiction, a contradiction arises. Therefore the argument is valid.