Originally Posted by
Petros Agapetos
Modal ontological argument
This is a version of the argument defended by such apologists as Alvin Plantinga. The premises are as follows:
P(1): It is possible that God exists.
P(2): If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds.
P(3): If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds.
P(4): If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
P(5): If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
C(1): Therefore, God exists.
Counter argument
The Modal Ontological Argument is a deductive argument, which means that in order to deny the conclusion of the argument one must show the form of the argument to be invalid, that at least one of the premises are false, or that the argument commits some other fallacy.
As a way to show the argument contains a fallacy, one could substitute something like a necessarily existing unicorn into the argument instead of God.
P(1)': It is possible that a necessarily existing unicorn exists.
P(2)': If it is possible that a necessarily existing unicorn exists, then a necessarily existing unicorn exists in some possible worlds.
P(3)': If a necessarily existing unicorn exists in some possible worlds, then a necessarily existing unicorn exists in all possible worlds.
P(4)': If a necessarily existing unicorn exists in all possible worlds, then a necessarily existing unicorn exists in the actual world.
P(5)': If a necessarily existing unicorn exists in the actual world, then a necessarily existing unicorn exists.
C(1)': Therefore, a necessarily existing unicorn exists.
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