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Loxias
11-03-2009, 11:15 AM
Indeed, here is the question, what ethical school of thought do you follow?
Which one most closely matches your views on what makes an act right?

Here is a definition for each of the possibilities here :

An act is right if, and only if :
ethical egoism :
The act tends, more than any alternative open to the agen at the time, to produce the happiness of the agent.
egoistical hedonism :
The act tends, more than any alternative open to the agent at the time, to produce the greatest amount of pleasure for the agent.
act utilitarianism :
The act tends, more than any alternative open to the agent at the time, to produce the greatest amount of good or pleasure for the greatest number of all those affected by that act.
rule utilitarianism :
The act tends, when adopted as a rule, more than any alternative open to the agent at the time, to produce the greatest amount of good or happiness for the greatest number of all those affected by the act.
ethical relativism :
The act is generally judged to be right by one's culture or group.
Kantianism :
The agent willing the act could at the same time will that the maxim of the act be a universal law.
ethical intuitionism :
The agent, in virtue of an innate knowledge or special ability, and in the abence of any known inferential process or discernement of the effects of the act, judges that the act is right in virtue of some nonnatural property of goodness that the act has and which the agent immediately apprehended without reasoning
theologism :
The act, more than any alternative open to the agent at the time, is most consistent with what God wills, or commands, either or indirectly.
ethical nihilism :
There are no right or wrong acts, there are prudent or imprudent acts that are more or less in one's self-interest to perform, but there are no acts that one must do if they do not want to.

Tell us which you follow, and why you follow it?
Also, if your ideas don't correspond to any of those, or you have doubts about some of those views, feel free to explain them!

Let the debate go on ! :thumbs up

Tabiti
11-03-2009, 11:21 AM
ethical nihilism :
There are no right or wrong acts, there are prudent or imprudent acts that are more or less in one's self-interest to perform, but there are no acts that one must do if they do not want to.
More close to that, however I try not to harm people I'm personally connected with and who deserve to be treated better according to me. I'm egoist at all.

Freomęg
11-03-2009, 12:17 PM
Probably ethical intuitionism, with ethical relativism a close second.

Loxias
11-03-2009, 01:20 PM
Probably ethical intuitionism, with ethical relativism a close second.

Would you say that your ethical intuition is partly affected by your culture? Do the two sometimes clash?

Loddfafner
11-03-2009, 02:06 PM
I don't recognize my practice in any of those except, arguably, relativism. I reject absolutes and think in terms of situations. Long-term consequences matter more than momentarily pleasing the people around me.

I am categorically anti-Kantian and am wary of utilitarianism. I am more concerned with exceptions, the exceptional, and the anomalous than any numerical or conventional majority.

Knowledge and experience matter more to me than happiness and pleasure.

Manifest Destiny
11-03-2009, 02:15 PM
For me, it would be individual rights/rational self-interest.

I believe that an act is right if it protects or reinforces the concept of individual rights.

Lulletje Rozewater
11-03-2009, 02:49 PM
Virulent nihilism

Difficult to explain,but it is a mixture of Kant-Nietzsche-Sade-Freud-Marx-Boltzmann-Rimbaud-Miller and such enemies as Aquinas-Hegel-Derrida.
More important by far than most of these names have been the saints-shamans-werewolves-vampires- and lunatics with whom I have communed

Where Descartes needed God to mediate his relation fellows,secular man is happy with his television set,his Internet pep talk and with all other channels of pseudo-communication with which his civilization has so thoughtfully endowed him.
Such things are for his own protection of course; to filter the terrifying threat of infection.
If openness to alterity,base communication,and experimental curiosity are marks of an exuberant society,its only true gauge lies in its tendency to be decimated by sexually transmitted diseases and pop religion.
On this basis it seems that our society,despite its own most strenuous efforts,has not yet consummated its long idealized sclerosis into impermeable atoms.
The grit still exists,and it is only amongst the grit that we connect.

Boerseun why do you not use the KISS method,trying to copy Lutiferre:D:D

I have not really connected with the Internet websites as such.
I was a mere spectator looking in--just for fun.
Then it hit me-this thread reminded me- the Internet is a first step to Nihilism.

The real history of the spirit is to die without a trace.

Liffrea
11-03-2009, 03:37 PM
I tend to have a dual view.

On the one hand I take the position that motive linked to logical reasoning provides the only real basis for objectively defining an action (or rather it’s effect). By implication an individual incapable of logical reasoning is not morally culpable.

Second I believe in recognising men as men, not as abstract ideas. What I mean is men should be judged by the things that motivate us as humans i.e. our inherent natures and usual self interest. A man who slays his daughter’s killer may well have (legally) committed a crime of murder but is his action understandable? Of course this conflicts with the above statement, to kill your daughters murderer is logically inconsistent, but as a pure human urge it is entirely understandable, in my view, although it warrants punishment but a punishment taken in light of the circumstances.

As a result I would say my position is relative and that an overall framework of ethics is largely impossible.

Freomęg
11-03-2009, 04:45 PM
Would you say that your ethical intuition is partly affected by your culture? Do the two sometimes clash?
I'd say my ethnical intuition is mostly affected by my spirituality, so in a sense, my culture. My decisions in life are largely based upon what is good for my soul and what is good for my reputation in this life and after. I see this as different from theologism because my actions do not pander to the will of a god, but rather to my own supernatural spirit.

SwordoftheVistula
11-04-2009, 03:21 AM
A rule utilitarianism that recognizes that allowing for broad ethical egoism generally produces the most good due to human differences and limits, with aspects of ethical relativism.

For an example of how my 'rules utilitiarianism' works, take this example:


A man who slays his daughter’s killer may well have (legally) committed a crime of murder but is his action understandable? Of course this conflicts with the above statement, to kill your daughters murderer is logically inconsistent, but as a pure human urge it is entirely understandable, in my view, although it warrants punishment but a punishment taken in light of the circumstances.


Assuming the killer, Kamal, had no legitimate reason to kill the daughter (Darla) of the man (Maddox) and it was not an accident:


Society needs a rule against murder, partly because people don't want to walk outside every day having to worry about someone killing them, also the population would get reduced to near zero pretty quick and in general society would cease to function. Thus, what Kamal did to Darla must be judged wrong, and punished by society. Preferred punishment: execution by the state/society.

What Maddox did to Kamal does not fit into the above. Most people are not murderers, and we don't like those people anyways, so creating an environment where murderers don't have to worry about retribution is not needed or desired. Likewise, Kamal is probably a net detriment to society, as are murderers in general, so this does not apply either. So, as a rule society should not punish Maddox for the same reasons or in the same way as Kamal.

The only problem with Maddox's actions is that he may not be the best judge of whether Kamal actually killed Darla, or whether it was entirely purposeful and unjustified, so society may adopt a rule in general against 'retribution' killings in general to prevent the possibility of Maddox killing Kamal when it was actually Juwaun that killed Darla, or Kamal killed Darla because she was trying to rob him. Also the possibility that these things can spiral out of control into family/clan feuds which can disrupt and endanger society as a whole. Since Maddox is a good guy, and the nature of the crime is entirely different from what Kamal did to Darla (murder vs public disorder offense), a much lesser punishment is desired. Preferred punishment: monetary fine equivalent to an average week's pay in that country, one weekend in jail.

This punishment can be waived if Maddox can prove that he knew without a doubt at the time he killed Kamal that Kamal had indeed killed Darla without any justification. For example, Maddox and Darla are in a car at a deserted stoplight, and Kamal, who is unknown to them, opens the door, sticks a gun in Darla's face, and orders her out of the car. Darla attempts to close the door and drive away, Kamal pulls the trigger and blows her face off, then realizing what he has done takes off running down the sidewalk running as fast as he can. Maddox, enraged, gets out of the car, pulls out his gun, and shoots Kamal several times in the back, then walks up to where Kamal is lying on the sidewalk and puts another bullet into his head. For this, we can let Maddox off.

But if for example, Maddox is at home watching TV one night, and Darla's friends come up and bang on the door "this guy Kamal stabbed Darla to death at the bar downtown!" Maddox grabs his shotgun, asks where this Kamal lives, and tracks Kamal down to his place and shoots him. Kamal's girlfriend sees this happen and runs to Kamal's brother's house "this guy named Maddox killed Kamal!" Now society can't have people running around shooting eachother willy-nilly based on rumors, and some arm of society such as police or a court has to get intervene before Kamal's brother kills Maddox or some such, and sort out what actually happened. To prevent this sort of disorder, some sort of punishment needs to be levied onto Maddox, just like society punishes people who run red lights. This is where 'rules utilitiarianism' differs from 'act' specific ethics, which would simply say "good riddance to Kamal"

To insert 'ethical relativism' into this, say that Kamal, Darla, and Maddox are all part of the African-descended community, in a city/state/country in which no significant portion of the tax proceeds are derived from the African-descended community, and a disproportionate number of killings in that city/state/country occur within the African-descended community. The city/state/country as a whole, or the majority/voters/rulers of that community, may decide that policing the African-descended community is too much of a hassle and expense, and to avoid intervention in the matter and simply allow Maddox and Kamal's family and friends to fight it out.

Smaland
11-04-2009, 03:29 AM
For me, an act is right or wrong depending on whether Scripture commands or bans it.

Anthropos
11-04-2009, 08:23 AM
You forgot about virtue ethics, what would be closest to me, I guess; traditional virtue ethics, to be more precise.

I do feel though that there is a nauseating moralist tendency in 'ethics' and 'moral philosophy'. "Theologism", e.g., does not appeal to me for the reason that what comes to mind, and what is perfectly fit under that heading, is someone who views Scripture as a dry collection of ethical commands and someone who thinks that he knows God's will on every occasion. I don't feel at home there.

Loxias
11-04-2009, 08:25 AM
I have to admit I know very little about virtue ethics. Can you explain a bit more about it and why it is the one that corresponds the most to you?

Anthropos
11-04-2009, 08:53 AM
I have to admit I know very little about virtue ethics. Can you explain a bit more about it and why it is the one that corresponds the most to you?

Virtues were always spoken of in any traditional context such as the canonical sources of various traditions. Virtues were also spoken of by many of the Greek philosophers of the classical era. The New Testament of Christianity does also mention virtues, e.g. in Paul's epistles, where several are mentioned by name, in the first epistle of John where Love plays an important role, as well as in the Gospel, where virtues are often explained by way of parables and events in the life of Jesus. The Christian virtue of Love is thus revealed in Luke 7:36-50:

And one of the Pharisees desired him that he would eat with him. And he went into the Pharisee's house, and sat down to meat. And, behold, a woman in the city, which was a sinner, when she knew that Jesus sat at meat in the Pharisee's house, brought an alabaster box of ointment, And stood at his feet behind him weeping, and began to wash his feet with tears, and did wipe them with the hairs of her head, and kissed his feet, and anointed them with the ointment. Now when the Pharisee which had bidden him saw it, he spake within himself, saying, This man, if he were a prophet, would have known who and what manner of woman this is that toucheth him: for she is a sinner. And Jesus answering said unto him, Simon, I have somewhat to say unto thee. And he saith, Master, say on. There was a certain creditor which had two debtors: the one owed five hundred pence, and the other fifty. And when they had nothing to pay, he frankly forgave them both. Tell me therefore, which of them will love him most? Simon answered and said, I suppose that he, to whom he forgave most. And he said unto him, Thou hast rightly judged. And he turned to the woman, and said unto Simon, Seest thou this woman? I entered into thine house, thou gavest me no water for my feet: but she hath washed my feet with tears, and wiped them with the hairs of her head. Thou gavest me no kiss: but this woman since the time I came in hath not ceased to kiss my feet. My head with oil thou didst not anoint: but this woman hath anointed my feet with ointment. Wherefore I say unto thee, Her sins, which are many, are forgiven; for she loved much: but to whom little is forgiven, the same loveth little. And he said unto her, Thy sins are forgiven. And they that sat at meat with him began to say within themselves, Who is this that forgiveth sins also? And he said to the woman, Thy faith hath saved thee; go in peace.

A virtue is something that comes from within and from above, from the heart; it is something the exercise of which requires a change of heart.

Black Turlogh
11-04-2009, 09:26 AM
Well this is all very technical, isn't it? Ultimately I just ask myself whether what I'm doing is just, fair or noble. Whether it's something, if I were to walk outside my current circumstances and look at from the outside in, I would admire or something I would frown upon. In the end, if casting aside the prospect of gaining my immediate desires means that my conscience won't weigh heavily upon me, I find myself being far more content and at ease than I otherwise would be.

Lutiferre
11-04-2009, 11:49 AM
I agree with Alasdair McIntyre and his central work, After Virtue (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/After_Virtue), that the only real options are Aristotle (Thomas Aquinas) and Nietzsche. Anything else is ultimately just a subjective abstraction which amounts to nihilism by failing to give any real foundation to morality, and hence supports Nietzsches case.

Sol Invictus
11-04-2009, 11:52 AM
Cool thread. I chose ethical relativism, or:

"The act is generally judged to be right by one's culture or group."

If it is good for the people, and is in harmony with the people, then yes I deem it to be right.


For me, an act is right or wrong depending on whether Scripture commands or bans it.

I also support this as well. And I think it is in harmony with my choice of Ethical Relativism.

Lutiferre
11-04-2009, 12:09 PM
Cool thread. I chose ethical relativism, or:

"The act is generally judged to be right by one's culture or group."

If it is good for the people, and is in harmony with the people, then yes I deem it to be right.
So I guess human sacrifice is alright as long as parents would love to burn their children for better crops?

And if it just has to be "good for the people", then you run into the collectivist justifications for immoral actions of the Marxists and Communists, and can practically speaking just as well advocate Stalinism.


I also support this as well. And I think it is in harmony with my choice of Ethical Relativism.
How so? Christianity claims to be universally valid and authoritative, regardless of cultural relativities.

Loxias
11-04-2009, 12:19 PM
I agree with Alasdair McIntyre and his central work, After Virtue (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/After_Virtue), that the only real options are Aristotle (Thomas Aquinas) and Nietzsche. Anything else is ultimately just a subjective abstraction which amounts to nihilism by failing to give any real foundation to morality, and hence supports Nietzsches case.

Can you clarify to the few profanes here (at least me) what ideas and views you refer to as the Artistotle and Nietzsche cases?

Edit : the link does give quite a lot of explanation, actually. But feel free to add stuff if you think it's important.

Lutiferre
11-04-2009, 12:26 PM
Can you clarify to the few profanes here (at least me) what ideas and views you refer to as the Artistotle and Nietzsche cases?

Edit : the link does give quite a lot of explanation, actually. But feel free to add stuff if you think it's important.
"Aristotle" refers simply to Christian/Aristotelian ethics which are based on telos (end/goal/purpose and hence, value), which is also what Anthropos referred to as virtue ethics, whereas "Nietzsche" refers to the dissolution of all such "intrinsic" cross-subjective teloi and values in favour of.. well, in McIntyres words, moral solipsism and acting simply according to impulses.

Monolith
11-04-2009, 12:44 PM
You forgot about virtue ethics, what would be closest to me, I guess; traditional virtue ethics, to be more precise.

Seconded.

Aside from that, I tend to adhere to moral realism and act utilitarianism.

Lutiferre
11-04-2009, 12:59 PM
Just for the sake of interest, and since I randomly came across this, I will post a really speculative perspective on ethics which I am almost certain none of you have ever lended even a thought.

You should read it on the link since it has a lot of links to understand what it's about, that didn't get copied here, but I will post the text just for reference as well: Quantum Ethics? Suffering in the Multiverse (http://www.abolitionist.com/multiverse.html)


Quantum Ethics?
Suffering in the Multiverse

The Abolitionist Project (http://www.abolitionist.com/index.html) lays out the case for abolishing suffering via biotechnology; and predicts that our posthuman descendants will live, in effect, happily ever after. A heart-warming tale? Yes, in a sense. However, any rosy conception of the world which this scenario inspires is potentially misleading. Here are three depressing reasons why:

First, on a "block universe" interpretation of the world - mandated by the Theory of General Relativity - the Darwinian Era perpetually occupies the space-time coordinates it does. The pain and suffering of primordial life can't be erased. At best, we are poised merely to determine its boundaries. A full scientific understanding of time remains elusive. Yet barring some unimaginable revolution in our entire logico-conceptual scheme, rational agents can't extinguish the frightful events happening elsewhere in space-time. The past is fixed and unalterable. Admittedly, the feasibility of backward-causation suggested by quantum-mechanical "delayed-choice" experiments is a tantalizing complication to this generalisation. A further complication is that quantum cosmology suggests that future and past quasi-classical histories alike are non-unique. But we can safely state that even the most godlike of our post-human successors can't eradicate their terrible origins.

In practice, even professed utilitarians are much more relaxed about tragedies occurring in what we call the past, especially the distant past, than about what unfolds in the future. This statement of human psychology is reflected in our asymmetric attitudes to our own past and future pain. Compare one's joyful relief on leaving the dentist with one's dread at an imminent dental appointment. By the same token, mature posthumans - for whom the Darwinian Era belongs to distant antiquity - may find the ghastliness of their ancestors' suffering seems less important, "less real" - than everyday Heaven-on-Earth, assuming (problematically) that future life chooses to contemplate its dreadful birth-pangs at all. But whether such primitive nastiness is commemorated or forgotten, the horrors of Darwinian life are a fixture of Reality; and these horrors are not diminished by spatio-temporal distance. Sub specie aeternitatis, all here-and-nows are equally real.

Secondly, our best fundamental theory of the world is quantum mechanics; and our best understanding of the quantum formalism suggests that we live in a Multiverse rather than a classical universe. Post-Everett quantum mechanics [i.e. the universal Schrödinger equation or its relativistic analogue without any ill-motivated "collapse of the wave function"] discloses the existence of a multitude of macroscopic branches rather than a single unique history. The fact that most of these classically inequivalent branches interfere only minimally with each other explains the popular soubriquet "Many Worlds", though the term can mislead the unwary. In the vast majority of these macroscopic world branches, no complex structures can arise, let alone sentient life; the coupling constants of the forces of Nature and other "fundamental" parameters in such branches are wrong. Their sterility still leaves googols of branches where information-bearing self-replicators evolve via natural selection. Critically, in only a small minority of these populated branches of the Multiverse can intelligent agents arise who are able to eradicate the biological substrates of their own suffering. In branches where, for example, a meteorite didn't wipe out the non-avian dinosaurs, Darwinian life "red in tooth and claw" presumably continues indefinitely. This is because only language-using tool-users can ever master the rudiments of science; and then go on to devise the biotechnology needed to rewrite their own genetic code and redesign their global ecosystem. To the best of our knowledge, no reptile could ever do this. Yes, we should beware of naļve, anthropocentric definitions of intelligence; but this cognitive constraint rules out self-emancipation in the overwhelming bulk of branches of the Multiverse that support life.

To advance such a conjecture isn't dogmatically to claim that only members of the genus Homo could ever initiate a post-Darwinian transition. Passage through this choke-point may be possible via species in other biological taxa thanks to the phenomenon of convergent evolution. We simply don't know. Thus if ape-like marsupials were ever to evolve in Australia, for instance, then it is possible that one species would also have stumbled on the suite of adaptations needed to liberate their own phenotypes and then the rest of the living world. But either way, most life-supporting branches of the Multiverse are inaccessible to techno-scientific agency. And TV sci-fi dramas aside, we can't do anything about life in this (comparative) abundance of god-forsaken worlds. Interstellar rescue missions are in theory feasible if sentient life exists elsewhere in our galaxy, and maybe even our local galactic supercluster. [Unless our understanding of physics is fundamentally wrong, the accelerating expansion of the universe precludes full-blown cosmic-engineering] But we can't tamper with other branches of the universal wavefunction. The evolution of the universal wavefunction is continuous, linear, unitary and deterministic. One may hope modern physics is mistaken; but if it isn't, we're stuck.

One practical implication of the reality of other macroscopic branches is to compel a systematic reassessment of our notions of "acceptable" risk. Recognition of the freakish unlikelihood of various desired outcomes does not stop most of us playing the National Lottery; but the converse doesn't hold. Thus we are accustomed to thinking that various nasty scenarios are of negligible likelihood, and even vanishingly small possibility; and then disregarding them altogether in the way we behave. Yet if a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, then all these physically possible events actually happen, albeit only in low-density branches of the universal wavefunction. So one should always act "unnaturally" responsibly, driving one's car not just slowly and cautiously, for instance, but ultracautiously. This is because one should aim to minimise the number of branches in which one injures anyone, even if leaving a trail of mayhem is, strictly speaking, unavoidable. If a motorist doesn't leave a (low-density) trail of mayhem, then quantum mechanics is false. This systematic re-evaluation of ethically acceptable risk needs to be adopted world-wide. Post-Everett decision theory should be placed on a sound institutional, research and socio-economic footing, not just pursued by responsible Everettistas on an individual basis. The ramifications of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics are ethically too momentous for purely private initiative. Our moral intuitions fail because natural selection equipped us to deal with a classical world rather than a Multiverse. Human beings tend to discount "remote" risks by treating the probability of such events as zero. Ultimately, perhaps ethical decision-making should be performed by quantum supercomputers doing felicific calculus across world-branches; quantum ethics may be computationally too difficult even for enhanced post-human brains. For it's worth stressing that Everett's relative state interpretation of quantum mechanics doesn't propose "anything goes". The branching structure of the Multiverse precisely replicates the probabilities predicted by the Born rule. There are no branches supporting civilisations in the middle of the Sun. Nor are there any branches where, for instance, one of the world's religions is true (as distinct from believed to be true): Everett is not a theory of magic. But the universal wavefunction does encode hell-worlds beyond our worst nightmares, albeit at low density.

Perhaps it's worth noting, too, that many physicists still don't accept Everett, or at least suspend judgement. But this is typically more out of incredulity at what the equations [and experimental evidence] are telling us, not because of any evidence that quantum mechanics breaks down at large scales.

Thirdly, contemporary theoretical physics suggests that even the multiverse of Everettian quantum mechanics doesn't remotely exhaust the totality of suffering. For there may be googols of other multiverses. Suffering may exist in other post-inflationary domains far beyond our light cone; and in countless other "pocket universes" on variants of Linde's eternal chaotic inflation scenario; and in myriad parent and child universes on Smolin's cosmological natural selection hypothesis; and among a few googols of the other 10500+ different vacua of string theory; and even in innumerable hypothetical "Boltzmann brains", vacuum fluctuations in the (very) distant future of "our" Multiverse. These possibilities are not mutually exclusive. Nor are they exhaustive. Thus some theorists believe we live in a cyclic universe, for instance; and that the Big Bang is really the Big Bounce.

Of course, the theories alluded to above are speculative. They are far removed from our everyday experience. Even if one or more of these theories is correct, it is tempting implicitly to suppose that the suffering of sentient beings occupying such realms is (somehow) less real than our own: metaphysical theories imply, in some sense, only metaphysical suffering. This comfortable assumption would be wrong-headed, not to say complacent. If any of the above hypotheses are substantively true, then the suffering of victims embedded therein is no less real than our own. Moreover in the case of other branches of "our" multiverse, it's debatable whether the branches are even "metaphysical". Not merely is their existence implied by empirically well-attested theory. Strictly speaking, interference effects from other quasi-classical branches never disappear; they merely become vanishingly small. Interference effects between different "worlds" can in principle be quantified by decoherence functionals. Their inferred real existence isn't just airy philosophizing.

* * *

Faced with this fathomless immensity of suffering, a compassionate mind may become morally shell-shocked, numbed by the sheer enormity of it all. Googlolplexes of Holocausts are too mind-wrenching to contemplate. We might conclude that the amount of suffering in Reality must be infinite - and hence any bid to minimise such infinite suffering would still leave an infinite amount behind. A sense of moral urgency risks succumbing to a hopeless fatalism.

Thankfully such moral defeatism is premature. For it is not at all clear that physically realised infinity is a cognitively meaningful notion. Infinities that crop up in the equations of theoretical physics have always hitherto turned out to be vicious; and yield meaningless results. Doubts about physically embodied infinity arise, not because one presumes to "tell God [or the Devil?] how to construct the world", but because of doubts that the claim of physically realised infinity is well-defined or even intelligible. Granted, some kind of "as if" platonism - and "Cantor's paradise" [or demonic bestiary] - may be mathematically fruitful. Yet it's doubtful whether Reality supports any abstract objects, let alone an ontology of physically realised infinities, notionally large or small. If Reality is indeed finite rather than infinite, then the suffering in the world is presumably infinitesimal compared to truly infinite suffering. So we should be grateful for small mercies. But the sheer scale of such suffering as indubitably does exist still swamps human comprehension. Mercifully, we can't grasp the potential real-world implications of our own notation.

The tenor of this narrative would be contested by many non-utilitarians. Why focus exclusively on suffering? Lighten up! There is so much more to life. Why not think about life's joys? Temperamental optimists will tend to have mood-congruent thoughts about the plenitude of unsuspected wonders that modern physics' expanded vision of Reality entails rather than focus on the nasty side of existence. But if you are an ethical utilitarian, then the relative importance of anything isn't a mere subjective value-judgement but a matter of objective fact, written into the fabric of the world. Extreme emotional intensity of experience morally matters most. Since the extremes of suffering dwarf the mundane pleasures of Darwinian life, they should presumably dominate any narrative outline of its features. And Darwinian life is statistically far more common in the Multiverse than post-Darwinian life.

A classical utilitarian might respond that it is more appropriate to focus on the unimaginable glories of our superhappy descendants rather than dwelling on the nastiness of Darwinian life. Yes, branches supporting such sublime superhappiness may be unrepresentative of sentience in the Multiverse as a whole - though the numbers become complicated if superintelligence hypothetically converts the accessible universe into blissful computronium. But assuming that the intensity of well-being of posthuman superbliss will surpass the comparatively dim awareness of ancestral minds, possibly by several orders of magnitude, then such superbliss matters far more than dim Darwinian consciousness too. As a consequence, posthuman superbliss should dominate our narrative. Analogously, any history of contemporary life on Earth should focus, not on its inordinate number of beetles, but on human beings. The negative utilitarian, for whom minimising suffering is the absolute moral priority, will of course find such a response unsatisfactory. There is nothing dim about Darwinian consciousness if, say, you are a grieving parent who has just lost a child. Or, more prosaically, if you have a toothache.

This discussion contains a controversial assumption which if confounded will make the story sketched here even darker. The controversial assumption is that when intelligent agents have attained the technical means to abolish the biological substrates of suffering, they will almost invariably do so. Thus by implication, suffering will be abolished in the great preponderance of branches where humans [or their functional counterparts] decipher their own genetic source code and develop biotechnology. A subsequent cross-branch reproductive revolution of designer babies is effectively inevitable. This generalisation might seem an extraordinarily reckless prediction. Forecasting is perilous enough even if one is a classical one-worlder. So predicting that a highly speculative scenario (i.e. the abolition of suffering) will eventually play out in the vast bulk of branches of macroscopic worlds with inhabitants attaining our level of technological development - and conversely, predicting that only a vanishingly small density of such branches will retain suffering indefinitely - might seem foolhardy in the extreme. Perhaps so. Recall how opiophobia still retards the medical treatment of even "physical" pain. But let's suppose instead that the analogy with anaesthetics holds up. After the discovery of general anaesthesia, its surgical use was contentious for a decade or two. But pain-free surgery soon became universally accepted. In our current state of ignorance, there is no way we can rigorously calculate the probability density of branches of the Multiverse where anaesthesia was discovered and rejected. But at worst, it's a fair to say the proportion of branches is extremely small. Branches where governments outlaw pain-free surgery aren't sociologically credible. Of course the abolition of psychological distress is a less clear-cut case than anaesthesia. Technologies to abolish mental pain are in their infancy. But let's assume that in future they can be made as technically clean and successful as surgical anaesthesia. In what proportion of such branches will some or all people reject mental superhealth indefinitely? Again, a case can be made (though it won't be attempted here) that the proportion will be vanishingly small. Unfortunately, the proportion of life-supporting branches of the Multiverse whose dominant species reaches this stage of technical development is extremely small too. So the anticipated local success of the abolitionist project touted here is not as wonderful news as it sounds.

What practical lessons, if any, should be drawn from this bleak analysis of Reality? Assume, provisionally at any rate, a utilitarian ethic. The abolitionist project follows naturally, in "our" parochial corner of Hilbert space at least. On its completion, if not before, we should aim to develop superintelligence to maximise the well-being of the fragment of the cosmos accessible to beneficent intervention. And when we are sure - absolutely sure - that we have done literally everything we can do to eradicate suffering elsewhere, perhaps we should forget about its very existence.

David Pearce
(2008)

Lulletje Rozewater
11-04-2009, 02:28 PM
A rule utilitarianism that recognizes that allowing for broad ethical egoism generally produces the most good due to human differences and limits, with aspects of ethical relativism.

For an example of how my 'rules utilitiarianism' works, take this example:




Assuming the killer, Kamal, had no legitimate reason to kill the daughter (Darla) of the man (Maddox) and it was not an accident:


Society needs a rule against murder, partly because people don't want to walk outside every day having to worry about someone killing them, also the population would get reduced to near zero pretty quick and in general society would cease to function. Thus, what Kamal did to Darla must be judged wrong, and punished by society. Preferred punishment: execution by the state/society.

What Maddox did to Kamal does not fit into the above. Most people are not murderers, and we don't like those people anyways, so creating an environment where murderers don't have to worry about retribution is not needed or desired. Likewise, Kamal is probably a net detriment to society, as are murderers in general, so this does not apply either. So, as a rule society should not punish Maddox for the same reasons or in the same way as Kamal.

The only problem with Maddox's actions is that he may not be the best judge of whether Kamal actually killed Darla, or whether it was entirely purposeful and unjustified, so society may adopt a rule in general against 'retribution' killings in general to prevent the possibility of Maddox killing Kamal when it was actually Juwaun that killed Darla, or Kamal killed Darla because she was trying to rob him. Also the possibility that these things can spiral out of control into family/clan feuds which can disrupt and endanger society as a whole. Since Maddox is a good guy, and the nature of the crime is entirely different from what Kamal did to Darla (murder vs public disorder offense), a much lesser punishment is desired. Preferred punishment: monetary fine equivalent to an average week's pay in that country, one weekend in jail.

This punishment can be waived if Maddox can prove that he knew without a doubt at the time he killed Kamal that Kamal had indeed killed Darla without any justification. For example, Maddox and Darla are in a car at a deserted stoplight, and Kamal, who is unknown to them, opens the door, sticks a gun in Darla's face, and orders her out of the car. Darla attempts to close the door and drive away, Kamal pulls the trigger and blows her face off, then realizing what he has done takes off running down the sidewalk running as fast as he can. Maddox, enraged, gets out of the car, pulls out his gun, and shoots Kamal several times in the back, then walks up to where Kamal is lying on the sidewalk and puts another bullet into his head. For this, we can let Maddox off.

But if for example, Maddox is at home watching TV one night, and Darla's friends come up and bang on the door "this guy Kamal stabbed Darla to death at the bar downtown!" Maddox grabs his shotgun, asks where this Kamal lives, and tracks Kamal down to his place and shoots him. Kamal's girlfriend sees this happen and runs to Kamal's brother's house "this guy named Maddox killed Kamal!" Now society can't have people running around shooting eachother willy-nilly based on rumors, and some arm of society such as police or a court has to get intervene before Kamal's brother kills Maddox or some such, and sort out what actually happened. To prevent this sort of disorder, some sort of punishment needs to be levied onto Maddox, just like society punishes people who run red lights. This is where 'rules utilitiarianism' differs from 'act' specific ethics, which would simply say "good riddance to Kamal"

To insert 'ethical relativism' into this, say that Kamal, Darla, and Maddox are all part of the African-descended community, in a city/state/country in which no significant portion of the tax proceeds are derived from the African-descended community, and a disproportionate number of killings in that city/state/country occur within the African-descended community. The city/state/country as a whole, or the majority/voters/rulers of that community, may decide that policing the African-descended community is too much of a hassle and expense, and to avoid intervention in the matter and simply allow Maddox and Kamal's family and friends to fight it out.

Interesting,but why are laws made???
Certainly not for the people.
For thousands of years the rule of nature was prime and for thousands of years tribes-small communities did not slaughter each other out of existence.
Does the factor predator/prey prevented the early humans from wholesale slaughter????

Or has the priestly class to do with the introduction of the laws(economic gain)

The greatest good for the greatest number of people??????? Could this be Utopian. ie some sort of longing but not yet achieved

The Law is applicable to the minority---criminals--- and very few people really benefit from the Law,because a Law makes criminals,not humans. A Law promotes curiosity.
Tell a kid:"Do not touch a hotplate". What does the kid do?????

[B]Only through pain can a human/animal grow and produce better offspring. No man-made law or ideals or theories can replace it.

No matter how we try,we can never domesticate a human being or a wild animal, tame it...... up to a point.

Liffrea
11-04-2009, 04:07 PM
Originally Posted by Boerseun
The Law is applicable to the minority---criminals--- and very few people really benefit from the Law

I think that’s probably simplistic to a degree, I’m sure most of us benefit from laws daily, when I purchase goods I benefit from laws protecting the rights of the consumer.

But we could argue there are are contractual regulatory laws and not necessarily defined by ethics, in which case consider this:

“Good people do not need laws”.

Plausible?

If we take law as an imposed system based upon the values of a minority (i.e. a social elite) imposed upon society then we may have a case. Not because people necessarily obey laws but because moral people don’t need a law book in order to live their lives.

As Sword of Vistula pointed out there are “soft universals” in morality, what is termed moral plurality, that cross human cultures. For example all societies frown upon murder, all societies tend towards stable environments in order to raise children, the family unit is a universal. As far as it benefits humans to co-operate (that’s most of the time) we could argue that certain states of “morality” are perhaps biologically inherent.

To go back to the quote above if one has an internal sense of ethics, I believe one study termed higher order ethics as an actual internally developed sense of ethics rather than imposed social norms or laws, then why would one need law? Surely “good people” do the “right thing” because they have a higher level of consciousness (honour if you like)?

SwordoftheVistula
11-04-2009, 07:30 PM
And if it just has to be "good for the people", then you run into the collectivist justifications for immoral actions of the Marxists and Communists, and can practically speaking just as well advocate Stalinism.


In the long term, socialism turned out to not be "good for the people", because they all ended up living in impoverished repressive countries. If it had worked, most people probably wouldn't have a problem with it.


So I guess human sacrifice is alright as long as parents would love to burn their children for better crops?

Again, if burning a child could actually produce better crops and prevent a famine and save the lives of hundreds or thousands of other children, this might be justified, except there is no scientific proof that it does, so we don't do it. We do in a way 'sacrifice' people all the time for the greater good of society: for example, we could save many lives by banning the automobile as a mode of transport, but it would also create enormous problems for society.



For thousands of years the rule of nature was prime and for thousands of years tribes-small communities did not slaughter each other out of existence.
Does the factor predator/prey prevented the early humans from wholesale slaughter????

Or has the priestly class to do with the introduction of the laws(economic gain)

True, but as society grew, more formal rules were needed. It is easy for a grandfather at the head of an extended family to say "don't hit your cousin" and expect compliance, much harder for a mayor to say to an entire city "don't hit any of your fellow townsfolk" and expect compliance.




The Law is applicable to the minority---criminals--- and very few people really benefit from the Law,because a Law makes criminals,not humans.

It depends. If you make a law against something few people want to do anyways, like "do not have sex with prepubescant children", then you could say the vast majority of society benefits, since everyone is a prepubescant child at some point but few of them ever desire sex with prepubescant children. If you make a law against something many people want to do, like "do not produce goods for your own personal use and sale" then few people would really benefit from this Law in the long term.



A Law promotes curiosity.
Tell a kid:"Do not touch a hotplate". What does the kid do?????

Depends. If he's seen people tortured to death in the town square for touching hotplates, he's probably not going to touch the hotplate.


Only through pain can a human/animal grow and produce better offspring. No man-made law or ideals or theories can replace it.

No matter how we try,we can never domesticate a human being or a wild animal, tame it...... up to a point.

True, so laws should be made which correlate with human nature as much as possible, and allow people to act in their own instinctive nature as much as possible.

Lutiferre
11-04-2009, 09:28 PM
In the long term, socialism turned out to not be "good for the people", because they all ended up living in impoverished repressive countries. If it had worked, most people probably wouldn't have a problem with it.
I was speaking of the attitude behind it, that anything should be done in a collectivist manner, strictly for the "good of the people", in which the individual is left out of the equation.


Again, if burning a child could actually produce better crops and prevent a famine and save the lives of hundreds or thousands of other children, this might be justified, except there is no scientific proof that it does, so we don't do it. We do in a way 'sacrifice' people all the time for the greater good of society: for example, we could save many lives by banning the automobile as a mode of transport, but it would also create enormous problems for society.
But that was not what I addressed. I addressed the idea that what is good or bad is just culturally relative. Obviously, we both agree that it's bad to burn children in the belief that it benefits the crops regardless of what your culture thinks about it, because the fact is that that is not the case, as you say.

On the other hand, your post seems to suggest that science should be moral arbiter, which isn't preferrable either. The scientific method is fundamentally speaking not designed to prescribe moral behaviour, only to study it and inform moral judgements with more data, but never to make those moral judgements. Otherwise we end up with things like social darwinism. There is scientific proof that there are many ways in which killing/disposing of select groups of populations could be beneficial to society; for one, the ones that are unhealthy/sick and require too many resources relative to their productivity/possible merits and spread weaker genetic, not to mention memetic profiles.

Sol Invictus
11-04-2009, 09:36 PM
So I guess human sacrifice is alright as long as parents would love to burn their children for better crops?

How so? Christianity claims to be universally valid and authoritative, regardless of cultural relativities.

Well I think you're stretching it a bit here. In my society, we don't burn children for better crops. Canada's agricultural system is among the best in the world, actually. And Christianity is universally valid, of course, in our western societies, and is in full harmony with it. Canada is a Christian Nation.

Lutiferre
11-04-2009, 09:40 PM
Well I think you're stretching it a bit here. In my society, we don't burn children for better crops.
I never claimed you did. But they certainly do and have done in other cultures, which by a cultural-relativist ethic, would be acceptable.


And Christianity is universally valid, of course, in our western societies,
What does that mean? You believe it is true that the Christian God created the universe, but only in Western societies, but somehow in Africa God isn't the creator of the universe? What a petty god!

That is certainly not the Christian God. Read your bible; it says in the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. The heavens and the earth is not confined to "Western societies". Christianity claims absolute universality.


and is in full harmony with it.
I disagree. Christianity is not really in harmony with any society, except a monastery.

Sol Invictus
11-04-2009, 10:00 PM
I never claimed you did. But they certainly do and have done in other cultures, which by a cultural-relativist ethic, would be acceptable.

I'm not concerned by what they do in other cultures, it makes no difference to me what-so-ever, and we have no right to say what's acceptable and what's not outside our own societies, especially when we are worse off than many of the societies we look down upon in some respects.


What does that mean? You believe it is true that the Christian God created the universe, but only in Western societies, but somehow in Africa God isn't the creator of the universe? What a petty god!

I am saying it's universally valid, as you said. But in regards to my society, we hold this to be truth.


That is certainly not the Christian God. Read your bible; it says in the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. The heavens and the earth is not confined to "Western societies". Christianity claims absolute universality.

Like I said, I am not concerned with anyone outside my society. I try to live my life right by God, and I can't be too concerned about what others are doing.

Lutiferre
11-04-2009, 10:05 PM
I'm not concerned by what they do in other cultures, it makes no difference to me what-so-ever,
I'd argue that it does. But anyway, Christianity is concerned with other cultures, even if you aren't; it's concerned with the whole of mankind. Jesus told to evangelize to all the gentile nations, not just one, and you are just as much gentile from the point of view of a 1st century Jew as an African.


and we have no right to say what's acceptable and what's not outside our own societies,
I agree. But does God, if you hold the bible to be divinely inspired?

Sol Invictus
11-04-2009, 10:15 PM
I'd argue that it does. But anyway, Christianity is concerned with other cultures, even if you aren't;

And thank God for that. And there are braver, better men out there than me who devote their lives to it. But I'm more concerned, from a Christian point of view, of living by the law, and putting my trust in Him. I'm not going to drop everything and go on a Missionary expedition to the eastern block or Africa, because there's more of that to be done here in my own society.


it's concerned with the whole of mankind. Jesus told to evangelize to all the gentile nations, not just one, and you are just as much gentile from the point of view of a 1st century Jew as an African.

True, but you are not living in sin if you refuse to spread the Gospel to every foreigner you encounter. I think He was more concerned about how you live your life, and how you treat your fellow man.


I agree. But does God, if you hold the bible to be divinely inspired?

God would probably want me to spread His word for the sake of all mankind as he told the apostles. But like I said, I think I would be much happier in the knowledge that the people in my neighbourhood were Christians, not Muslims, nor Jews. And I think God would be too.

Lutiferre
11-04-2009, 10:25 PM
And thank God for that. And there are braver, better men out there than me who devote their lives to it. But I'm more concerned, from a Christian point of view, of living by the law, and putting my trust in Him. I'm not going to drop everything and go on a Missionary expedition to the eastern block or Africa, because there's more of that to be done here in my own society.
Of course. I was speaking more about general principes than what course of action you are to choose as an individual.

SwordoftheVistula
11-05-2009, 05:54 AM
I was speaking of the attitude behind it, that anything should be done in a collectivist manner, strictly for the "good of the people", in which the individual is left out of the equation.

Societies are made up of individuals, so due to human differences, and the inability for any human to completely accurately determine what is best for any other human, much less a country full of them, most of the time the best thing for society as a whole is to let individuals make their own choices. For example, if 1/3 of a country believes in Christianity, 1/3 of a country believes in Wicca, and the other 1/3 believes in none of them, the easiest way to create the most total happiness in society is to allow people to choose to follow either or no religion.

Or say you have a country that is 45% Christian, 45% Wicca, and 10% can't make up their mind. The rule that fits the collective best is 'no religion may attack the other or use the state to persecute eachother'. That way, Christians don't have to worry about being burned by witches, and witches don't have to worry about being burned by Christians. Since we can assume that to most people, being burned alive is significantly more disconcerting than the dissappointment of not being able to burn members of other religions alive, this rule creates the most happiness for society as a whole over the long term.



we end up with things like social darwinism. There is scientific proof that there are many ways in which killing/disposing of select groups of populations could be beneficial to society; for one, the ones that are unhealthy/sick and require too many resources relative to their productivity/possible merits and spread weaker genetic, not to mention memetic profiles.

:thumbs up

SteelRose
03-15-2010, 01:32 AM
other:

justice calculus:
One act is more rightful than another act if it results in a higher amount of net justice in the long term.

-This concept came from my own mind. I don't know whether or not one of the well-known philosophers had already thought of it. I did however adopt the word 'calculus' from Bentham's 'hedonistic calculus'.

Lithium
03-15-2010, 04:28 AM
"These Eight words the Rede fulfill:
Bide within the Law you must, in perfect Love and perfect Trust.
Live you must and let to live, fairly take and fairly give.
An Ye Harm None, Do What Ye Will"

safinator
02-10-2014, 11:52 AM
..

SkyBurn
02-10-2014, 12:00 PM
I've always been a huge fan of Utilitarianism. And more specifically, act utilitarianism. Nice thread.

arcticwolf
02-11-2014, 03:31 PM
Intent does determine if an act is ethical or not. Not just to me, that's the way it is.

Also
03-29-2014, 12:54 AM
I am a moral realist and a Christian, so I picked theologism.

de Burgh II
06-06-2014, 04:19 PM
I'd pick ethical egoism; you define your life by how you want to live it as an individual.

Breedingvariety
06-06-2014, 04:27 PM
Do what thou wilt... NOT!