Radojica
02-06-2010, 01:15 PM
Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Author: Juan Carlos Antúnez
Uploaded: Tuesday, 16 September, 2008
Intended Outcome
Wahhabism in B-H is an alien, small, but according to some sources growing tendency within B-H. It is relatively successful in recruiting young ‘converts’ from within the B-H moderate Muslim tradition circles. Wahhabism identifies mainstream Bosnian Muslims as false Muslims and even as enemies. It has some potential to result in growing, and even violent confrontation with moderate Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This could have serious ramifications for B-H in its efforts to maintain a pluralistic society, as well as complicate the International War on terrorism, by providing an ever safer environment for transient terrorists. If the Wahhabi reportedly growth tendency is not effectively stopped and reversed by the indigenous Muslim structures, the challenge of Wahhabism in B-H will have serious implications for the rest of Europe.
For most International Community (IC) personnel, this is the first time in their careers that they have had to deal with any kind of Islamic issue. Part of the local media, often biased by nationalistic or/and political interests, have tried to present the problem of Wahhabism in B-H as a growing tendency that is a threat to safety and security not only in the country but also in the rest of Europe. These media have used a discourse very similar to that used at the beginning of the 90’s, changing the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ by ‘Wahhabism’. On the other hand, media close to the Bosniak establishment have tried to ‘hide’ any evidence of the Wahhabi presence in B-H, or at least to play down the importance of the phenomenon.
Most of the information gathered until now is based on the regurgitation of media or biased spread of rumours without further confirmation. A serious analysis must try to define who is a real follower of Wahhabism, in order to avoid misinterpretations. Only then can proper proposals be developed for stopping the ‘reported’ growing tendency, and reversing it.
This is a paper on the situation of Wahhabism in B-H, intended to represent original thinking about the real picture of the Islamic community in the country and not a ‘regurgitation of open-source wisdom’.
The purpose of this document is to disseminate it to any member of the International Community who has to deal with this issue. For most of them, it is the first time they have had to get in touch with Islam. It is very important to defeat prejudices and misunderstandings that present obstacles to their proper job performances.
This ‘handbook’ would contribute by increasing the level of the information obtained by the above-mentioned personnel, and also contribute to a better IC relationship with the local community. The book would also contribute to the ability of IC personnel to distinguish what is a real threat to safety and security in B-H.
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina: short historical review
a) The Ottoman period
b) The Habsburg period
c) The Kingdom of Yugoslavia
d) The Second World War and the Tito period
3. Traditional Islam in B-H versus Wahabism / Salafism
4. Current Situation of Wahhabism / Salafism
a) ‘Wahhabi’ stream ‘loyal’ to the B-H Islamic community
b) ‘Wahhabi’ stream ‘outside’ the B-H Islamic community
i) Missionary Salafism / Wahhabism
ii) Jihadi Salafism / Wahhabism
5. Wahhabi links to international terrorism
6. Conclusions
1. Introduction
During and just after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) the relationship between the Bosniak part of the new state of B-H and the Muslim world were elevated to an unprecedented level. The financial support coming from foreign Muslim countries undermined the power of the well-organized and structured Bosnian Islamic community . The Islamic revival that began in Yugoslavia in the 70’s decade, which was developed in the framework of the local Muslim institutions and tradition, turned during and after the war to a more politicized revitalization influenced by foreign elements as the Arab fighters and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from the Middle East.
The Official Islamic community has been taking control of Islam in B-H since the end of the 1992-95 war. However, the Islamic Community has recognized the presence of religious organizations outside its control, and that one of these organizations is an obstacle for the legitimate activities of the wider Islamic Community.
Besides efforts on behalf of the Islamic Community to counter Wahhabi influence, ordinary believers are very often staunch opponents of Wahhabism and that might be the really insurmountable obstacle in front of Wahhabism in B-H. Since the end of the war the largely secular and European attitude among the Bosniaks has caused friction with foreign Islamic extremists. Different reports on incidents involving moderate and radical Muslims have shown that Wahhabi communities are willing to use coercive methods to spread their radical ideas. Traditional Muslims have also demonstrated that they can use radical methods to counter the spread of the Wahhabi movement in B-H.
Assessments show that, despite their efforts, the Wahhabi movement does not have many supporters in B-H. The general population is afraid of their fundamentalist approach towards religion. B-H Muslims want to maintain the local traditional and moderate version of Islam.
While the predominance of traditional ‘Bosniak’ Islam is widespread, the Wahhabi movement has established itself in some areas of B-H. Some radical groups have been determined in their efforts to publicly confront the role of the B-H official Islamic Community and its control over Islamic religion in B-H, using their radical Wahhabi interpretation of the Koran. Their actions have drawn the attention of both local and international media and security services.
An element of the local media, that often shows nationalist or political bias, has tried to show the problem of Wahhabism in B-H as a growing threat against the safety and security within B-H and perhaps within the rest of Europe. This media element has used a theme that is similar to that used at the beginning of the 1990’s, in changing the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ to ‘Wahhabism’. To counter this, media close to the Bosniak establishment, have tried to ‘hide’ any evidence of the Wahhabi presence in B-H or, at least, to downplay the significant of their influence.
2. Islam in B-H: short historical review
a) The Ottoman period
Islam in B-H was introduced by the Ottoman Empire. From 1463 to 1878 this empire ruled the area. So, the history of Islam in Bosnia is intimately connected to the history of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. The State within the Ottoman Empire, like other Muslim empires before, was organized according to the principle of organic unity of religious and political authority. They did however introduce an unprecedented hierarchy of Muslims scholars or Ulama. Muftis, Mudarris and Imams, together with judges, Qadis, and Friday prayer preachers, or Khatibs, were under state jurisdiction and they were very often state officials. Because this rigid organisation, there was little autonomy in interpretation and practice of Islam in Bosnia.
The Ottoman troops also brought the Sunni Islam and the official legal school to the Ottoman Empire: the Hanafi School of Jurisprudence1. The Hanafi is one of the four Sunni legal schools. It is the largest one and it is followed by approximately 30 percent of Muslims worldwide. This school is predominant in Turkey, northern Egypt, Levant, and amongst the Muslim communities of the Balkans, Central and South Asia, China, Russia and Ukraine. Hanafi School has been considered by many authors as the most open-minded School. Early Hanafism was associated with the partisans of Ra’y (translation: Opinion). Other schools, however, especially Hanbalism, that wanted to base everything on formal reports about the prophetic Sunna, grew out of the party of Hadith. This has been cast as ‘rationalism vs. traditionalism’. According to the Hanafi School, the Iytihad, or individual reasoning, is often a used source of the Sharia, or Islamic Law, together with customs or 'Urf, hence a degree of flexibility in interpretation.(1)
b) The Habsburg period
In July 1878 the Congress of European powers held in Berlin, gave Habsburg monarchy the right to occupy and administer Bosnia. The Bosniak resisted the occupying Habsburg forces but their three-month resistance was eventually crushed in October 1878.
The relations between religion and state in the Habsburg monarchy were based upon the concept of ‘recognized religious communities’ which was adopted in 1874. According to this concept, the state guarantees freedom of conscience, belief and private manifestations of religious beliefs and practice.
The Habsburg government introduced this concept in Bosnia. Six religious communities were given the status of ‘recognized religions’: Islamic, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Evangelic and Judaic. The status of Islam dramatically changed. Instead of being the basic principle of social cohesion as it was in the Ottoman times, it now became one of several ‘recognized religions’ within a non-Muslim state. The Bosniaks became a religious minority instead of being a part of the ruling elite.
This change brought about a new challenge to the Bosniaks: to build up a system of the administration of Islamic affairs that would not be identical with the organization of the state. Christians and Jews in Bosnia were in comparative advantage. Under the Ottomans they already had a separate communal organization, which enabled them to easily adapt to the Habsburg regime. Relying upon Ottoman heritage and responding to new challenges during the first two decades of Habsburg rule, the Bosniaks built a new administration of Islamic affairs. This system included religious hierarchy or 'ilmyya, religious education or maarif, endowments or waqf and sharia courts for religious issues.
The system was gradually built through the struggle over the prerogatives for the appointment of key officials, allocation of funding and the running of institutions. The struggle ended on 15 April 1909 when the Habsburg monarch approved the Statute for autonomous administration of Islamic endowments and educational affairs.
The basic features of the administration of Islamic affairs envisaged in the Statute of 1909 were the creation of a council of ulama headed by the Rais Ul Ulama and the introduction of autonomy and elections into the administration of endowments and religious schools.
c) The Kingdom of Yugoslavia
In 1918 the Habsburg monarchy disintegrated and Bosnia was incorporated in a new South Slav state, initially called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The administration of Islamic affairs in Bosnia, as developed in the Habsburg times, continued to function. The Muslims in other parts of Yugoslavia had a separate religious administration.
This state of affairs lasted until 1930, when the new regime of the Yugoslav King Aleksandar Karađorđević decided to introduce a unified administration of religious affairs for all Muslims in the country and virtually took over the control of that administration, according to his ideology of ‘Yugoslav Unitarism’, which viewed different South Slav ethnic groups as one nation and attended to eliminate any organization alongside ethnic criteria.
The state control over the Yugoslav Islamic Community was, to some extent, relaxed in 1936, when a Bosniak-based political party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, joined a coalition government in Belgrade. The relaxation of state control over the community did not mean the return of autonomy from 1909. Rather, a new type of influence was introduced, that of a Muslim political party.
According to the 1936 Yugoslav Islamic Community Constitution, the seat of Rais Ul Ulema, which had been moved during the previous period to Belgrade, returned to Sarajevo.
d) The Second World War and the Tito period
The World War Two broke out in 1939 and the Nazis and their collaborationists occupied Bosnia, together with other parts of Yugoslavia. The leadership of the Yugoslav Islamic Community stuck to the policy of keeping the existing administration of Islamic affairs intact until the war ended.
The end of the war in 1945 was accompanied by the change of state organization and political regime in the country. The Unitarian concept of Yugoslavia was replaced by that of federation, kingdom by republic and parliamentarian democracy by socialist ‘people’s democracy’. These changes greatly affected the position of Islam, as well as other religions, and the organization of the Islamic community .
The socialist regime proclaimed ‘the separation of church from state’ and the principle that ‘religion is a private affair of the citizens’. These principles of secular state were interpreted in socialist practice as subjugation of religious communities to state as ‘allies of the capitalists’ and the persecution of those known to be believers.
The change affected in the social, political and legal positions of religion in Bosnia affected all segments of the administration of Islamic affairs. First, Sharia courts were abolished (5 March 1946) and the Islamic law lost its binding legal force for the Muslims.
Second, in 1952 the government closed all elementary religious maktabs and left only one secondary school, the ‘Gazi Husrevbeg’ Madrasa in Sarajevo, to prepare future imams and khatibs. Religious instruction to the ordinary believers could be given only during weekends in mosques and even that legal possibility was restricted by the policy of the local authorities.
Third, waqf property was largely expropriated and nationalized between 1945 and 1958. During the late 1960s, the socialist regime in Yugoslavia became more liberal. Consequently, more space for activities was given to religious communities. At the same time, the Federal Constitution of Yugoslavia of 1968 gave more power to federal units. These developments found their reflection in the Constitution of the Islamic Community of 5 November 1968.
e) The Islamic revival
During the 1970s and 1980s, Bosnia and other parts of Yugoslavia witnessed Islamic revival.
The Islamic revival in B-H started in the 1970s due to several factors:
- a certain aperture of the then Yugoslav regime.
- an improved economic situation.
- the graduation of a new generation of young Muslims intellectuals from Yugoslav and Middle Eastern universities.
- global trends in the Muslim world that began in the Petroleum Crisis in 1973 and culminated in the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
- the main manifestations of revival until 1992 were:
- rebuilding or construction of mosques financed by local money except in a few cases.
- opening or reopening of education institutions.
- publishing of Islamic texts and periodicals.
- intensified personal religiosity and use of Islamic social symbols.
- establishment of Muslim political organizations.
- emergence of Muslim solidarity institutions.
During this period, the Islamic revival in B-H happened into the institutional framework of the Islamic Community. Alternative organizations were practically ignored. This would be dramatically changed after April 1992.
For all these activities the existing Constitution of the Islamic Community was too narrow. Also in 1974 Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution, which moved the state organization toward confederacy. As in the past, changes in the political system found reflection in the organization of the Islamic Community.
On 12 April 1990 the Supreme Islamic Assembly in Sarajevo passed a new Constitution of the Islamic Community. This constitution divided the institutional structure of the Islamic Community into organs, institutions, and officials. The organs of the Community were local yamaas boards, formed mostly formed in the level of boroughs, Mufti offices which were almost at the level of district, the Islamic Communities assemblies and their executive organs, mashiats, the jurisdiction of which coincided with the borders of the Yugoslav states, and finally, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Community as the highest representative body of the Muslims in Yugoslavia. The executive body of this assembly was the Riaset, at the head of which stands Rais Ul Ulema as a religious leader of the Muslims in Yugoslavia. The seat of Riaset is in Sarajevo. Members of all these bodies were to be elected and their term of office was limited. There was also the Islamic Council, a body of scholars in charge of keeping constitution within the Islamic Community and providing interpretation of Islamic teachings.
The institutions of the Islamic Community were madrasas, faculties, institutes, libraries and a museum. The Constitution also provided for the establishment of charitable, humanitarian and other institution, something that was unimaginable in Bosnia during previous decades.
In 1992 the Yugoslav Federation broke down and its ‘domino effect’ brought an end to all organizations, associations and institutions built on the same principle.
In 1993 the representatives of different bodies of the Islamic Community, Muslim organizations and institutions, met in Sarajevo and proclaimed themselves as the Constituent Assembly of the Islamic Community. This Assembly called for the reconstruction of the autonomous Islamic Community in Bosnia and proclaimed itself as the highest authority in the Community and passed on the same day an interim Basic Regulation that will serve as a legal basis for the organization and function of the Islamic Community until the end of the war.
However, the interim Basic Regulation for all practical purposes relied mainly on the Constitution of the Islamic Community of 1990, which had been adjusted in certain aspects to meet demands of the new situation. The new organization structure again was composed of organs, institutions and officials. Basic organs were the same: yamaa, boards, Mufti offices. Others were adjusted: Naibu Ar Rais, Deputy Rais, replaced the President of the Mashiat, the Riaset replaced Mashiat and Constituent Assembly replaced the Assembly of the Islamic Community. Institutions and officials remained the same.
The organization of the Islamic Community from the time of the Yugoslav Federation was slightly modified to fit the circumstances of independent Republic of B-H. The basic regulation of 1993 provides that the Constituent Assembly will call for elections after the war and thus replace the emergency administration with a permanent one. The elections were conducted in the spring of 1995 and permanent Assembly of the Islamic Community was constituted on 28 April 1995. On 26 November 1997 this Assembly adopted a new Constitution, which is a legal basis for the present administration of Islamic Affairs in Bosnia.
3. Traditional Islam in B-H versus Wahabism / Salafism
For more than 500 years Bosnian Muslims have maintained the Hanafi tradition, following a moderate and open-minded version of Islam: rich on tradition, tolerant of other communities and compatible with western values. The Islamic revival in B-H, which began after the secularist Tito period, underwent radical changes from the beginning of the war in April 1992. In those parts of B-H under Serbian and Croatian forces, 75 per cent of Bosnian territory was ‘cleansed’ of Muslims, while mosques and other Islamic buildings were in almost all cases destroyed.(2) However, freedom for Islamic activities became almost unlimited in some territories under the control of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is reported that several hundred Afghan-Arab Mujahidin, or Holy Warriors, joined with, fought alongside Bosniaks during the 1992-5 war in B-H. Highly religious and motivated, they brought a specific understanding of Islam with them and they tried to indoctrinate those ideas into Bosniak minds, having the opportunity to preach and spread propaganda freely. Thus the Wahhabi ideas surfaced for the first time on a wider scale. This foreign creed was different from the moderate and traditional version of Islam in B-H. During this time the relations between B-H and the Muslim world were elevated to an unprecedented level. The number of graduates of Islamic Studies outside the country increased and Islamic literature arrived in significant quantities. Additionally, the economic power of local populations was practically reduced to nothing and the foreign agencies became the prime founders of the Islamic revival. This financial support, coming from foreign Muslim countries, undermined the power of the well-organized and structured Bosnian Islamic community . Saudi Arabian funding of mosques and economic help aimed to confirm Saudi global Muslim leadership (vs. Iran) and to bring Bosnian Muslims closer to beliefs and practices acceptable to Wahhabism.
The activities of the Islamic Community in B-H have always included charity, income-generating projects and Waqf (religious endowment). The Islamic Community of B-H has been the exclusive administrator of these endowments for decades. However, several multi million dollar foreign Waqfs were established after 1995, which, according to the contract with the Islamic Community, were granted full autonomy for various periods of time, usually two decades. The Cultural Centre King Fahd (CCKF) in Sarajevo is an example of this process, together with the Saudi cultural centre in Bugojno and the Cultural Centre in Hadžići.
The financing of the reconstruction of a mosque by a Saudi based organization was a part of a strategy aimed at acquiring the spiritual leadership of the community. The result of this process is the replacement of the Hanafi, the moderate traditional local version of Islam, with Wahhabism, (3) a more radical and intolerant Saudi version that in some cases might be a shift toward more radical and, possibly, terrorist activities. The elder and established Imams in some areas, who stand for a more moderate Islam, were more controlled and restricted in their activities.
In the past, the High Saudi Commission for the Relief of Bosnian Muslims (HSC) has administered the Cultural Centre King Fahd without consulting the Islamic Community of B-H. The HSC gave full support to different Wahhabi organisations, including Active Islamic Youth (AIO) and different Islamic NGO’s. After the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 Sep 01, the situation changed because the media identified the HSC and related organisations as potential sources of extremism. Some of their members were arrested or questioned by local police or international forces about their links to terrorism. At the end of 2002, the Cultural Centre King Fahd, tried to change its public image and attempted to distance itself from these extremist circles, and established closer relations with the official Islamic Community of B-H. When the government of Saudi Arabia decided to close the HSC all the mosques whose construction was financed by the HSC were handed over to the B-H Islamic Community, and the King Fahd Cultural Centres in Sarajevo and Mostar to the Embassy of Saudi Arabia for management. According to Abdul Aziz Al Akili, Cultural Attaché with the Saudi Arabia Embassy in B-H, the King Fahd Cultural Centre is a cultural institution that remains under the supervision and care of the Saudi Arabian Embassy. Despite of this fact, the facilities of the Cultural Centre King Fahd and the King Fahd Mosque in Dobrinje, Sarajevo, are still the epicentre of the spreading of radical ideas
in B-H.
The spreading of radical ideas in B-H has been linked to the return process of the people who were displaced during the war and to the social, economic and education situation within the country. The return of Muslims to some areas of B-H controlled by Bosnian Serbs or B-Croats is creating an unstable local climate, potentially leading to increased ethnic tensions and inter-ethnic incidents. Some of these Muslim returnees are members of the Wahhabi sect. The perceived harassment of Bosniaks may stimulate an increased involvement of organizations tied to Islamic extremism in local communities. Reportedly, Wahhabism was already attempting to take advantage of Bosniak feelings of frustration by trying to radicalize the youth of these areas. These radical movements are taking advantage of the poor condition of education and social services, in some areas, and offering young people a variety of possibilities, as means to subsequently recruit them. The same policy has been used by different radical Islamic movements all over the world.
Extremist recruiters, who are likely to be a few years older, take the young people under their care, organizing bonding activities like camping trips and sporting events. The recruiter gradually isolates the recruits from their families and steps into the role of mentor. In this newfound clique, young recruits find the social integration and spiritual space they have yearned for, as radical indoctrination intensifies, and bonds tighten around a shared worldview.
Radical religious groups are also offering health and social services to former drug users and petty criminals. The weak mental and physical condition of the addicts makes them easy targets for indoctrination and recruiting. In addition, former drug users are familiar with illegal activities and once recruited these individuals may be used to support the organization, through criminal activity. For these reasons petty criminals inside jails all around Europe are also recruited.
Author: Juan Carlos Antúnez
Uploaded: Tuesday, 16 September, 2008
Intended Outcome
Wahhabism in B-H is an alien, small, but according to some sources growing tendency within B-H. It is relatively successful in recruiting young ‘converts’ from within the B-H moderate Muslim tradition circles. Wahhabism identifies mainstream Bosnian Muslims as false Muslims and even as enemies. It has some potential to result in growing, and even violent confrontation with moderate Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This could have serious ramifications for B-H in its efforts to maintain a pluralistic society, as well as complicate the International War on terrorism, by providing an ever safer environment for transient terrorists. If the Wahhabi reportedly growth tendency is not effectively stopped and reversed by the indigenous Muslim structures, the challenge of Wahhabism in B-H will have serious implications for the rest of Europe.
For most International Community (IC) personnel, this is the first time in their careers that they have had to deal with any kind of Islamic issue. Part of the local media, often biased by nationalistic or/and political interests, have tried to present the problem of Wahhabism in B-H as a growing tendency that is a threat to safety and security not only in the country but also in the rest of Europe. These media have used a discourse very similar to that used at the beginning of the 90’s, changing the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ by ‘Wahhabism’. On the other hand, media close to the Bosniak establishment have tried to ‘hide’ any evidence of the Wahhabi presence in B-H, or at least to play down the importance of the phenomenon.
Most of the information gathered until now is based on the regurgitation of media or biased spread of rumours without further confirmation. A serious analysis must try to define who is a real follower of Wahhabism, in order to avoid misinterpretations. Only then can proper proposals be developed for stopping the ‘reported’ growing tendency, and reversing it.
This is a paper on the situation of Wahhabism in B-H, intended to represent original thinking about the real picture of the Islamic community in the country and not a ‘regurgitation of open-source wisdom’.
The purpose of this document is to disseminate it to any member of the International Community who has to deal with this issue. For most of them, it is the first time they have had to get in touch with Islam. It is very important to defeat prejudices and misunderstandings that present obstacles to their proper job performances.
This ‘handbook’ would contribute by increasing the level of the information obtained by the above-mentioned personnel, and also contribute to a better IC relationship with the local community. The book would also contribute to the ability of IC personnel to distinguish what is a real threat to safety and security in B-H.
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina: short historical review
a) The Ottoman period
b) The Habsburg period
c) The Kingdom of Yugoslavia
d) The Second World War and the Tito period
3. Traditional Islam in B-H versus Wahabism / Salafism
4. Current Situation of Wahhabism / Salafism
a) ‘Wahhabi’ stream ‘loyal’ to the B-H Islamic community
b) ‘Wahhabi’ stream ‘outside’ the B-H Islamic community
i) Missionary Salafism / Wahhabism
ii) Jihadi Salafism / Wahhabism
5. Wahhabi links to international terrorism
6. Conclusions
1. Introduction
During and just after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) the relationship between the Bosniak part of the new state of B-H and the Muslim world were elevated to an unprecedented level. The financial support coming from foreign Muslim countries undermined the power of the well-organized and structured Bosnian Islamic community . The Islamic revival that began in Yugoslavia in the 70’s decade, which was developed in the framework of the local Muslim institutions and tradition, turned during and after the war to a more politicized revitalization influenced by foreign elements as the Arab fighters and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from the Middle East.
The Official Islamic community has been taking control of Islam in B-H since the end of the 1992-95 war. However, the Islamic Community has recognized the presence of religious organizations outside its control, and that one of these organizations is an obstacle for the legitimate activities of the wider Islamic Community.
Besides efforts on behalf of the Islamic Community to counter Wahhabi influence, ordinary believers are very often staunch opponents of Wahhabism and that might be the really insurmountable obstacle in front of Wahhabism in B-H. Since the end of the war the largely secular and European attitude among the Bosniaks has caused friction with foreign Islamic extremists. Different reports on incidents involving moderate and radical Muslims have shown that Wahhabi communities are willing to use coercive methods to spread their radical ideas. Traditional Muslims have also demonstrated that they can use radical methods to counter the spread of the Wahhabi movement in B-H.
Assessments show that, despite their efforts, the Wahhabi movement does not have many supporters in B-H. The general population is afraid of their fundamentalist approach towards religion. B-H Muslims want to maintain the local traditional and moderate version of Islam.
While the predominance of traditional ‘Bosniak’ Islam is widespread, the Wahhabi movement has established itself in some areas of B-H. Some radical groups have been determined in their efforts to publicly confront the role of the B-H official Islamic Community and its control over Islamic religion in B-H, using their radical Wahhabi interpretation of the Koran. Their actions have drawn the attention of both local and international media and security services.
An element of the local media, that often shows nationalist or political bias, has tried to show the problem of Wahhabism in B-H as a growing threat against the safety and security within B-H and perhaps within the rest of Europe. This media element has used a theme that is similar to that used at the beginning of the 1990’s, in changing the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ to ‘Wahhabism’. To counter this, media close to the Bosniak establishment, have tried to ‘hide’ any evidence of the Wahhabi presence in B-H or, at least, to downplay the significant of their influence.
2. Islam in B-H: short historical review
a) The Ottoman period
Islam in B-H was introduced by the Ottoman Empire. From 1463 to 1878 this empire ruled the area. So, the history of Islam in Bosnia is intimately connected to the history of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. The State within the Ottoman Empire, like other Muslim empires before, was organized according to the principle of organic unity of religious and political authority. They did however introduce an unprecedented hierarchy of Muslims scholars or Ulama. Muftis, Mudarris and Imams, together with judges, Qadis, and Friday prayer preachers, or Khatibs, were under state jurisdiction and they were very often state officials. Because this rigid organisation, there was little autonomy in interpretation and practice of Islam in Bosnia.
The Ottoman troops also brought the Sunni Islam and the official legal school to the Ottoman Empire: the Hanafi School of Jurisprudence1. The Hanafi is one of the four Sunni legal schools. It is the largest one and it is followed by approximately 30 percent of Muslims worldwide. This school is predominant in Turkey, northern Egypt, Levant, and amongst the Muslim communities of the Balkans, Central and South Asia, China, Russia and Ukraine. Hanafi School has been considered by many authors as the most open-minded School. Early Hanafism was associated with the partisans of Ra’y (translation: Opinion). Other schools, however, especially Hanbalism, that wanted to base everything on formal reports about the prophetic Sunna, grew out of the party of Hadith. This has been cast as ‘rationalism vs. traditionalism’. According to the Hanafi School, the Iytihad, or individual reasoning, is often a used source of the Sharia, or Islamic Law, together with customs or 'Urf, hence a degree of flexibility in interpretation.(1)
b) The Habsburg period
In July 1878 the Congress of European powers held in Berlin, gave Habsburg monarchy the right to occupy and administer Bosnia. The Bosniak resisted the occupying Habsburg forces but their three-month resistance was eventually crushed in October 1878.
The relations between religion and state in the Habsburg monarchy were based upon the concept of ‘recognized religious communities’ which was adopted in 1874. According to this concept, the state guarantees freedom of conscience, belief and private manifestations of religious beliefs and practice.
The Habsburg government introduced this concept in Bosnia. Six religious communities were given the status of ‘recognized religions’: Islamic, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Evangelic and Judaic. The status of Islam dramatically changed. Instead of being the basic principle of social cohesion as it was in the Ottoman times, it now became one of several ‘recognized religions’ within a non-Muslim state. The Bosniaks became a religious minority instead of being a part of the ruling elite.
This change brought about a new challenge to the Bosniaks: to build up a system of the administration of Islamic affairs that would not be identical with the organization of the state. Christians and Jews in Bosnia were in comparative advantage. Under the Ottomans they already had a separate communal organization, which enabled them to easily adapt to the Habsburg regime. Relying upon Ottoman heritage and responding to new challenges during the first two decades of Habsburg rule, the Bosniaks built a new administration of Islamic affairs. This system included religious hierarchy or 'ilmyya, religious education or maarif, endowments or waqf and sharia courts for religious issues.
The system was gradually built through the struggle over the prerogatives for the appointment of key officials, allocation of funding and the running of institutions. The struggle ended on 15 April 1909 when the Habsburg monarch approved the Statute for autonomous administration of Islamic endowments and educational affairs.
The basic features of the administration of Islamic affairs envisaged in the Statute of 1909 were the creation of a council of ulama headed by the Rais Ul Ulama and the introduction of autonomy and elections into the administration of endowments and religious schools.
c) The Kingdom of Yugoslavia
In 1918 the Habsburg monarchy disintegrated and Bosnia was incorporated in a new South Slav state, initially called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The administration of Islamic affairs in Bosnia, as developed in the Habsburg times, continued to function. The Muslims in other parts of Yugoslavia had a separate religious administration.
This state of affairs lasted until 1930, when the new regime of the Yugoslav King Aleksandar Karađorđević decided to introduce a unified administration of religious affairs for all Muslims in the country and virtually took over the control of that administration, according to his ideology of ‘Yugoslav Unitarism’, which viewed different South Slav ethnic groups as one nation and attended to eliminate any organization alongside ethnic criteria.
The state control over the Yugoslav Islamic Community was, to some extent, relaxed in 1936, when a Bosniak-based political party, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, joined a coalition government in Belgrade. The relaxation of state control over the community did not mean the return of autonomy from 1909. Rather, a new type of influence was introduced, that of a Muslim political party.
According to the 1936 Yugoslav Islamic Community Constitution, the seat of Rais Ul Ulema, which had been moved during the previous period to Belgrade, returned to Sarajevo.
d) The Second World War and the Tito period
The World War Two broke out in 1939 and the Nazis and their collaborationists occupied Bosnia, together with other parts of Yugoslavia. The leadership of the Yugoslav Islamic Community stuck to the policy of keeping the existing administration of Islamic affairs intact until the war ended.
The end of the war in 1945 was accompanied by the change of state organization and political regime in the country. The Unitarian concept of Yugoslavia was replaced by that of federation, kingdom by republic and parliamentarian democracy by socialist ‘people’s democracy’. These changes greatly affected the position of Islam, as well as other religions, and the organization of the Islamic community .
The socialist regime proclaimed ‘the separation of church from state’ and the principle that ‘religion is a private affair of the citizens’. These principles of secular state were interpreted in socialist practice as subjugation of religious communities to state as ‘allies of the capitalists’ and the persecution of those known to be believers.
The change affected in the social, political and legal positions of religion in Bosnia affected all segments of the administration of Islamic affairs. First, Sharia courts were abolished (5 March 1946) and the Islamic law lost its binding legal force for the Muslims.
Second, in 1952 the government closed all elementary religious maktabs and left only one secondary school, the ‘Gazi Husrevbeg’ Madrasa in Sarajevo, to prepare future imams and khatibs. Religious instruction to the ordinary believers could be given only during weekends in mosques and even that legal possibility was restricted by the policy of the local authorities.
Third, waqf property was largely expropriated and nationalized between 1945 and 1958. During the late 1960s, the socialist regime in Yugoslavia became more liberal. Consequently, more space for activities was given to religious communities. At the same time, the Federal Constitution of Yugoslavia of 1968 gave more power to federal units. These developments found their reflection in the Constitution of the Islamic Community of 5 November 1968.
e) The Islamic revival
During the 1970s and 1980s, Bosnia and other parts of Yugoslavia witnessed Islamic revival.
The Islamic revival in B-H started in the 1970s due to several factors:
- a certain aperture of the then Yugoslav regime.
- an improved economic situation.
- the graduation of a new generation of young Muslims intellectuals from Yugoslav and Middle Eastern universities.
- global trends in the Muslim world that began in the Petroleum Crisis in 1973 and culminated in the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
- the main manifestations of revival until 1992 were:
- rebuilding or construction of mosques financed by local money except in a few cases.
- opening or reopening of education institutions.
- publishing of Islamic texts and periodicals.
- intensified personal religiosity and use of Islamic social symbols.
- establishment of Muslim political organizations.
- emergence of Muslim solidarity institutions.
During this period, the Islamic revival in B-H happened into the institutional framework of the Islamic Community. Alternative organizations were practically ignored. This would be dramatically changed after April 1992.
For all these activities the existing Constitution of the Islamic Community was too narrow. Also in 1974 Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution, which moved the state organization toward confederacy. As in the past, changes in the political system found reflection in the organization of the Islamic Community.
On 12 April 1990 the Supreme Islamic Assembly in Sarajevo passed a new Constitution of the Islamic Community. This constitution divided the institutional structure of the Islamic Community into organs, institutions, and officials. The organs of the Community were local yamaas boards, formed mostly formed in the level of boroughs, Mufti offices which were almost at the level of district, the Islamic Communities assemblies and their executive organs, mashiats, the jurisdiction of which coincided with the borders of the Yugoslav states, and finally, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Community as the highest representative body of the Muslims in Yugoslavia. The executive body of this assembly was the Riaset, at the head of which stands Rais Ul Ulema as a religious leader of the Muslims in Yugoslavia. The seat of Riaset is in Sarajevo. Members of all these bodies were to be elected and their term of office was limited. There was also the Islamic Council, a body of scholars in charge of keeping constitution within the Islamic Community and providing interpretation of Islamic teachings.
The institutions of the Islamic Community were madrasas, faculties, institutes, libraries and a museum. The Constitution also provided for the establishment of charitable, humanitarian and other institution, something that was unimaginable in Bosnia during previous decades.
In 1992 the Yugoslav Federation broke down and its ‘domino effect’ brought an end to all organizations, associations and institutions built on the same principle.
In 1993 the representatives of different bodies of the Islamic Community, Muslim organizations and institutions, met in Sarajevo and proclaimed themselves as the Constituent Assembly of the Islamic Community. This Assembly called for the reconstruction of the autonomous Islamic Community in Bosnia and proclaimed itself as the highest authority in the Community and passed on the same day an interim Basic Regulation that will serve as a legal basis for the organization and function of the Islamic Community until the end of the war.
However, the interim Basic Regulation for all practical purposes relied mainly on the Constitution of the Islamic Community of 1990, which had been adjusted in certain aspects to meet demands of the new situation. The new organization structure again was composed of organs, institutions and officials. Basic organs were the same: yamaa, boards, Mufti offices. Others were adjusted: Naibu Ar Rais, Deputy Rais, replaced the President of the Mashiat, the Riaset replaced Mashiat and Constituent Assembly replaced the Assembly of the Islamic Community. Institutions and officials remained the same.
The organization of the Islamic Community from the time of the Yugoslav Federation was slightly modified to fit the circumstances of independent Republic of B-H. The basic regulation of 1993 provides that the Constituent Assembly will call for elections after the war and thus replace the emergency administration with a permanent one. The elections were conducted in the spring of 1995 and permanent Assembly of the Islamic Community was constituted on 28 April 1995. On 26 November 1997 this Assembly adopted a new Constitution, which is a legal basis for the present administration of Islamic Affairs in Bosnia.
3. Traditional Islam in B-H versus Wahabism / Salafism
For more than 500 years Bosnian Muslims have maintained the Hanafi tradition, following a moderate and open-minded version of Islam: rich on tradition, tolerant of other communities and compatible with western values. The Islamic revival in B-H, which began after the secularist Tito period, underwent radical changes from the beginning of the war in April 1992. In those parts of B-H under Serbian and Croatian forces, 75 per cent of Bosnian territory was ‘cleansed’ of Muslims, while mosques and other Islamic buildings were in almost all cases destroyed.(2) However, freedom for Islamic activities became almost unlimited in some territories under the control of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is reported that several hundred Afghan-Arab Mujahidin, or Holy Warriors, joined with, fought alongside Bosniaks during the 1992-5 war in B-H. Highly religious and motivated, they brought a specific understanding of Islam with them and they tried to indoctrinate those ideas into Bosniak minds, having the opportunity to preach and spread propaganda freely. Thus the Wahhabi ideas surfaced for the first time on a wider scale. This foreign creed was different from the moderate and traditional version of Islam in B-H. During this time the relations between B-H and the Muslim world were elevated to an unprecedented level. The number of graduates of Islamic Studies outside the country increased and Islamic literature arrived in significant quantities. Additionally, the economic power of local populations was practically reduced to nothing and the foreign agencies became the prime founders of the Islamic revival. This financial support, coming from foreign Muslim countries, undermined the power of the well-organized and structured Bosnian Islamic community . Saudi Arabian funding of mosques and economic help aimed to confirm Saudi global Muslim leadership (vs. Iran) and to bring Bosnian Muslims closer to beliefs and practices acceptable to Wahhabism.
The activities of the Islamic Community in B-H have always included charity, income-generating projects and Waqf (religious endowment). The Islamic Community of B-H has been the exclusive administrator of these endowments for decades. However, several multi million dollar foreign Waqfs were established after 1995, which, according to the contract with the Islamic Community, were granted full autonomy for various periods of time, usually two decades. The Cultural Centre King Fahd (CCKF) in Sarajevo is an example of this process, together with the Saudi cultural centre in Bugojno and the Cultural Centre in Hadžići.
The financing of the reconstruction of a mosque by a Saudi based organization was a part of a strategy aimed at acquiring the spiritual leadership of the community. The result of this process is the replacement of the Hanafi, the moderate traditional local version of Islam, with Wahhabism, (3) a more radical and intolerant Saudi version that in some cases might be a shift toward more radical and, possibly, terrorist activities. The elder and established Imams in some areas, who stand for a more moderate Islam, were more controlled and restricted in their activities.
In the past, the High Saudi Commission for the Relief of Bosnian Muslims (HSC) has administered the Cultural Centre King Fahd without consulting the Islamic Community of B-H. The HSC gave full support to different Wahhabi organisations, including Active Islamic Youth (AIO) and different Islamic NGO’s. After the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 Sep 01, the situation changed because the media identified the HSC and related organisations as potential sources of extremism. Some of their members were arrested or questioned by local police or international forces about their links to terrorism. At the end of 2002, the Cultural Centre King Fahd, tried to change its public image and attempted to distance itself from these extremist circles, and established closer relations with the official Islamic Community of B-H. When the government of Saudi Arabia decided to close the HSC all the mosques whose construction was financed by the HSC were handed over to the B-H Islamic Community, and the King Fahd Cultural Centres in Sarajevo and Mostar to the Embassy of Saudi Arabia for management. According to Abdul Aziz Al Akili, Cultural Attaché with the Saudi Arabia Embassy in B-H, the King Fahd Cultural Centre is a cultural institution that remains under the supervision and care of the Saudi Arabian Embassy. Despite of this fact, the facilities of the Cultural Centre King Fahd and the King Fahd Mosque in Dobrinje, Sarajevo, are still the epicentre of the spreading of radical ideas
in B-H.
The spreading of radical ideas in B-H has been linked to the return process of the people who were displaced during the war and to the social, economic and education situation within the country. The return of Muslims to some areas of B-H controlled by Bosnian Serbs or B-Croats is creating an unstable local climate, potentially leading to increased ethnic tensions and inter-ethnic incidents. Some of these Muslim returnees are members of the Wahhabi sect. The perceived harassment of Bosniaks may stimulate an increased involvement of organizations tied to Islamic extremism in local communities. Reportedly, Wahhabism was already attempting to take advantage of Bosniak feelings of frustration by trying to radicalize the youth of these areas. These radical movements are taking advantage of the poor condition of education and social services, in some areas, and offering young people a variety of possibilities, as means to subsequently recruit them. The same policy has been used by different radical Islamic movements all over the world.
Extremist recruiters, who are likely to be a few years older, take the young people under their care, organizing bonding activities like camping trips and sporting events. The recruiter gradually isolates the recruits from their families and steps into the role of mentor. In this newfound clique, young recruits find the social integration and spiritual space they have yearned for, as radical indoctrination intensifies, and bonds tighten around a shared worldview.
Radical religious groups are also offering health and social services to former drug users and petty criminals. The weak mental and physical condition of the addicts makes them easy targets for indoctrination and recruiting. In addition, former drug users are familiar with illegal activities and once recruited these individuals may be used to support the organization, through criminal activity. For these reasons petty criminals inside jails all around Europe are also recruited.