Question to the Heraclitians/temporalists here

[Lutiferre]

I was wondering what is your take on the "block time" view of the universe, also referred to as "eternalism"? We could perhaps allude to Parmenides. This eternalism view can be contrasted with "presentism", the view that only the present is real and exists, and all other things don't exist.

But I thought to myself, doesn't it make more sense if the past and future still exist, just outside of our experience because we are at different locations in the same "block" universe, while in another location (not strictly a spatial location; more like in another aspect of it), the future and past still exist.

I was reminded to this view by reading a comment from Einstein that "To us believing phycisists, past present and future are only illusions", which represents the idea. It is the view that time is an illusion/lie generated by the human psychology, not an "objective phenomenon" relating to the world outside of our minds, which is in fact just one block which contains us, who generate in our own minds the idea that this block is temporal.

Past, present and future in that view, become simply different aspects or parts of one block of existence, which simultaneously contains all time.

How would you Heraclitians respond to some arguments for Eternalism taken from Wikipedia:

Simultaneity

Special relativity has shown that the concept of simultaneity is not universal: observers in different frames of reference will have different perceptions of which events are in the future and which are in the past—there is no way to definitively identify a particular point in universal time as "the present". More generally, special relativity makes no distinction between past, future, or present.

Uniqueness of the present

There is no fundamental reason why a particular "present" should be more valid than any other; observers at any point in time will always consider themselves to be in the present. However, every moment of time has a "turn" at being the present moment in flow-of-time theories, so the situation ends up symmetrical. Although there is still an ontological distinction between past, future, and present that is not symmetrical.

Rate of flow

The concept of "time passing" can be considered to be internally inconsistent, by asking "how much time goes by in an hour?" However, the question could be no different from "how much space is contained in a meter?" — all measurements being equally arbitrary. Each observer measures their own clock to be running at the same rate.

[Psychonaut]

There is no fundamental reason why a particular "present" should be more valid than any other; observers at any point in time will always consider themselves to be in the present. However, every moment of time has a "turn" at being the present moment in flow-of-time theories, so the situation ends up symmetrical. Although there is still an ontological distinction between past, future, and present that is not symmetrical.

The concept of "time passing" can be considered to be internally inconsistent, by asking "how much time goes by in an hour?" However, the question could be no different from "how much space is contained in a meter?" — all measurements being equally arbitrary. Each observer measures their own clock to be running at the same rate.

I can't say that I've read too many (if any) process philosophers who specifically emphasize the present. Whitehead, having written extensively about Special and General Relativity, certainly makes no such error—focusing instead on the principle of flux itself.


More generally, special relativity makes no distinction between past, future, or present.

Err...I'm not sure how correct that statement is in isolation. My Special Relativity textbooks are packed away right now, so I can't dig out any quotes from Wheeler, but there are definitely two distinct schools of thought regarding time in the wake of SR. More than a few have taken to the idea that since time can, mathematically, be treated as an analog to space then it is so—thus falling in line with McTaggart's position on fixity. Others are, in my opinion at least, more sensible and treat time as a qualitatively different part of the spacetime continuum.

The way I see it, the antitemporalists have an extremely counterintuitive position that rests on a number of nonobservable a priori[i]. Whitehead's ditching of [i]objects that persist and change in time in favor of actual occurrences, or events, is far more in line with Special Relativity than any philosophy of time that came before him. It is a holistic perspective that does not, as so many philosophers are guilty of, treat time in isolation from space.


The concept of "time passing" can be considered to be internally inconsistent, by asking "how much time goes by in an hour?" However, the question could be no different from "how much space is contained in a meter?" — all measurements being equally arbitrary. Each observer measures their own clock to be running at the same rate.

The rate is relative, but there is no observable state in which it does not pass.

[Cato]

You never step into the same stream twice.

[Lutiferre]

I can't say that I've read too many (if any) process philosophers who specifically emphasize the present. Whitehead, having written extensively about Special and General Relativity, certainly makes no such error—focusing instead on the principle of flux itself.
But what is his view? Is the present state the only existing state of the universe, e.g. "the present = the world"? Or does the past, present and future all exist simultaneously as different parts of the same "block"?

[Lutiferre]

You never step into the same stream twice.
We don't really need one-liners from Heraclitus that everyone already knows.

[Cato]

We don't really need one-liners from Heraclitus that everyone already knows.

I don't recall asking your permission to post it.

[Psychonaut]

But what is his view? Is the present state the only existing state of the universe, e.g. "the present = the world"? Or does the past, present and future all exist simultaneously as different parts of the same "block"?

I don't think you'll see many process philosophers try to explain things in such monolithic terms. "The" world needn't be a singular fact, but can be conceived of as a plurality of occurrences representative of different reference frames. There need be no unified meta-frame to link everything together. I also don't think you'll see process philosophers speak about the past or future as concrete. Only the present is in the process of concrescence. The future exists as potentiality, and the past as memory, but neither is an actual occurrence on par with the infinitude of instances of the present.