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View Full Version : The Eternal Shouting Match Between Arminius and Flavus



Lenny
01-14-2009, 09:53 PM
The final major campaign against Arminius and his allies came in AD 16. Roman field commander Germanicus commanded eight legions, along with auxiliary units, overland from the Rhine, up the Ems River, and perhaps up the Weser as well. In the first engagement of the campaign, he met the enemy on a plain that Tacitus called Idistaviso, a place somewhere near the Weser River that has not yet been identified archaeologically.

One event recounted by Tacitus is of particular interest. The Roman army approached the Weser from the west; Arminius and his troops, from the east. Among the Roman forces was Flavus, Arminius's brother. The two siblings shouted across the river to each other in an exchange that Tacitus uses to represent the two opposing positions among Germanics--Those in favor of alliance with Rome and those against it.

Flavus insisted on "Roman greatness, the power of the Emperor ... the mercy always waiting for him who submitted himself..." His brother [Arminius] urged "the sacred call of their country; their ancestral liberty; the gods of their Germanic hearths; and their mother, who prayed, with himself, that Flavus would not choose the title of Renegade and Traitor to his kindred...to the whole of his race in fact, before that of their liberator."
Flavus became so enraged that he prepared to collect his weapons and mount his horse to cross the river to fight his brother. But the Roman general Stertinius stopped him. Arminius all the while taunted Flavus from the other bank, partly in their native tongue and "much in Latin, as he had seen service in the Roman camp as a captain of native auxiliaries".

Though the ensuing battle resulted in a marginal Roman victory, the campaign of AD 16 itself proceeded as all other Roman forays past the Rhine into the heart of Germania ultimately did: With Romans occupying and burning settlements; Germanic warriors ambushing Roman legionaries in the forests; the occasional stand-up pitched battle with both sides giving as good as they took; and ultimately with Roman withdrawal back to their safe forts west of the Rhine in the Fall. The next year (AD 17), Emperor Tiberius decided to give up the attempt to subdue the Germanics and recalled [Roman field commander] Germanicus to Rome. The reason for these decisions must have lain in Arminius's tough resistance. Even with the truly enormous strength of eight legions, Germanicus and his army were unable to break the indigenous peoples' spirit of resistance.

Lenny
09-08-2009, 06:03 PM
I am bumping this thread in honor of the 2,000th anniversary of the Kalkriese Battle (mistakenly called the Battle of Teutoberg Forest for many years).

At the risk of saying what everyone knows:
On the 9th of September, AD 9, Arminius and his allies annihilated the three Roman legions then on a campaign of conquest in the heart of Germania. It was to be one of the most significant battles in European history, as Rome abandoned its ambitions east of the Rhine after that catastrophe. (A thread about it - though beware that it is infected with PCism throughout (http://www.theapricity.com/forum/showthread.php?t=7702).)

Nevertheless, consider if you would the above-discussed Shouting Match. It took place years after the famous battle, between a proud-and-free Arminius and his romanized-brother Flavus. The latter proudly willing to abandon his heritage for the glitter and phony-glory of the Universal Power of his day.

Really: That scene of the two brothers shouting at each other across the river is such perfect symbolism of so much, in so many ways. Of a conflict that is just as relevant today as it was then. Which is why I titled this thread "The Eternal Shouting Match...". What course others may take I know not, but as for me, I'm with Arminius over Flavus.


Arminius and co., we salute you on this, the anniversary of your finest hour.

Liffrea
09-08-2009, 06:11 PM
To be fair, the battle wasn’t that decisive, it was Germania’s economic poverty that kept it free of Roman rule rather than any feat of arms on their part, it just wasn’t worth Rome’s effort, relative to the cost (and let’s not pretend that if Rome had bent her will to it the German tribes would have stood a chance), to acquire Germania.

Sol Invictus
09-08-2009, 06:25 PM
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Lenny
09-08-2009, 06:49 PM
To be fair, the battle wasn’t that decisive, it was Germania’s economic poverty that kept it free of Roman rule rather than any feat of arms on their part, it just wasn’t worth Rome’s effort, relative to the cost (and let’s not pretend that if Rome had bent her will to it the German tribes would have stood a chance), to acquire Germania.
The plan was to make Germania a full province like any other.

For years, they had sent large forces east of the Rhine on long campaigns to show force and bully the small Germanic rulers into "alliance". That was the exact M.O. they used everywhere else that they eventually annexed. It is irrational to believe that they "did not really want to colonize Germania" in light of that. Several Germanic states were forced into submission in the first Century BC already, and the first "Flavus-Germanics" began popping up then. The "Arminius-Germanics" ultimately won out. (But this shouting match is far from over, and currently the Flavuses are winning big). They won out largely because of this single spectacular victory 2,000 years ago this Wednesday. No defeat for Rome was as complete or total.
Rome sent as many as eight legions in subsequent campaigns but never recaptured the initiative, and eventually cut their losses and dug in at the Rhine. And the rest is history.


The impact this event has had on the history of Europeans can almost not be exaggerated. The Latin-Germanic cultural line remains the Rhine today; that line has almost not shifted at all in 2,000 years. When the Reformation came, all the Germanic areas that were never under Roman occupation immediately dove into the Protestant cause, and it was the romanized areas of the deep Rhineland and south-of-the-Danube that remained partly RomanCatholic.

Without this battle, the "metaethnicity" and culturo-linguistic grouping "Germanic", itself, would probably exist today only in the way that Finnics do today, at best. (It's no insult to Finnics; I like you guys a lot ;)). That is to say, as a proud but minor grouping tucked away in a corner, possibly only in parts of Scandinavia. In other words, you would definitely not be reading this in English right now if not for that battle, as the language would not exist.

After the fall of Rome, the dynamic force that took over Europe and drove it forward was the Germanic nations. If the Germanics had been romanized-out-of-existence 2,000 years ago, that dynamic force would've been absent (the romanized [Flavus-ized] descendants of the Germanics would've declined equally as much as Rome itself had - i.e., no Voelkerwanderung or centuries-long initiative-taking, any more than the sons of Vercingetorix had). At that point, all of Europe would've been very dark indeed, and Islam may have taken it over completely in the 700s. Martel himself was a French-speaking Germanic, similar to William The Conqueror. Spain's proud and rugged resistance to the Muslims had a Germanic backbone. And so forth.

Liffrea
09-08-2009, 07:40 PM
Originally Posted by Lenny
The impact this event has had on the history of Europeans can almost not be exaggerated.

Debatable, but that’s hindsight, the point is that the battle wasn’t a decisive one. Decisive in the sense that there was no other likely outcome from it’s results. Hastings was a decisive battle (any organised English resistance was wiped out in one battle), Gettysburg was a decisive battle (the Confederacy no longer had the capability of waging an offensive war and so would, in time, be defeated), the Teutoberg Wald was not (the Romans had their revenge and could quite easily have absorbed the Germans if they so chose).

Rome had no “master plan” of expansion, it was haphazard based upon a number of factors, historians have made the mistake in the past of assuming that the Romans expanded until they ran out of steam, others think this is incorrect, Rome absorbed economically viable/valuable lands into the empire, Germany was neither, as Peter Heather has claimed Rome’s frontier was a socio-economic one, not an ethnic one, there were many Germanic and Celto-Germanic tribes west of the Rhine. The decision not to expand across the Rhine on a more or less permanent basis can really be said to have only taken place during Nero’s reign. Before then the legions were effectively housed in staging camps, not permanent frontiers and emperor’s after Augustus had expressly ignored his wishes not to expand the empire. There is also the factor that, at that time, the Germans were no threat to Roman security in the way that the better organised and more wealthier Gauls had been, and, of course, Rome’s rivals in the Mediterranean.

The decision to halt at the Rhine, and Danube, was made for sound economic and logistical reasons, not because of German tribesmen.

Peter Heather:

“It was not the military prowess of the Germani that kept them outside the Empire, but their poverty.”

I agree, that Rome decided the Germans just weren’t worth the effort was decisive, not the battle itself, which Rome revenged and had a long history of coming back from stunning defeats to conquer their enemies.

Lenny
09-08-2009, 09:14 PM
Debatable, but that’s hindsight, the point is that the battle wasn’t a decisive one. ...the Romans had their revenge and could quite easily have absorbed the Germans if they so chose.
I'm sorry, Liffrea, but you're just wrong. There's not really a single battle more strategically decisive in all Roman history, that I know of. Certainly not as regards Europrean history in the Roman Era. The strategic outcomes of wars/battles are what we really care about when looking into the past, especially the long-distant past.

You have quite a narrow view of military affairs: Just because there were perhaps a dozen or so other "field legions" in the European part of the Roman Empire at the time, then yes, Rome could and did press onward with their war against the Germanic states. But so likewise could the British have pressed on with their war against the American rebels in 1781 after Yorktown. They still had thousands of troops in North America. But it reached a point where they did not because it was too costly and they realized victory was never to be. Comparisons of the Arminius campaigns to the U.S. Civil War are just dishonest, because of the very different natures of the wars.

Liffrea
09-08-2009, 09:33 PM
Originally Posted by Lenny
I'm sorry, Liffrea, but you're just wrong.

Damn that's put me in my place!

I'll just get right along and leave you be.....


There's not really a single battle more strategically decisive in all Roman history, that I know of. Certainly not as regards Europrean history in the Roman Era.

Then I suggest you read more widely, I’ll give you a head start, Adrianople.


But it reached a point where they did not because it was too costly and they realized victory was never to be.

The first part of your statement is correct, the later part is debatable and I believe incorrect. .


Comparisons of the Arminius campaigns to the U.S. Civil War are just dishonest, because of the very different natures of the wars.

We’re talking about how decisive Teutoberg Wald was, I provided examples of decisive battles in the context I described:

in the sense that there was no other likely outcome from it’s results.

The fact remains Teutoberg Wald was not a decisive conflict and rest assured I have read the works of many first rate historians of the Roman period on the subject of Roman strategy and economics both generally and pertaining to Germany.

I can give you a list of titles to aid your research if you so wish.

Osweo
11-04-2009, 07:05 PM
Liffrea, you're not taking enough account of the blow to morale that this massacre was. Remember the stories of Augustus years later banging his head on walls with the groan "Varus! Give me back my Legions!"

Okay, maybe this was Tacitus's melodramatisation, and maybe the battle was exaggerated by later historians, maybe it was used as an excuse by the central power to forget transRhenish adventures, and maybe maybe maybe...

But too many maybes! This was the culmination of the earliest phase of Roman-Germanic interaction, and our lot won out. :)

Imagine the psychological effect it will have had on Germanics at the time. It may even have played a great part in the break up of old traditional tribal traditions, political notions and worldview ideas and the emergence of newer more warlike ideas and multi-tribal conglomerations of the later period.

At the end of the day HOW MANY of the world's greatest military force ended up nailed to the gibbet? That sort of thing doesn't happen very often, and even less without major consequences in both defeated and victors...


As for modern fashionable economic arguments - what of Britain? The same could have been said there, but Claudius came anyway. There's more to history than these matters. If the Germans hadn't humiliated Rome when they did, who's to say that Claudius wouldn't have turned his attention that way instead? It wouldn't have been the last time that the Elbe was seen as a sensible major European divider...

Liffrea
11-04-2009, 07:22 PM
Originally Posted by Osweo
As for modern fashionable economic arguments - what of Britain? The same could have been said there, but Claudius came anyway.

Britain has always been an economic asset, particularly the south west. British tin production has had value going back deep into prehistoric times, indeed Byzantine traders still made the journey to the south west long after Roman withdrawal. The Romans had been trading with Britain long enough to know it was worth the effort in subduing.

The economic argument, I believe, is sound, empires are pragmatic affairs Realpolitik means far more in reality than a foreign policy based on ethics or ideology, one only has to look at Britain’s most famous imperialist Cecil Rhodes to see how often rhetoric about empire and so called “English supremacy” was used effectively in the acquisition of tangible gains.

As I see it Germany simply wasn’t worth the, admittedly, large effort the Romans would have had to make to acquire it. If it were then the legions would have been on the Elbe and, quite probably, the Baltic and the Vistula.

As for psychological damage, the Romans had their arses kicked more humiliatingly by the Parthians/Sassanians (several times), still didn't stop them trying to take over the lucrative Mesopotamian provinces....

Osweo
11-04-2009, 07:44 PM
Britain has always been an economic asset, particularly the south west. British tin production has had value going back deep into prehistoric times, indeed Byzantine traders still made the journey to the south west long after Roman withdrawal. The Romans had been trading with Britain long enough to know it was worth the effort in subduing.
There's tin, or at least there was once, in Bohemia. I was just looking at a map of Bavaria, and saw a town called summat like 'Oloviy' just over the border, which is near enough the Russian for 'tin'. The Halstatt world seemed to do pretty well making tin alloys there too. I don't know Germany very well, but there must be plenty of natural resources there. The Erz in Ergebirge means 'ore', no?

And the booty in slaves is present in any populated barbarian land.

The economic argument, I believe, is sound, empires are pragmatic affairs Realpolitik means far more in reality than a foreign policy based on ethics or ideology, one only has to look at Britain’s most famous imperialist Cecil Rhodes to see how often rhetoric about empire and so called “English supremacy” was used effectively in the acquisition of tangible gains.
'Cape to Cairo' was FAR more symbolic an aim than one with any real economic benefit. Rhodes made fortunes, but had ideas and vanities beyond them.

As I see it Germany simply wasn’t worth the, admittedly, large effort the Romans would have had to make to acquire it. If it were then the legions would have been on the Elbe and, quite probably, the Baltic and the Vistula.
Augustus himself seems to have regarded an Elbe-Danube or Oder-Danube frontier as more strategically sensible. These long frontiers were a nightmare for Rome, and always provided too much leeway for distant armies to come up with usurpers.

Would Germania really have been harder to take than Britain or Northern Gaul? There is an argument to be made there concerning differences in political organisation between Celts and Germans, sure, but I don't think the difference is too great between the effort/rewards ratios. Britain was quite a pain in the arse at times, and we all now how Honorius was glad to turn his back on this Claudian abberation.

As for psychological damage, the Romans had their arses kicked more humiliatingly by the Parthians/Sassanians (several times), still didn't stop them trying to take over the lucrative Mesopotamian provinces....
The nature of the enemy was rather different though. Rome was dealing with something in the east that more approached her as a peer or rival. Getting slaughtered by tribesmen of the wild north must have felt different.

asulf
11-07-2009, 08:01 AM
I note with pleasure, not being the only one here interested in this episode of history.
I read fine arguments on both others indeed correct, but I think part of the table have not been highlighted to know the human factor.

Rome .... the name symbolizes the capital, and the manifestation of the desire to conquer and administer of peoples under its control.
At the time, 2000 years ago, the empire stretches around the Mediterranean, this means a huge political machine and administrative set up to repatriate wealth to Rome.
All positions of power are held by Roman citizens, especially by the most influential son of the great patrician families this explains why, among other Flavius cousin of Augustus empeureur hold office in the organigrame of the empire and its desire irrepressible to shine and be reconu again and again by his parent who has power of life or death over one quarter of humanity has shone in Judea subduing revolts in a bath of blood, and by Rome, confirming Auguste in choosing to administer Flavius Germania
add guards, Roman soldiers, officers, commanders of police patrols throughout the Roman Empire
add as a factor, the plebeian Roman who made his compulsory military service, with campaigns that go with
add the system of decimation applied to the legions in defeat .....
for those who ignore the decimated: It is to line up the Roman legions, then randomly a Roman officer located in the column, and every ten legionnaires counted, the fate of the rank and runs up to 10% of workforce in order to galvanize the troops to fight ............
add further to this, the harsh climate of Germany thick fog, the light that filters and chokes the sound, damp cold, which infiltrate under the heavy and cumbersome armor,
demons that inhabit this vast and dark forest, which covers everything .... the, or the Roman legions effective if held in plain here in the woods and marshes, it is ineffective
Hostile territory by reference, Rome did not sing the Roman legions conquered parts of the territories farther north among Danes, which only came carts filled with heads of legionnaires as a fatal warning

and the constant threat still well hidden from my brothers ready to pounce on them every moment ...

and why all this? why? a region of Northern Europe who has not the wealth of Egypt ?
a land inhabited by fierce barbarians who thirst for Roman blood?
apart from the insult to Rome, killing three Roman legions, the emperor Augustus was aware that the expansion of his empire s would stop, aware that to strip an area of the empire to build another region would weaken the whole.

The priority now would be to try to maintain the military power of Rome and to stop the will of the expansionist empire.

The petition was addressed to Flavius Make me my legions
was that the demonstration proved its inability to recreate three legions ..... the beginning of the end.