The Lawspeaker
03-03-2009, 02:29 PM
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
By John Locke
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/John_Locke_%281632-1704%29.png
Book I -- Innate Notions
Chapter i: Introduction
1. Since it is the understanding that sets man above all other animals and enables him to use and dominate them, it is certainly worth our while to enquire into it. The understanding is like the eye in this respect: it makes us see and perceive all other things but doesn’t look in on itself. To stand back from it and treat it as an object of study requires skill and hard work Still, whatever difficulties there may be in doing this, whatever it is that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves, it will be worthwhile to let as much light as possible in upon our minds, and to learn as much as we can about our own understandings. As well as being enjoyable, this will help us to think well about other topics.
2. My purpose, therefore, is to enquire into Ÿthe origin, certainty, and extent of human
knowledge, and also into Ÿthe grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent. I shan’t involve myself with the biological aspects of the mind. For example, I shan’t wrestle with the question of what alterations of our bodies lead to our having sensation through our sense-organs or to our having any ideas in our understandings. Challenging and entertaining as these questions may be, I shall by-pass them because they aren’t relevant to my project. All we need for my purposes is to consider the human ability to think. My time will be well spent if by this plain, factual method I can explain how our understandings come to have those notions of things that we have, and can establish ways of measuring how certainly we can know things, and of evaluating the grounds we have for our opinions. Although our opinions are various, different, and often wholly contradictory, we express them with great assurance and confidence. Someone observing human opinions from the outside - seeing how they conflict with one another, and yet how fondly they are embraced and how stubbornly they are maintained - might have reason to suspect that either there isn’t any such thing as truth or that mankind isn’t equipped to come to know it.
3. So it will be worth our while to find where the line falls between opinion and knowledge, and to learn more about the ‘opinion’ side of the line. What I want to know is this: When we are
concerned with something about which we have no certain knowledge, what rules or standards should guide how confident we allow ourselves to be that our opinions are right? Here is the method I shall follow in trying to answer that question.
First, I shall enquire into the origin of those ideas or notions - call them what you will - that
a man observes and is conscious of having in his mind. How does the understanding come to be equipped with them?
Secondly, I shall try to show what knowledge the understanding has by means of those ideas
- how much of it there is, how secure it is, and how self-evident it is.
I shall also enquire a little into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion - that is,
acceptance of something as true when we don’t know for certain that it is true.
4. I hope that this enquiry into the nature of the understanding will enable me to discover what its powers are - how far they reach, what things they are adequate to deal with, and where they fail us. If I succeed, that may have the effect of persuading the busy mind of man Ÿto be more
cautious in meddling with things that are beyond its powers to understand; Ÿto stop when it is at the extreme end of its tether; and Ÿto be peacefully reconciled to ignorance of things that turn out to be beyond the reach of our capacities. Perhaps then we shall stop pretending that we know everything, and shall be less bold in raising questions and getting into confusing disputes with others about things to which our understandings are not suited - things of which we can’t form any clear or distinct perceptions in our minds, or, as happens all too often, things of which we have no notions at all. If we can find out what the scope of the understanding is, how far it is able to achieve certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess, that may teach us to accept our limitations and to rest content with knowing only what our human condition enables us to know.
5. For, though the reach of our understandings falls far short of the vast extent of things, we shall still have reason to praise God for the kind and amount of knowledge that he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of creation. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God has seen fit to give them, since he has given them everything they need for the Ÿconveniences of life and the forming of virtuous characters - that is, everything they need to discover how to Ÿthrive in this life and how to Ÿfind their way to a better one. . . . Men can find plenty of material for thought, and for a great variety of pleasurable physical activities, if they don’t presumptuously complain about their own constitution and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with because their hands are not big enough to grasp everything. We shan’t have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds if we will only employ them on topics that may be of use to us; for on those they are very capable. . . .
6. When we know what our ·muscular· strength is, we shall have a better idea of what·physical
tasks· we can attempt with hopes of success. And when we have thoroughly surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate of what we can expect from them, we shan’t be inclined either Ÿto sit still, and not set our thoughts to work at all, in despair of knowing anything or Ÿto question everything, and make no claim to any knowledge because some things can’t be understood. It is very useful for the sailor to know how long his line is, even though it is too short to fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is good for him to know that it is long enough to reach the bottom at places where he needs to know where it is, and to caution him against running aground. . . .
7. This was what first started me on this Essay Concerning the Understanding. I thought that the first step towards answering various questions that people are apt to raise ·about other things· was to take a look at our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what they are fitted for. Till that was done (I suspected) we were starting at the wrong end - letting our thoughts range over the vast ocean of being, as though there were no limits to what we could understand, thereby spoiling our chances of getting a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concern us. . . . If men consider the capacities of our understandings, discover how far our knowledge extends, and find the horizon that marks off Ÿthe illuminated parts of things from Ÿthe dark ones, Ÿthe things we can understand from Ÿthe things we can’t, then perhaps they would be more willing to accept their admitted ignorance of Ÿthe former, and devote their thought and talk more profitably and satisfyingly to Ÿthe latter.
8. Before moving on, I must here at the outset ask you to excuse how frequently you will find me using the word ‘idea’ in this book. It seems to be the best word to stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by
‘phantasm’, ‘notion’, ‘species’, or whatever it is that the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I couldn’t avoid frequently using it.
Nobody, I presume, will deny that there are such ideas in men’s minds; everyone is
conscious of them in himself, and men’s words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others. Our first enquiry then will be, how they come into the mind.
Source and more (http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfbig/lockebig.pdf)(PDF)
By John Locke
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/John_Locke_%281632-1704%29.png
Book I -- Innate Notions
Chapter i: Introduction
1. Since it is the understanding that sets man above all other animals and enables him to use and dominate them, it is certainly worth our while to enquire into it. The understanding is like the eye in this respect: it makes us see and perceive all other things but doesn’t look in on itself. To stand back from it and treat it as an object of study requires skill and hard work Still, whatever difficulties there may be in doing this, whatever it is that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves, it will be worthwhile to let as much light as possible in upon our minds, and to learn as much as we can about our own understandings. As well as being enjoyable, this will help us to think well about other topics.
2. My purpose, therefore, is to enquire into Ÿthe origin, certainty, and extent of human
knowledge, and also into Ÿthe grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent. I shan’t involve myself with the biological aspects of the mind. For example, I shan’t wrestle with the question of what alterations of our bodies lead to our having sensation through our sense-organs or to our having any ideas in our understandings. Challenging and entertaining as these questions may be, I shall by-pass them because they aren’t relevant to my project. All we need for my purposes is to consider the human ability to think. My time will be well spent if by this plain, factual method I can explain how our understandings come to have those notions of things that we have, and can establish ways of measuring how certainly we can know things, and of evaluating the grounds we have for our opinions. Although our opinions are various, different, and often wholly contradictory, we express them with great assurance and confidence. Someone observing human opinions from the outside - seeing how they conflict with one another, and yet how fondly they are embraced and how stubbornly they are maintained - might have reason to suspect that either there isn’t any such thing as truth or that mankind isn’t equipped to come to know it.
3. So it will be worth our while to find where the line falls between opinion and knowledge, and to learn more about the ‘opinion’ side of the line. What I want to know is this: When we are
concerned with something about which we have no certain knowledge, what rules or standards should guide how confident we allow ourselves to be that our opinions are right? Here is the method I shall follow in trying to answer that question.
First, I shall enquire into the origin of those ideas or notions - call them what you will - that
a man observes and is conscious of having in his mind. How does the understanding come to be equipped with them?
Secondly, I shall try to show what knowledge the understanding has by means of those ideas
- how much of it there is, how secure it is, and how self-evident it is.
I shall also enquire a little into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion - that is,
acceptance of something as true when we don’t know for certain that it is true.
4. I hope that this enquiry into the nature of the understanding will enable me to discover what its powers are - how far they reach, what things they are adequate to deal with, and where they fail us. If I succeed, that may have the effect of persuading the busy mind of man Ÿto be more
cautious in meddling with things that are beyond its powers to understand; Ÿto stop when it is at the extreme end of its tether; and Ÿto be peacefully reconciled to ignorance of things that turn out to be beyond the reach of our capacities. Perhaps then we shall stop pretending that we know everything, and shall be less bold in raising questions and getting into confusing disputes with others about things to which our understandings are not suited - things of which we can’t form any clear or distinct perceptions in our minds, or, as happens all too often, things of which we have no notions at all. If we can find out what the scope of the understanding is, how far it is able to achieve certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess, that may teach us to accept our limitations and to rest content with knowing only what our human condition enables us to know.
5. For, though the reach of our understandings falls far short of the vast extent of things, we shall still have reason to praise God for the kind and amount of knowledge that he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of creation. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God has seen fit to give them, since he has given them everything they need for the Ÿconveniences of life and the forming of virtuous characters - that is, everything they need to discover how to Ÿthrive in this life and how to Ÿfind their way to a better one. . . . Men can find plenty of material for thought, and for a great variety of pleasurable physical activities, if they don’t presumptuously complain about their own constitution and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with because their hands are not big enough to grasp everything. We shan’t have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds if we will only employ them on topics that may be of use to us; for on those they are very capable. . . .
6. When we know what our ·muscular· strength is, we shall have a better idea of what·physical
tasks· we can attempt with hopes of success. And when we have thoroughly surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate of what we can expect from them, we shan’t be inclined either Ÿto sit still, and not set our thoughts to work at all, in despair of knowing anything or Ÿto question everything, and make no claim to any knowledge because some things can’t be understood. It is very useful for the sailor to know how long his line is, even though it is too short to fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is good for him to know that it is long enough to reach the bottom at places where he needs to know where it is, and to caution him against running aground. . . .
7. This was what first started me on this Essay Concerning the Understanding. I thought that the first step towards answering various questions that people are apt to raise ·about other things· was to take a look at our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what they are fitted for. Till that was done (I suspected) we were starting at the wrong end - letting our thoughts range over the vast ocean of being, as though there were no limits to what we could understand, thereby spoiling our chances of getting a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concern us. . . . If men consider the capacities of our understandings, discover how far our knowledge extends, and find the horizon that marks off Ÿthe illuminated parts of things from Ÿthe dark ones, Ÿthe things we can understand from Ÿthe things we can’t, then perhaps they would be more willing to accept their admitted ignorance of Ÿthe former, and devote their thought and talk more profitably and satisfyingly to Ÿthe latter.
8. Before moving on, I must here at the outset ask you to excuse how frequently you will find me using the word ‘idea’ in this book. It seems to be the best word to stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by
‘phantasm’, ‘notion’, ‘species’, or whatever it is that the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I couldn’t avoid frequently using it.
Nobody, I presume, will deny that there are such ideas in men’s minds; everyone is
conscious of them in himself, and men’s words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others. Our first enquiry then will be, how they come into the mind.
Source and more (http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfbig/lockebig.pdf)(PDF)