PDA

View Full Version : The Problem of the Far East: Nazi Germany's Policy Toward Japan



Joe McCarthy
09-24-2011, 10:41 AM
This is a translated article from a chapbook of SS literature a friend of mine shared with me sometime ago. It reveals the danger inherent in Nazi Germany's pro-Japan policy and its implications for the West.


The Problem of the Far East

All Far Eastern politics are Japanese politics: all concerns of the Far East are Japanese concerns.

Japan's first and greatest problem, is: gaining space as a vent for a population density of 180 inhabitants per square kilometer, which is still steadily growing. The second problem, which is closely connected with this one, is: Japan's hegemony in the Far East for the protection of the Japanese life drive and for the elimination of the servitude of the folks there in the services of the English, American and French capital.

Especially England and America have never seen in the Far East anything but a promising business region with limitless possibilities, which will exist and be viable as long as one is willing to ruthlessly walk over corpses. France has held itself somewhat in the background in this respect, without acting basically any different than both close pals.

Since Japan's strengthening as a result of the smart and goal-conscious reform of the great Emperor Meiji, a Japanese push toward elimination of the continent's suppression by Europe and America has been unmistakable. Japan withstood its test of strength radiantly in the Russian-Japanese War. Nothing suited it more than the World War, the product of English envy at the deserved German successes. Since the Japanese long knows what we Germans only grasped a few years ago, namely that one must pursue foreign policy with a cool head and not with a hot heart, he did not feel the slightest inhibitions to view Germany, a friend for half as century, as an enemy as long as there was something for Japan to gain in this war.

And that was not even very much. It had to return Tsingtau to China in 1923, the German South Sea possessions were not particularly valuable or even spatially significant. Furthermore it had to promise not to fortify these islands, just as America promised to above all not fortify the island Guam and the Philippines, and as England refrained from further expanding Hong Kong as a fleet base. Furthermore, the Washington Treaty of 1922 set the relative fleet strengths of England, America and Japan in the ratio 5:5:3.

Japan's goal was firm from the start and it will also always remain the same: the exploitation of the disunity and weakness of the powers interested in the Far East to the advantage of the sole real great power in that part of the world: Japan. So when it had meanwhile become strong enough, it revoked the fleet treaty and placed fundamental conditions for new negotiations from the start.

As not to be otherwise expected, the main condition was Japan's fleet equality with England and America. Since Japan must be far superior to all other powers of the earth in the Far East - first, because it is incomparably so much closer, and second, because it does not fight for reasons of profit, like the other powers, but from bitter necessity - one could calculate on the fingers of one hand that a fleet equality would be the end of White domination in the Far East. The conference fell apart.

Japan thus regained its freedom of action, while the great democracies resorted to their old weapon, the economic blockade, in order to prevent any significant armament by Japan. As in Germany's case, they were mistaken here as well, because they underestimated Japan. The democracies, thinking solely in terms of numbers and percentages, could not imagine that - aside from so and so many tons of iron and gold, copper and rubber - there are for a suffering folk certain imponderables, which have such un-businesslike names as: national discipline, readiness to sacrfice, voluntary self-restraint and defiance.

So they had to make a miscalculation here, which they nonethless repeated with Germany, without ever learning from it. Since Japan had issued its "Monroe Declaration" on April 17, 1924, which only produced a lame protest from the other powers, its prestige in the Far East already grew tremendously.

When in 1931 the world economic crisis reached its peak and all European powers had their hands full at home, Japan initiated a war against China
and also achieved the seperation of Manchuria from China and its
transformation into the independent state Mandshukuo, which one could
designate a vassal state of Japan, because it stands totally under
Japanese trusteeship.

Since then Japan's advance no longer knew any halt. The three
democracies, which ardently wished for the preservation of the status quo
in the Far East, were in time joined by the Soviet Union, which wanted to
somewhat preserve the already reduced position of its harbour
Wladiwostok [ which means "Rule the East!" ]. It is meanwhile a sign of
the times that the Russians now consider the forward zone up to
Chabarowsk as quick sand, which in the event of a war will immediately
be lost.

For Japan must turn toward the mainland. Korea and Mandshukuo can not be significant colonization land for the Japanese, above all not for the
Japanese peasant, because the climate is too severe for him and he
cannot cultivate his primary food, rice. Australia with its six million
inhabitats on 7.7 million square kilometers has for decades had a strict
immigration ban against all people of color, which is however also
extended to Whites, so that a surplus of labor can not push down wages,
That the country's development is thereby artificially prevented,
naturally means nothing.

But where else should Japan turn? America has prevented or restricted
Japanese immigration for decades, the South Sea islands obviously also
do not come into question for any significant colonization. So aside
from the Philippines, so far in American possession, and the Dutch
possessions, only the mainland remains.

But the mainland is so densely populated that precisely in China's
coastal areas a Japanese settlement is hardly feasible. China's average
population density is 115 inhabitants per square kilometer, but in the
fertile coastal areas it often reaches 550 people per square kilometer.
In the province Kiangsu the density is 349, in Tschekiang 256, Schantung
239 and Honan 204.

After President Roosevelt signed a law a few years ago that grants the
Philippines full independence in ten years, it remains to be seen if the
Philippians actually get this for them rather useless freedom. It should
indeed be the case, then one can certainly presume that Japan will soon
afterward take possession of this country. The USA knows that very well and also knows that in the long run it can never hold the Philippine Islands taken from Spain roughly 40 years ago by force.

So China will never be able to be Japanese colonization land. The
Philippines offer greater possibilities and likewise the Dutch East
Indies, where many tens of thousands of Japanese already reside,
primarily as merchants and tradesmen. Since the overthrow of the Chinese
monarchy, and even many decades previously, China was a sphere of
influence and object of exploitation by the Anglo-Saxon powers. Any
expansion by Japan in the Far East, however, would be impossible, or at
least gravely threatened as long as the clumsy colossus China found
itself in the hands of anti-Japanese.

It is hence an unavoidable necessity that Japan faces, if it for decades
tries to bring China under its influence. For years now, a strong man
has emerged in Marshal Chiangkaischek, who as Japan's opponent wishes to
lead his country back to the old greatness. As long as his intentions
were directly only toward this goal, we understood them. Since, however,
the real weakness of the Anglo-Saxon powers in the Far East became
apparent, Chiangkaischek turned to the Soviet Union in order to get its
help against Japan. Here our understanding then ended.

Japan is the land of the future in the Far East, because of the
character of the Japanese folk and because of its virtues, which make it
capable of the greatest deeds and destine it to something higher. The
Japanese dynamics, spiritually related to ours, stands in gross
constrast to the soft dreamy essence of the Chinaman. Thus for years we
Germans have reckoned that Japan will sooner or later exercise
domination over the folks of the Far East. If we establish friendly
relations with this folk, that is not due to sympathy alone, rather also
political reason.

We also knew for a long time that Franco was Spain's coming man. In
addition to our natural sympathy for his struggle, clear considerations
also played an important role in the formation of our relations with
him. And that is good. For every clear head knows that he only has good
friends as long as he is strong and will remain strong. Having strong
friends is thus not only a sign of sympathy...

In the Boor War Germany back then made a bad mistake. Instead of
reconciling with the idea that England - as a replacement for the, in
time of war problematic, Suez Canal route to India - had to secure a
second, older route around the Cape of Good Hope, since the named sea
route is the backbone of the British World Empire, the German press
raged against the conquest of the key position of South Africa by the
English.

From the general human standpoint that was doubtlessly very good and
moral, but it did not help the Boors and only brought us English
hostility. When a change of the status quo comes in the world, in cases
which are natural, one should guard against pronounced indignation. One
can instead gain much more for one's country, for a well-meaning
neutrality does not always have to be offered for free...

Meanwhile, we have long since recognized the mistakes of back then. It
is now a sign of the times that the mistakes of back then are now being
made by the others. But just as our failure back then was dead certain,
so is the failure of the others today a normal fact, for whose
prediction one does not need to be a prophet.

Wilhelm II once coined the term "Yellow Peril". What about it? Asia will
sooner or later belong to the Asians, without a White power being able
to do anything about it. Most Asian folks stand culturally much too high
for one to be able to make colonial folks out of them. Simply the
ancestor worship of the Japanese and Chinese stands far above what most
White folks practice at present in this respect.

The Japanese themselves do not think of world conquest, while the
Chinese, due to reasons of their general character inclination, are not
even suited to it. There will certainly be no yellow peril as long as
the European nations are strong or atleast halfway unified. The
quintessence of all thinkings hence runs that the White folks must
prepare themselves for an end to their political influence in the Far
East soon and only keep sight of the preservation of their economic
terrain, if they want to proceed wisely.

England is temporarily sure of Hong Kong and Singapore. France is less
optimistic regarding Indo-China. Holland, however, does not feel at all
well at the thought of the Dutch East Indies, because it knows precisely
that it can never help this its own colony on its own strength, if it
comes down to it. It hence relies on England and bases itself on
Singapore, which has been massively built up in the last years. This is
also the reason for Holland sailing in England's wake, even if it does
not correspond to Dutch interests. For without its East Indian
possessions, Holland would be nothing but an obscure, small state
without any political significance. Since England is considered the
protector of these possessions, Holland must follow it through thick and
thin.

If especially America and England today regret Japan's strengthening,
they must admit that they themselves have caused all that from the first
minute onward. Japan was forced to enter world politics against its will
in 1853 by the American Admiral Perry. Its first treaty was then
concluded on March 31, 1854 with Perry in Kanagawa, which openned the
harbours Shimoda and Hakodate to the Americans and lifted the ban
against Whites entering the country.

Because the Anglo-Saxons have inflicted so much nonsense on the Far
East, the demand "Asia for the Asians" can not be initially traced back
to Japanese propaganda, rather to the disillusionment with England and
America. When they forced China to declare war against Germany, they knew that hardly a single Chinese soldier would really participate in the
war. It was not about a strategic, rather a political issue. Namely,
through the declaration of war, Germany's claims to extraterritorial "concessions" in China's large cities were abolished. For the
first time Whites, namely Germans, could be arrested by Chinese police
and sentenced by Chinese courts. They wanted to hurt Germany, but they
hurt the White race in its entirety.

Germany is since then only economically interested in the Far East, but
protects these interests outlandishly. In light of that it sounds too
childish when the democracies occasionally accuse us - precisely
Germany! - of treason against the interests of the White race through
the Axis Pact with Japan. From the Dutch side, the childish proposal is
sometimes made to transfer to Germany the eastern-most Dutch possessions for administration under Dutch sovereignty.

The Asiatic folks today stand on the offensive, the previous masters of
the defensive. Naturally, in the Far East nothing happens as swiftly as
in Europe. Among us, one does not have the correct concept of the
tremendous distances to be overome there. Therefore, the
Japanese-Chinese war is a protracted one, and is also understood as such
by the Japanese, while a naval war under present conditions with Japan
on the one side and England and America on the other would only have
chances for Japan due to its splendidly remote location, due to its
"splendid isolation", of which until recently the English boasted.
England has lost this protracted situation due to the development of the
Luftwaffe, but Japan is sure of it, especially if China first comes
under it's guardianship. Singapore is, after all, 6,000 kilometers from
Osaka!

Since the emptiness of Soviet militarism just proved itself again at
Tschangkufeng, and England, France and America are totally occupied with
their arson in Europe, Japan will one day present the great democracies
with accomplished facts, which is could create in peace undistrurbed.

Presumably, the great peace apostles will then be amazed. We will not be
surprised, because for years we have reckoned with it and have
recognized this development as being natural and logical.

And meanwhile our trade with the Far East grows, blossoms and thrives,
especially with Mandshukuo, whose important trade partner today after
Japan is Germany.

Joe McCarthy
09-24-2011, 11:54 AM
In commenting on the above my friend had this to say:


My own view, is that regardless of how one might sympathize with the Nazis, from a purely racial perspective, their alliance with Japan was racial treason. Whilst all powers involved made use of non-white volunteers, including Germany, the Allies did not encourage non-white states to invade white states.

Logan
09-24-2011, 12:49 PM
'In light of that it sounds too childish when the democracies occasionally accuse us - precisely Germany! - of treason against the interests of the White race through the Axis Pact with Japan.'

The Germans were up to the same as when they joined up with the U.S.S.R.

This, more than a 'dangerous implication' in either war.
http://www.papillontravels.net/Euro2009/Images/93rd%20soldiers.jpg
http://www.blackpresence.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/BWI_chaytor-300x258.jpg
http://www.archives.gov/research/african-americans/ww2-pictures/images/african-americans-wwii-024.jpg

Joe McCarthy
09-24-2011, 01:39 PM
Interesting to say the least that the Allies accused Nazi Germany of racial treason for aligning with Japan. That is a factoid not likely to be welcomed by the mainstream press or Hitlerites.

demiirel
09-24-2011, 01:49 PM
Perhaps national interest was more important to the Nazis than race?

demiirel
09-24-2011, 02:01 PM
Japan was acting on the basis of pure imperialism for the sake of national aggrandizement.

From http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin16_p4.pdf


DOCUMENT No. 1
Information Memorandum, “About the Claims of the
Chinese Leaders with Regard to the Mongolian People’s
Republic,” by USSR Far Eastern Department First
Secretary, I. Kalabukhov, 30 January 1964
[Source: CWIHP Collection (www.cwihp.org).]
TOP SECRET. Copy No. 1

During the same conversation, Liu Shaoqi added that the
Chinese people allegedly are very deeply pained by Mongolia’s
secession from China. He noted that when the Soviet Union
was celebrating the 300-year anniversary of the reunification
of Ukraine with Russia, [some people] said in China that 300
years ago Mongolia was already a part of China and asked
whether it could be reunited with China. The Chinese, Liu
Shaoqi continued, consider Mongolia, like Taiwan, a part of
their territory.

Comrade Mikoyan replied that it is wrong to equate Mongolia
with Taiwan. Chinese [people] live in Taiwan, but in Mongolia
there is a completely different nationality. Mongolia was not
a de facto part of China even under the tsar. It acquired independent
existence as a state after the October Revolution, and
the Mongolians, having learned the taste of national independence,
will now hardly want to abandon it. We, continued
A. I. Mikoyan, never considered joining Mongolia to the
Soviet Union. When the Japanese occupied a part of China
and decided to grab Mongolia as well, we defended it with
weapons in our hands. When the danger passed, we pulled
out our forces from the MPR [Mongolian People’s Republic]
and helped the Mongolians create a national army to defend
their own country. Moreover, at the time some Mongolian
comrades raised the question of joining Mongolia to the USSR
as a Soviet Republic. We categorically refused this. Finally,
continued Comrade Mikoyan, the Chinese communists should
not be worried about the existence of regret in the PRC regarding
the MPR’s secession from China because the very act of
Mongolia’s formal secession from China was carried out by
Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] government, and not by the
PRC government, and this act was correct and proceeded from
the [de facto] situation.

Comrade Mikoyan, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/53/%D0%90%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%81_%D0%98% D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87_%D0%9C%D 0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%8F%D0%BD.jpg

Joe McCarthy
09-24-2011, 02:07 PM
Perhaps national interest was more important to the Nazis than race?

I'd say that's accurate, but it's not something neo-Nazi romanticists want to hear. Ultimately though Germany's Faustian bargain with Japan was no use to it militarily. It just got Germany into war with the US.

demiirel
09-24-2011, 02:14 PM
I'd say that's accurate, but it's not something neo-Nazi romanticists want to hear. Ultimately though Germany's Faustian bargain with Japan was no use to it militarily. It just got Germany into war with the US.

Those Japanese shouldn't have gone to war with the US. They should have just concentrated on taking Mongolia and Siberia and generally diverting Soviet forces eastward. Japan's whole Pacific campaign was totally unnecessary. It led them to ignore the Mongolian front, the most important front.

Logan
09-24-2011, 03:02 PM
Those Japanese shouldn't have gone to war with the US. They should have just concentrated on taking Mongolia and Siberia and generally diverting Soviet forces eastward. Japan's whole Pacific campaign was totally unnecessary. It led them to ignore the Mongolian front, the most important front.

Battles of Khalkhin-Gol. They did well against the Chinese, but not so with the Soviets.

http://siberianlight.net/khalkhin-gol-battle-nomonhan/

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/91/Battlefields_in_the_Russo_Japanese_War.jpg

http://www.russojapanesewar.com/

demiirel
09-24-2011, 03:40 PM
Battles of Khalkhin-Gol. They did well against the Chinese, but not so with the Soviets.

http://siberianlight.net/khalkhin-gol-battle-nomonhan/

http://www.russojapanesewar.com/

Great link!

Yeah Khalkhin-Gol was pivotal. Zhukov was a great general.

Medvedev with Mongolian President Elbegdorj in Mongolia during the 70th anniversary of Khalkhin-Gol:
http://www.novinite.com/media/images/2009-08/photo_verybig_107155.jpg