Joe McCarthy
02-12-2012, 02:11 PM
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7d/OljeituToPhilippeLeBel1305.jpg/260px-OljeituToPhilippeLeBel1305.jpg
1305 letter (a roll measuring 302 by 50 centimetres (9.91 by 1.6 ft)) from the Ilkhan Mongol Öljaitü to King Philip IV of France, suggesting military collaboration
Franco-Mongol relations were established in the 13th century, when the Christian Crusaders and the Mongol Empire attempted to form a Franco-Mongol alliance against various Muslim empires. Such an alliance might have seemed an obvious choice to both parties: the Mongols were sympathetic to Christianity, given the presence of many influential Nestorian Christians in the Mongol court. The Franks (Western Europeans and those in the Crusader States of the Levant[1]) were open to the idea of support from the East, owing to the long-running legend of the mythical Prester John, an Eastern king in a magical kingdom whom many believed would one day come to the assistance of the Crusaders in the Holy Land.[2][3] The Franks and Mongols shared a common enemy in the Muslims, but despite many messages, gifts, and emissaries over the course of several decades, the often-proposed alliance never came to fruition.[2][4]
Contact between Europeans and Mongols began in about 1220, with occasional messages from the papacy and European monarchs to Mongol leaders such as the Great Khan, and subsequently to the Ilkhans in Mongol-conquered Iran. Communications tended to follow a recurring pattern: the Europeans asked the Mongols to convert to Western Christianity, and the Mongols responded with demands for submission and tribute. The Mongols had already conquered many Christian and Muslim nations in their advance across Asia. After destroying the Muslim Abbasid and Ayyubid dynasties, for the next few generations the Mongols fought the remaining Islamic power in the region, the Egyptian Mamluks. Hethum I, king of the Christian nation of Cilician Armenia, had submitted to the Mongols in 1247, and strongly encouraged other monarchs to engage in a Christian-Mongol alliance, but was only able to persuade his son-in-law, Prince Bohemond VI of the Crusader State of Antioch, who submitted in 1260. Other Christian leaders, such as the Crusaders of Acre, perceived the Mongols as the most significant threat in the region. The Barons of Acre therefore engaged in an unusual passive alliance with the Egyptian Mamluks, allowing Muslim forces to advance unopposed through Crusader territory to engage and defeat the Mongols at 1260's pivotal Battle of Ain Jalut.[5]
European attitudes began to change in the mid-1260s, from perceiving the Mongols as enemies to be feared, to potential allies against the Muslims. The Mongols sought to capitalize on this, promising a re-conquered Jerusalem to the Europeans in return for cooperation. Attempts to cement an alliance continued through negotiations with many leaders of the Mongol Ilkhanate in Iran, from its founder Hulagu to his descendants Abaqa, Arghun, Ghazan, and Öljaitü, but without success. The Mongols invaded Syria several times between 1281 and 1312, sometimes in attempts at joint operations with the Franks. But the considerable logistical difficulties involved meant that their forces were never able to coordinate their simultaneous arrival, and thus could not cooperate in any meaningful way.[6] The Mongol Empire eventually dissolved into civil war, and the Egyptian Mamluks successfully recaptured all of Palestine and Syria from the Crusaders. After the Fall of Acre in 1291, the remaining Crusaders retreated to the island of Cyprus. A final attempt was made to establish a bridgehead at the small island of Ruad off the coast of Tortosa, again in an attempt by the Crusaders to coordinate military action with the Mongols, but the plan failed, and the Egyptians besieged the island. With the Fall of Ruad in 1302 or 1303, the Crusaders lost their last foothold in the Holy Land.[7]
Modern historians debate whether a successful alliance between the Franks and Mongols would have shifted the balance of power in the region, and if it would have been a wise choice on the part of the Europeans.[8] Traditionally, the Mongols tended to see outside parties as either subjects or enemies, with little room in the middle for a concept such as ally
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/41/B_Gregor_X.jpg
Pope Gregory X (1210–1276) promulgated a new crusade in liaison with the Mongols in 1274
Edward I's crusade (1269–1274)In 1269, the English Prince Edward (the future Edward I), inspired by tales of his great-uncle, Richard the Lionheart, and the second crusade of the French King Louis, started on a crusade of his own, the Ninth Crusade.[85] The number of knights and retainers that accompanied Edward on the crusade was quite small, possibly around 230 knights, with a total complement of approximately 1,000 people, transported in a flotilla of 13 ships.[46][86] Edward understood the value of an alliance with the Mongols, and upon his arrival in Acre on May 9, 1271, he immediately sent an embassy to the Mongol ruler Abaqa, requesting assistance.[87] Abaqa answered positively to Edward's request, asking him to coordinate his activities with his general Samagar, whom he sent on an offensive against the Mamluks with 10,000 Mongols to join Edward's army.[36][88] But Edward was able only to engage in some fairly ineffectual raids that did not actually achieve success in gaining new territory.[85] For example, when he engaged in a raid into the Plain of Sharon, he proved unable to even take the small Mamluk fortress of Qaqun.[36] However, Edward's military operations, limited though they were, were still of assistance in persuading the Mamluk leader Baibars to agree to a 10-year truce between the city of Acre and the Mamluks, signed in 1272.[89] Edward's efforts were described by historian Reuven Amitai as "the nearest thing to real Mongol-Frankish military coordination that was ever to be achieved, by Edward or any other Frankish leader."
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3b/Mongol_raids_into_Syria_and_Palestine_ca_1300.svg/350px-Mongol_raids_into_Syria_and_Palestine_ca_1300.svg. png
In 1299/1300, the Mongols engaged in battles for cities in Syria, and engaged in raids as far south as Gaza.
There has been much discussion among historians as to why the Franco-Mongol alliance never became a reality and why, despite all the diplomatic contacts, it stayed a chimera or fantasy.[3][8] Many reasons have been proposed: one was that the Mongols at that stage in their empire were not entirely focused on expanding to the West. By the late 13th century, the Mongol leaders were several generations removed from the great Genghis Khan, and internal disruption was brewing. The original nomadic Mongols from the day of Genghis had become more settled, and had turned into administrators instead of conquerors. Battles were springing up that were Mongol against Mongol, which took troops away from the front in Syria.[153] There was also confusion within Europe as to the differences between the Mongols of the Ilkhanate in the Holy Land, and the Mongols of the Golden Horde, who were attacking Eastern Europe in Hungary and Poland. Within the Mongol Empire, the Ilkhanids and the Golden Horde considered each other enemies, but it took time for Western observers to be able to distinguish between the different parts of the Mongol Empire.[153] From the Mongol side, there were also concerns as to just how much clout the Franks could have brought to bear,[154] especially as there was decreased interest in Europe in pursuing the Crusades.[152] Court historians of Mongol Iran made no mention whatsoever of the communications between the Ilkhans and the Christian West, and barely mentioned the Franks at all. The communications were evidently not seen as important by the Mongols, and may have even been considered embarrassing. The Mongol leader Ghazan, a converted Muslim since 1295, might not have wanted to be perceived as trying to gain the assistance of infidels against his fellow Muslims in Egypt. When Mongol historians did make notes of foreign territories, the areas were usually categorized as either "enemies", "conquered", or "in rebellion". The Franks, in that context, were listed in the same category as the Egyptians, in that they were enemies to be conquered. The idea of "ally" was foreign to the Mongols.[155]
Some European monarchs responded positively to Mongol inquiries, but became vague and evasive when asked to actually commit troops and resources. Logistics also became more complex – the Egyptian Mamluks were genuinely concerned about the threat of another wave of Crusader forces, so each time the Mamluks captured another castle or port, instead of occupying it, they systematically destroyed it so that it could never be used again. This both made it more difficult for the Crusaders to plan military operations, and increased the expense of those operations. Monarchs in Western Europe often gave lip service to the idea of going on crusade, as a way of making an emotional appeal to their subjects, but in reality they would take years to prepare, and sometimes never actually left for Outremer. Internal wars in Europe, such as the War of the Vespers, were also distracting attention, and making it less likely for European nobles to want to commit their military to the Crusades, when they were more needed at home.[156][157]
Another concern among the Europeans about the long-term goals of the Mongols. The early Mongol diplomacy had been not a simple offer of cooperation, but straightforward demands for submission. It was only in later communications that the Mongol diplomats started to adopt a more conciliatory tone; but they still used language that more implied command than entreaty. Even the Armenian historian Hayton of Corycus, the most enthusiastic advocate of Western-Mongol collaboration, freely admitted that the Mongol leadership was not inclined to listen to European advice. His recommendation was that even if working together, European armies and Mongol armies should avoid contact because of the Mongol arrogance. European leaders were aware that the Mongols would not have been content to stop at the Holy Land, but were on a clear quest for world domination. If the Mongols had achieved a successful alliance with the West and destroyed the Mamluk Sultanate, there is little doubt that the Mongols would have then proceeded to conquer Africa. There, no strong state could have stood in their way until Morocco and the Islamic caliphates in the Maghreb of northwest Africa. The Mongols would have turned upon the Franks of Cyprus and the Byzantines.[153]
And lastly, there was not much support among the general populace in Europe for a Mongol alliance. Writers in Europe were creating "recovery" literature with their ideas about how best to recover the Holy Land, but few mentioned the Mongols as a genuine possibility. In 1306, when Pope Clement V asked the leaders of the military orders, Jacques de Molay and Fulk de Villaret, to present their proposals for how the Crusades should proceed, neither of them factored in any kind of a Mongol alliance. A few later proposals talked briefly about the Mongols as being a force that could invade Syria and keep the Mamluks distracted, but not as a force that could be counted on for cooperation.
http://cdn9.wn.com/pd/c4/60/deccf5b4bac59e79f7edb7e97a04_grande.jpg
Letter of Timur to Charles VI of France, 1402
1305 letter (a roll measuring 302 by 50 centimetres (9.91 by 1.6 ft)) from the Ilkhan Mongol Öljaitü to King Philip IV of France, suggesting military collaboration
Franco-Mongol relations were established in the 13th century, when the Christian Crusaders and the Mongol Empire attempted to form a Franco-Mongol alliance against various Muslim empires. Such an alliance might have seemed an obvious choice to both parties: the Mongols were sympathetic to Christianity, given the presence of many influential Nestorian Christians in the Mongol court. The Franks (Western Europeans and those in the Crusader States of the Levant[1]) were open to the idea of support from the East, owing to the long-running legend of the mythical Prester John, an Eastern king in a magical kingdom whom many believed would one day come to the assistance of the Crusaders in the Holy Land.[2][3] The Franks and Mongols shared a common enemy in the Muslims, but despite many messages, gifts, and emissaries over the course of several decades, the often-proposed alliance never came to fruition.[2][4]
Contact between Europeans and Mongols began in about 1220, with occasional messages from the papacy and European monarchs to Mongol leaders such as the Great Khan, and subsequently to the Ilkhans in Mongol-conquered Iran. Communications tended to follow a recurring pattern: the Europeans asked the Mongols to convert to Western Christianity, and the Mongols responded with demands for submission and tribute. The Mongols had already conquered many Christian and Muslim nations in their advance across Asia. After destroying the Muslim Abbasid and Ayyubid dynasties, for the next few generations the Mongols fought the remaining Islamic power in the region, the Egyptian Mamluks. Hethum I, king of the Christian nation of Cilician Armenia, had submitted to the Mongols in 1247, and strongly encouraged other monarchs to engage in a Christian-Mongol alliance, but was only able to persuade his son-in-law, Prince Bohemond VI of the Crusader State of Antioch, who submitted in 1260. Other Christian leaders, such as the Crusaders of Acre, perceived the Mongols as the most significant threat in the region. The Barons of Acre therefore engaged in an unusual passive alliance with the Egyptian Mamluks, allowing Muslim forces to advance unopposed through Crusader territory to engage and defeat the Mongols at 1260's pivotal Battle of Ain Jalut.[5]
European attitudes began to change in the mid-1260s, from perceiving the Mongols as enemies to be feared, to potential allies against the Muslims. The Mongols sought to capitalize on this, promising a re-conquered Jerusalem to the Europeans in return for cooperation. Attempts to cement an alliance continued through negotiations with many leaders of the Mongol Ilkhanate in Iran, from its founder Hulagu to his descendants Abaqa, Arghun, Ghazan, and Öljaitü, but without success. The Mongols invaded Syria several times between 1281 and 1312, sometimes in attempts at joint operations with the Franks. But the considerable logistical difficulties involved meant that their forces were never able to coordinate their simultaneous arrival, and thus could not cooperate in any meaningful way.[6] The Mongol Empire eventually dissolved into civil war, and the Egyptian Mamluks successfully recaptured all of Palestine and Syria from the Crusaders. After the Fall of Acre in 1291, the remaining Crusaders retreated to the island of Cyprus. A final attempt was made to establish a bridgehead at the small island of Ruad off the coast of Tortosa, again in an attempt by the Crusaders to coordinate military action with the Mongols, but the plan failed, and the Egyptians besieged the island. With the Fall of Ruad in 1302 or 1303, the Crusaders lost their last foothold in the Holy Land.[7]
Modern historians debate whether a successful alliance between the Franks and Mongols would have shifted the balance of power in the region, and if it would have been a wise choice on the part of the Europeans.[8] Traditionally, the Mongols tended to see outside parties as either subjects or enemies, with little room in the middle for a concept such as ally
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/41/B_Gregor_X.jpg
Pope Gregory X (1210–1276) promulgated a new crusade in liaison with the Mongols in 1274
Edward I's crusade (1269–1274)In 1269, the English Prince Edward (the future Edward I), inspired by tales of his great-uncle, Richard the Lionheart, and the second crusade of the French King Louis, started on a crusade of his own, the Ninth Crusade.[85] The number of knights and retainers that accompanied Edward on the crusade was quite small, possibly around 230 knights, with a total complement of approximately 1,000 people, transported in a flotilla of 13 ships.[46][86] Edward understood the value of an alliance with the Mongols, and upon his arrival in Acre on May 9, 1271, he immediately sent an embassy to the Mongol ruler Abaqa, requesting assistance.[87] Abaqa answered positively to Edward's request, asking him to coordinate his activities with his general Samagar, whom he sent on an offensive against the Mamluks with 10,000 Mongols to join Edward's army.[36][88] But Edward was able only to engage in some fairly ineffectual raids that did not actually achieve success in gaining new territory.[85] For example, when he engaged in a raid into the Plain of Sharon, he proved unable to even take the small Mamluk fortress of Qaqun.[36] However, Edward's military operations, limited though they were, were still of assistance in persuading the Mamluk leader Baibars to agree to a 10-year truce between the city of Acre and the Mamluks, signed in 1272.[89] Edward's efforts were described by historian Reuven Amitai as "the nearest thing to real Mongol-Frankish military coordination that was ever to be achieved, by Edward or any other Frankish leader."
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3b/Mongol_raids_into_Syria_and_Palestine_ca_1300.svg/350px-Mongol_raids_into_Syria_and_Palestine_ca_1300.svg. png
In 1299/1300, the Mongols engaged in battles for cities in Syria, and engaged in raids as far south as Gaza.
There has been much discussion among historians as to why the Franco-Mongol alliance never became a reality and why, despite all the diplomatic contacts, it stayed a chimera or fantasy.[3][8] Many reasons have been proposed: one was that the Mongols at that stage in their empire were not entirely focused on expanding to the West. By the late 13th century, the Mongol leaders were several generations removed from the great Genghis Khan, and internal disruption was brewing. The original nomadic Mongols from the day of Genghis had become more settled, and had turned into administrators instead of conquerors. Battles were springing up that were Mongol against Mongol, which took troops away from the front in Syria.[153] There was also confusion within Europe as to the differences between the Mongols of the Ilkhanate in the Holy Land, and the Mongols of the Golden Horde, who were attacking Eastern Europe in Hungary and Poland. Within the Mongol Empire, the Ilkhanids and the Golden Horde considered each other enemies, but it took time for Western observers to be able to distinguish between the different parts of the Mongol Empire.[153] From the Mongol side, there were also concerns as to just how much clout the Franks could have brought to bear,[154] especially as there was decreased interest in Europe in pursuing the Crusades.[152] Court historians of Mongol Iran made no mention whatsoever of the communications between the Ilkhans and the Christian West, and barely mentioned the Franks at all. The communications were evidently not seen as important by the Mongols, and may have even been considered embarrassing. The Mongol leader Ghazan, a converted Muslim since 1295, might not have wanted to be perceived as trying to gain the assistance of infidels against his fellow Muslims in Egypt. When Mongol historians did make notes of foreign territories, the areas were usually categorized as either "enemies", "conquered", or "in rebellion". The Franks, in that context, were listed in the same category as the Egyptians, in that they were enemies to be conquered. The idea of "ally" was foreign to the Mongols.[155]
Some European monarchs responded positively to Mongol inquiries, but became vague and evasive when asked to actually commit troops and resources. Logistics also became more complex – the Egyptian Mamluks were genuinely concerned about the threat of another wave of Crusader forces, so each time the Mamluks captured another castle or port, instead of occupying it, they systematically destroyed it so that it could never be used again. This both made it more difficult for the Crusaders to plan military operations, and increased the expense of those operations. Monarchs in Western Europe often gave lip service to the idea of going on crusade, as a way of making an emotional appeal to their subjects, but in reality they would take years to prepare, and sometimes never actually left for Outremer. Internal wars in Europe, such as the War of the Vespers, were also distracting attention, and making it less likely for European nobles to want to commit their military to the Crusades, when they were more needed at home.[156][157]
Another concern among the Europeans about the long-term goals of the Mongols. The early Mongol diplomacy had been not a simple offer of cooperation, but straightforward demands for submission. It was only in later communications that the Mongol diplomats started to adopt a more conciliatory tone; but they still used language that more implied command than entreaty. Even the Armenian historian Hayton of Corycus, the most enthusiastic advocate of Western-Mongol collaboration, freely admitted that the Mongol leadership was not inclined to listen to European advice. His recommendation was that even if working together, European armies and Mongol armies should avoid contact because of the Mongol arrogance. European leaders were aware that the Mongols would not have been content to stop at the Holy Land, but were on a clear quest for world domination. If the Mongols had achieved a successful alliance with the West and destroyed the Mamluk Sultanate, there is little doubt that the Mongols would have then proceeded to conquer Africa. There, no strong state could have stood in their way until Morocco and the Islamic caliphates in the Maghreb of northwest Africa. The Mongols would have turned upon the Franks of Cyprus and the Byzantines.[153]
And lastly, there was not much support among the general populace in Europe for a Mongol alliance. Writers in Europe were creating "recovery" literature with their ideas about how best to recover the Holy Land, but few mentioned the Mongols as a genuine possibility. In 1306, when Pope Clement V asked the leaders of the military orders, Jacques de Molay and Fulk de Villaret, to present their proposals for how the Crusades should proceed, neither of them factored in any kind of a Mongol alliance. A few later proposals talked briefly about the Mongols as being a force that could invade Syria and keep the Mamluks distracted, but not as a force that could be counted on for cooperation.
http://cdn9.wn.com/pd/c4/60/deccf5b4bac59e79f7edb7e97a04_grande.jpg
Letter of Timur to Charles VI of France, 1402