Would Axis have won WWII without US intervention?

[SwordoftheVistula]

Inspired by this thread:

http://www.theapricity.com/forum/showpost.php?p=58204&postcount=31


Well, even without America's intervention, the Soviets would have advanced deep into Germany and overthrown it. In fact, the Western offensive effectively checked the Soviet advance. If it wasn't for that, the whole of Germany would have been under Communism, not only one third

If the allies had not landed in France in 1944, the USSR may have pushed Germany back anyways, though at much greater expense.

But, without the US in the war:

Germany gains control of North Africa, or at least stabilizes the situation, and only has to fight on one front, maybe partial attention to the Mediterranean if the UK is still fighting (without the US, probably not for long).

If the UK is still in the war, they have to fight the Atlantic battle on their own, and may lose enough to the submarine warfare to make continuation of the war untenable. If the UK leaves the war, or possibly even with just the US sitting out, supply to Germany from South America becomes possible. If the UK is still in the war, they will have to focus on defending the Suez and India/Pacific territories, and be unable to launch offensive operations.

Troops and resources are not diverted to construction of the Atlantic wall and maintaining a garrison there.

Rommel, one of Germany's best generals, fought exclusively against the UK/US. Perhaps some things might have gone better on the eastern front with him in charge.

Most importantly:

Germany's industrial base is not pulverized by heavy bombing.

The Luftwaffe is not destroyed trying to defend against said heavy bombing, and instead is able to maintain air superiority over the eastern front.



Also, without Lend-Lease, that would have been another factor in Germany's favor early in the war.

[Agrippa]

Thats for sure. The ressources they brought into the Soviet Union were crucial in the most critical phase of the war to keep the Bolshevist resistance up and Great Britain would have been lost without the US either. Just think about the German ressources lost due to the bombardements, the steel, tanks, fuel, know-how etc. which was brought to the Soviet Union.

That the Soviets were able to produce more tanks 1942 than before, even though they lost so many people, territory and factories can be attributed to the fast and immense help.

The USA were, as an economic superpower, already in the war before Pearl Harbor, just not with large own troop contingents and not officially. That was the main reason beside the alliance with Japan why Germany declared war on the USA.

The plutocratic oligarchy and political establishment in the USA did the same in both World Wars, planning intrigues behind the scenes, manipulating everything and then, when the war was at its height, they came in as "the great victor" with, comparatively, low losses and apparent strength. Just think about the USA having to face the offensive of the Germans on their soil like the Soviets did, they wouldnt have made it without a doubt. But like Great Britain has the protected position in Europe's history from which they schemed, so did the USA on a worldwide scale from their excellent geostrategic position.

I might also add, how it would have been sure that Germany would have won the War, rather small changes if you think about it:
- No mercy at Dunkirk, elimination of the whole expedition corps and army rests. Those professional soldiers were the core troops for both the war in the air and even more so the North African and invasion forces. GB wouldnt been able to replace them in time.
- Earlier attack on the Soviet Union 1941 or earlier in the year 1942, to have more months under ideal conditions (Yugoslavia ruined it, or better the British intelligence in Yugoslavia and the Germans might have truly believed in a Soviet offensive 1941-42, so a preventive war with the moment of surprise seems to have been the best choice).
- Better winter material, plan for a lasting fight in the East after the "Blitzkrieg"
- No help from the US for the Soviet Union in the critical phase
- Japan attacking the Soviet Union at all costs in the East in the critical phase of 1941-1942.

The last two points are very important, because without the US help and the Eastern Siberian forces which changed the tide in the West, the Soviets would have been ruined. The Japanese might have lost catastrophically, but thats not even important if. Their task would have been to bind the Eastern Soviet divisions, so that they couldnt help the already destroyed or at least crippled forces in the West. But the German-Japanese coordination was a huge problem.

This were bad news for the Germans and to attack the USA and giving the plutocratic propaganda a tool for pushing the US-population in the war, was idiotic.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2%80%93Japanese_Neutrality_Pact

However, it was hard to the Japanese not to react to the constant US-provocations, but they should have looked at the big picture and make a plan with their allies in Europa, what they didnt and was decisive for the course of the war.

The "traffic spider" Moscow would have fallen 1941, the resistance broken and with the few forces left and without US help, the Soviet Union would have crumbled for sure. Just without the US help, but with the Japanese in the East - well, most likely too, but the Bolsheviks would have stand a rather small chance.

Even 1945 the Soviets still used Sherman tanks in Vienna:
http://www.ww2incolor.com/d/36698-4/sherman+in+vienna

Just think about the numbers of Shermans in the service of the Commonwealth states and USSR:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease_Sherman_tanks

Britain and the Soviet Union had a whole modern economic superpower to keep their back free and producing everything they need, whereas Germany had to stand largely alone and being under heavy bombardements, again by airplanes which wouldnt have been made without the US help.
The Germans had the better ratio, so it was in any case the victory of ressources and now think of who provided the ressources to make the difference in both World Wars...


Rommel, one of Germany's best generals, fought exclusively against the UK/US. Perhaps some things might have gone better on the eastern front with him in charge.

Rommel was often overestimated and that has a lot to do with propaganda, especially in comparison to people like von Manstein he was a secondary choice. What von Manstein would have needed were more ressources in the East, and thats again where the West played in.
The Germans should have never entered North Africa, or if, with sufficient forces to conquer the whole Near East, free the Arabs or supporting the loyal (to Vichy) French forces where they were still active and getting a hard grip on the oil.

But the fear of a Soviet offensive was too big I guess, the USSR demands unbearable and the objectives were of secondary order. One should attack to really reach a concrete and valuable goal or leave it and save the ressources for something more important, which wasnt done.

This leads to the forgotten war of the brave French forces which fought for Europe against the traitors and US-British forces in the Near East. Something the propaganda tried to hide during and after the war.

However, things went on like they did, nobody can change that, its all history now...

[Atlas]

The Russian Red army would have won anyway, but it'd have taken a much longer and painful, bloody war.

[Svarog]

i doubt Germans would manage to fight off even Russians, French and English alone, in the end, I agree with Dronckaert, the outcome would be the same, just with much more victims and terror in general in whole Europe, I guess the real question is how world would look after the war if US did not get involved.

[Svarog]

Even 1945 the Soviets still used Sherman tanks in Vienna:
http://www.ww2incolor.com/d/36698-4/sherman+in+vienna


Sherman tanks were garbage, a proven fact, Soviet tanks were way better than the US ones, in a long run, I believe they would manage to build enough of them to win the war, T-34 and later KV and JS tanks were probably the best armor vehicles in WWII beside German tanks, Tiger, King Tiger and Mouse of which only 2 were produced, one destroyed by Germans themselves and the other one captured by Soviets and was participated in the battle of Berlin on a Soviet's side, today in a museum in Russia, British and American tanks were pretty much what German young tankists were practicing on.

This is what allies tanks were worth for.


"Wittmann in Villers Bocage"

On 13th June 1944, a week after D-day, following a drive from Beauvais under repeated air attack, 2nd Kompanie of sSSPzAbt 101 led by Michael Wittmann had 6 Tigers located in the area of Hill (Point) 213 ahove Villers Bocage. His orders were to stop the advance of the 22nd Armored Brigade of the British 7th Armored Division (the famous 'Desert Rats') from advancing through the township, outflanking the German line and gaining the road to Caen. Wittmann's company hidden behind a hedgerow spotted the enemy column, which passed him at a distance of 200 meters. At about 8:00am, Wittmann attacked the British column on the main road, while the rest of his company (4 Tigers as one brokedown) attacked the British forces around Hill 213. Soon after, Wittmann destroyed Sherman Firefly and Cromwell IV and headed south to attack the rest of the enemy transport column. After knocking out 8 half-tracks, 4 Bren Carriers and 2 6 pdr anti-tank guns, Wittmann reached the crossroad with the road to Tilly-sur-Seulles. At the crossroad, he destroyed 3 Stuart tanks from recon unit and reached the outskirts of the town of Villers-Bocage. While in town, Wittmann destroyed 4 Cromwell IV tanks and single half-track and turns into Rue Pasteur. Following up the street, he knocked out Cromwell IV and Sherman OP tank, reaching the main street of Villers-Bocage. At the end of Rue Pasteur, Wittmann's Tiger was hit by Sherman Firefly from B Squadron and he decided to turn back as being too far forward without any infantry support and in a build-up area. He turned in the direction of Caen to join the rest of his company. On his way back, Wittmann's Tiger was attacked by another Cromwell IV, which he destroyed as well. Back at the Tilly crossroad, British soldiers from 1st Rifle Brigade opened fire at Wittmann with their 6 pdr anti-tank gun, immobilizing his Tiger. Wittmann and his crew managed to escape on foot towards the Panzer Lehr positions 7km away near Orbois. The rest of his company at the Hill 213, destroyed the rest of the A Squadron of 4th County of London Yeomanry Regiment ("Sharpshooters") including 5 Cromwell IV and Sherman Firefly, while capturing 30 men. During this short engagement, Wittmann's company destroyed 4 Sherman Firefly, 20 Cromwell, 3 Stuart, 3 M4 Sherman OP, 14 half-tracks, 16 Bren Carriers and 2 6 pdr anti-tank guns. Wittmann's attack was followed by another one by Tigers of Hauptsturmfuehrer Rolf Moebius' 1st Kompanie of sSSPzAbt 101 and Panzerkampfwagen IV tanks from Panzer Lehr but was repulsed by anti-tank guns from 22nd Armored Brigade. Following day, British withdrew from the town leaving it to the Germans, who occupied it for next two months. The British drive on Villers Bocage and Caen was stopped cold by Wittmann's attack and following actions.

[Brännvin]

The Russian Red army would have win anyway, but it'd have taken a much longer and painful, bloody war.

I heard that 85% of the German army was fighting on the Russian front so that pretty close.

[Agrippa]

Sherman tanks were garbage, a proven fact, Soviet tanks were way better than the US ones, in a long run, I believe they would manage to build enough of them to win the war, T-34 and later KV and JS tanks were probably the best armor vehicles in WWII beside German tanks, Tiger, King Tiger and Mouse of which only 2 were produced, one destroyed by Germans themselves and the other one captured by Soviets and was participated in the battle of Berlin on a Soviet's side, today in a museum in Russia, British and American tanks were pretty much what German young tankists were practicing on.

Its true, they were for sure not the best tanks in the war, not even in the first years, yet every tank is better than no tank in a wide variety of situations on the battlefield. Especially the British had a lack of good tanks anyway, so the Sherman, especially Firefly version was surely not worthless and the Soviets needed any armoured vehicle they could get.

4000 Shermans make up a huge force which was valuable, just consider that many German and Soviet units had no tanks at all and a lack of functioning armoured vehicles was a general problem throughout the war on many fronts for both sides. Now I think the Germans would have considered the Sherman "a bad tank" too for sure if getting it, as Americans made at that time just crappy tanks anyway, but still they would have been glad to get 20.000 such tanks from the USA and thats for sure too.

Even in the largest tank battle of history in Kursk just some thousand tanks and armoured vehicles were used of which many were not that much better, more effective than the Sherman actually.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk

The battle of Kursk also shows how important the intelligence services were, because the Soviets became all informations about the German advances not just from their own spies, of which they had many, but also from the Western Enigma-crackers.

Additionally, the T34 was one of the most innovative tanks and only the later German developments put him below the best ones of the war, yet the whole production line and ressources used for it were made up with the USA!
There wouldnt have been such a great production of T34 without the US and on every front where armoured vehicles were needed the Sherman was at least good enough as a stopgap.

Never said it was a good tank, of course it wasnt, especially not the early version which was like a driving torch in battle...

If the USA wouldnt have been the plutocratic warmonger they were and with a better coordination of Germany and Japan, there can be no doubt the USSR would have crumbled, one has to look at the facts and data 1941-1942. The Soviets themselves were desperate until the weather changed and the Siberian divisions were free for a counterattack - which they would have never have been with a Japanese attack in the East, for which they were reserved to the Neutrality Pact.

With a beaten British force and without the Americans, there would have been more divisions free for the East and of course the movement against Bolshevism Europe-wide would have been more successful and volunteers more numerous without the "Western alternative".

[Loki]

Sherman tanks were garbage, a proven fact, Soviet tanks were way better than the US ones, in a long run, I believe they would manage to build enough of them to win the war, T-34 and later KV and JS tanks were probably the best armor vehicles in WWII beside German tanks, Tiger, King Tiger and Mouse of which only 2 were produced, one destroyed by Germans themselves and the other one captured by Soviets and was participated in the battle of Berlin on a Soviet's side, today in a museum in Russia, British and American tanks were pretty much what German young tankists were practicing on.


True, it's the T-34 that won Russia the war.

[Loki]

If the USA wouldnt have been the plutocratic warmonger they were and with a better coordination of Germany and Japan, there can be no doubt the USSR would have crumbled, one has to look at the facts and data 1941-1942. The Soviets themselves were desperate until the weather changed and the Siberian divisions were free for a counterattack - which they would have never have been with a Japanese attack in the East, for which they were reserved to the Neutrality Pact.

With a beaten British force and without the Americans, there would have been more divisions free for the East and of course the movement against Bolshevism Europe-wide would have been more successful and volunteers more numerous without the "Western alternative".

I hear what you're saying Agrippa, but I'd like to hear a different viewpoint on this as well -- a Russian one. Hors?

[Svarog]

I don't mean to be funny, but I'd just love to see Japanese fighting Russians in Siberia :D

[Agrippa]

I hear what you're saying Agrippa, but I'd like to hear a different viewpoint on this as well -- a Russian one. Hors?

So far we only talked about opinions and viewpoints, lets look at some facts I found in a similar discussion:

I believe that investigation into a few of the archives here would show that Soviet Weapons Losses in 1941 (first six months of the "Great Patriotic War"), revealing that one of the most compelling reasons for immediate Western Allied assistance to the Soviet Union was the incredible heavy losses of weapons and equipment caused by the German invasion. The following few examples illustrate the severity of the Russian losses. The percentage of Weapons available, lost by Soviet Forces during 1941:

56% of all Small-arms and Machine guns.
69% of all Anti-Tank guns.
59% of all Field guns and Mortars.
72% of all Tanks.
34% of all Combat Aircraft.

Approximately 20,000 Tanks and 10,000 Combat Aircraft were lost by Soviet forces in this period. For a complete list of the Lend-Lease material shipped to the Soviet Union by the U.S. alone during the war years, goto:

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/lend.html.

In the three years, and ten months of Lend-Lease aid, these are the approximate percentages of the total materials, both war and civilian available to the Soviet military and industrial complex that were supplied by American Lend-Lease alone (UK contributions to the USSR removed, and verified by USSR documents):

80% of all canned meat consumed.
92% of all railroad locomotives, rolling stock and rails.
57% of all aviation fuel used.
53% of all explosives.
74% of all truck transport.
88% of all radio equipment.
53% of all copper.
56% of all aluminum.
60% of all automotive fuel.
74% of all vehicle tires.
12% of all armored vehicles.
14% of all combat aircraft.

That percentage list does NOT include the percentage of the high grade steel, communications cable, canned foods other than meat, medical supplies, and virtually every modern machine tool used by Soviet industry during and after the "Great Patriotic War". Even though this ends up being less than 16 percent of ALL Soviet War Production, there are some significant individual numbers included. Pete Paradis has posted this next in the past, and I tend to agree with the obsevation:

"Soviet sources complain that the quality of the tanks, which were mainly Shermans, Valentines and Matildas, was inferior to the German and Soviet models; there is some truth in this. Yet it must be remembered that the Sherman was a match for the earlier German Mark III and that the Sherman, Valentine and Matilda, although inferior to the T34, were much superior to many other types of Soviet tank which were being produced in large numbers, even in the middle of the war. The 18,700 Western aircraft are said to have represented only twelve per cent of the total Soviet war production, 136,000 planes. The Kremlin was rightly to judge the performance of the Kittyhawks and Hurricanes as below that of the main German fighter (the Me 109); on the other hand, although this is not acknowledged in the Soviet Union, the Kittyhawks and Hurricanes were superior to the Red Air Force fighters in service in 1941 and 1942. However this may be, the numbers of aircraft and tanks shipped to the Soviet Union, although of undoubted benefit, were probably too small to be of decisive importance. The same can be said for the consignments of guns and small arms.
At the end of the war the equipment holding of the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to 665,000 motor vehicles. Of these, 427,000 had been provided mainly from United States sources during the war years; contemporary evidence indicates that over fifty per cent of all vehicles in Red Army service were of American origin. These trucks, together with the thousands of locomotives and railway flats, gave to the Red Army the strategic and tactical mobility required to destroy the German forces. At Teheran Stalin had attributed the Soviet success to the ability to move the High Command Reserve, which he put at no higher than sixty divisions, from theater to theater in turn. This mobility could not have been achieved without this United States material aid.

Although Moscow was to compare the 26 million tons of imported petroleum products disparagingly with its own output of thirty million tons a year, it does not disclose that the imported petroleum consisted of blending agents and high octane fuels (which were not available in the USSR) to produce aviation gas. In addition numbers of complete oil refineries, tyre factories, electric generator stations, machine tools, explosives and raw
materials of all types formed part of the aid. A very large proportion of the food for the Soviet Armed Forces, (estimated at 1 lb a day of concentrated ration for six million men over the whole duration of the war) came from United States and Canadian sources and much of the Red Army?s clothing and footwear came from America and Great Britain.
As to whether the Western, and in particular the American material aid, was a decisive factor in the Soviet victory over the German forces on the Eastern Front, no opinion can be expressed without an independent and detailed survey of Soviet economic strength during the war years.

http://boards.history.com/thread.jspa?threadID=120007&messageID=1323923

There is also a Russian opinion represented there it seems, but what I consider to be most interesting are the estimated percentages of material just out of the Lend-Lease...
Probably there are other estimates around which are very different, but from what I know most are largely similar.


I don't mean to be funny, but I'd just love to see Japanese fighting Russians in Siberia :D

Their performance was rather bad when they had to meet the Soviet forces.

Battle of Khalkhin Gol (1939):


As Zhukov completed the annihilation of the 23rd division, great events were taking place thousands of miles to the west. The very next day, on September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler launched his invasion of Poland and World War II broke out in Europe. The Soviets had already agreed to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which called for the Soviet Union to occupy eastern Poland and establish spheres of influence in Finland, Latvia, and Estonia. Perhaps as a result of Stalin's new commitments in Eastern Europe, the Soviets advanced no further than the border line they had claimed at the start of this battle. The Soviets and Japanese signed a cease-fire agreement on 15 September; it took effect the following day.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khalkhin_Gol

Invasion of Manchuria (1945):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria

The Soviet plan incorporated all the experience in maneuver warfare that the Soviets had acquired fighting the Germans.

It seems the Japanese were not in shape for the Soviets, still they could have a great effect from stategical point of view.

[Æmeric]

What would have constituted a win by the Axis powers?


The situation before Dec. 07, 1941 between Germany & America could not have been any worst then that between America & Cuba 1961- or America & Iran 1979 -. It took the bombing of Pearl Harbor for Roosevelt to get Congress to declare war on Japan. Congress had not declared war on Germany in spite of the sinking of US ships in the North Atlanitc by German u-boats. An actually declaration of war by Germany on the US made the situation much worst & lead to levels of material aid to the Soviets (& British)that would have been unimaginable if not for an actual state of war.


Militarily it could have been possible for the Germany to win but the political leadership in Berlin made several errors besides declaring war on the US after Pearl Harbor. . The drive across Southern Russia towards the Baku Oilfields was a mistake. It was overreach & even if the Germans had made it to Baku, Stalin would have blown up the oil wells. Concentrating military resourses on Moscow would have made more sense - if captured it could have been traded for the oilfields. The Germans didn't make nice with the Slavs like the Ukrainians, leading to resistance movements. Without US intervention the Germans still would have faced years (pass 1945) of guerrilla warfare that would have made the last few years in Iraq look like Disneyland - or the German version of Vietnam. I think the best the Germans could have hoped for was setting up a group of (Slavic) client states in Eastern Europe that would have acted as a buffer against the Soviet Union.

[Hors]

I hear what you're saying Agrippa, but I'd like to hear a different viewpoint on this as well -- a Russian one. Hors?

85% of the German military resources were dedicated to the Eastern front. However, the remaining 15% in France and elsewhere were mostly garbage. Frozen meat (invalid survivors of the Winter campaign of '41), the old, deaf batallions etc, and plenty of ethnic formations not willing to fight on the Eastern front, and even less willing (as it turned out) to fight the Allies. So it's fair to say that Nazi Germany employed almost 100% of its military capability against the Russians in the East... and failed. And it failed already in 1941, once and for all. The Allied help did not arrive till after Hitler and Co lost their chance to seize Moscow and Leningrad, and even if they did, the Russian industry and the remaining bulk of population were located far more to the East, and the war would have continued and finished eventually, of course, in Berlin.

The American lend-lease was important (as it prevented starvation of many millions), and we remember it and are really grateful, but with or without it the fate of Germany was sealed.

And as for Normandy '44, it had little to do with fighting against emaciated Nazi Germany/helping the Russians. The invasion was evidently an anti-Russian move.

Tha'ts speaking about ifs and buts. But when the real military and economic might of Germany and Russia is considered, Nazi Germany had no chance at all. The initial astounding success of Hitler was due low morale of recently Sovetized Ukrainian and Belarussian conscripts. The Red Army in Ukraine alone was much stronger than the entire Wehrmacht, but the locals simply deserted, leaving heaps of state-of-the-art weapons Germans only dreamed of having. The draw in late 1941 and first half of 1942 was due to the fact that Russian arsenal and industry were lost in Ukraine and Belarus and Russian forces were poorly equipped. But as relocated from Ukraine to the Urals region industry started to mass product superior Russian weapons, Germans started running.

[SwordoftheVistula]

85% of the German military resources were dedicated to the Eastern front.

Of ground forces, maybe, but certainly not the Luftwaffe. A large portion of the Luftwaffe was deployed to the Mediterranean and defending against allied bombers. The Luftwaffe played a large role in the early successes of the campaign, and while not able to prevent disaster at Stalingrad, they did do so at Kursk. Not to mention, as mentioned earlier in the thread the assistance from Lend-Lease in building Russian production, railroads, and aviation fuel, combined with cutting down severely on production of German aviation fuel by bombing in Romania, and cutting down German production in general by a large amount. If the German production was unmolested by air attack, including industrial facilities in occupied countries like France and Czechoslovakia, the Soviets would not have had such a big production advantage.


the war would have continued and finished eventually, of course, in Berlin.

Extremely unlikely. The reason the Germans stalled in the campaign against the USSR was largely because of long supply lines and the immense amount of territory they had to occupy. Even assuming the Soviets were able to throw back the Germans minus the industrial assistance, the advance would have stalled in eastern europe, as the situation would have been similar to that the Germans had in western Europe. In western Europe, the Germans had superior ground forces for a while, but they couldn't move anywhere due to allied air superiority which blasted German armored columns as soon as they emerged from hiding and went on the move, also they couldn't get adequate fuel, again largely due to allied air superiority. The Red Army certainly would not have pushed as far as it did in the amount of time it did, and Germany in 1945 had many new advanced weapon systems coming online like the jet aircraft and more advanced tanks, which could have been put entirely to use on the eastern front, in addition to being developed faster and put into greater production without the allied bombing of Germany.


It seems the Japanese were not in shape for the Soviets, still they could have a great effect from stategical point of view.

The Japanese army was not made for that type of fighting, they never had any decent tanks. If Britain was still in the war, Japan could have directed all their navy and other forces against British possessions in India, Burma and Australia, forcing Britain to put all its efforts into defending those places, which would have rendered Britain unable to render any effective support against Germany. It's quite possible that 'WWII' would not have taken place in aggregate had the US not become involved, but 2 other wars, the Japanese against the British in the Indian Ocean; and the Germans against the Russians in eastern Europe.

[Hors]

Of ground forces, maybe, but certainly not the Luftwaffe. A large portion of the Luftwaffe was deployed to the Mediterranean and defending against allied bombers. The Luftwaffe played a large role in the early successes of the campaign, and while not able to prevent disaster at Stalingrad, they did do so at Kursk. Not to mention, as mentioned earlier in the thread the assistance from Lend-Lease in building Russian production, railroads, and aviation fuel, combined with cutting down severely on production of German aviation fuel by bombing in Romania, and cutting down German production in general by a large amount. If the German production was unmolested by air attack, including industrial facilities in occupied countries like France and Czechoslovakia, the Soviets would not have had such a big production advantage.

Luftwaffe was not a strategic force in WWII. Air forces were not as effective in WWII as they are now. So don't attribute much to Luftwaffe.

The Allies claim that their Air Force had strategic role, having bombed out Germany's industry. However, back in 1944-1945 despite really massive bomb raids (as opposed to much more modest employment of Luftwaffe in 1940-1942) Germany only increased (and significantly so) its production of military equipment.

As for Kursk not being a disaster... Were not Germans running non-stop after Kursk?


Extremely unlikely. The reason the Germans stalled in the campaign against the USSR was largely because of long supply lines and the immense amount of territory they had to occupy.

That's why Nazi idiots decided to continue the war by advancing to Northern Caucasus in 1942...


In western Europe, the Germans had superior ground forces for a while, but they couldn't move anywhere due to allied air superiority which blasted German armored columns as soon as they emerged from hiding and went on the move, also they couldn't get adequate fuel, again largely due to allied air superiority.

Now, now... I'm not interested in discussion of fairy tales...

[Lenny]

That the Soviets were able to produce more tanks 1942 than before, even though they lost so many people, territory and factories can be attributed to the fast and immense help [from the USA]/

The most poetic summary of that disastrous war and its ironies --
was the fact that the first waves of red-star-bearing tanks and trucks to enter Vienna in May 1945... were all "Made in the USA".

(edit: After finishing reading your post I see you made mention of this too).


Even 1945 the Soviets still used Sherman tanks in Vienna:
http://www.ww2incolor.com/d/36698-4/sherman+in+vienna

Just think about the numbers of Shermans in the service of the Commonwealth states and USSR:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease_Sherman_tanks

In the three years, and ten months of Lend-Lease aid, these are the approximate percentages of the total materials, both war and civilian available to the Soviet military and industrial complex that were supplied by American Lend-Lease alone (UK contributions to the USSR removed, and verified by USSR documents):

80% of all canned meat consumed.
92% of all railroad locomotives, rolling stock and rails.
57% of all aviation fuel used.
53% of all explosives.
74% of all truck transport.
88% of all radio equipment.
53% of all copper.
56% of all aluminum.
60% of all automotive fuel.
74% of all vehicle tires.
12% of all armored vehicles.
14% of all combat aircraft.

What a disaster. What fools we were.

[Agrippa]

Luftwaffe was not a strategic force in WWII. Air forces were not as effective in WWII as they are now. So don't attribute much to Luftwaffe.

Well, the air forces were very effective against tanks and all kinds of vehicles, and still valuable against supply lines in general.

If you think how many tanks were put in the Western and Southern front, largely destroyed by the Western Allies airforce later, this was of importance. The airforce was very important, as the early German successes in the Blitzkrieg and the late war Ardennen Offensive show too. The invasion in the Normandy would have never worked without the airforce. Some pilotes said in interviews made later, they couldnt move their hand properly after their attacks on retreating or advancing Germans day by day, they were physically and psychologically traumatised. They shot them down with the machine gun of the airplane - whole caravans of trucks with troops, sometimes even similar to what happened in the first US-Irag war, day by day. One pilote said he still has nightmares of the vast killings...
Thats documented, and often it was about elite troops, the SS tank divisions were the target of the airforces too, which might have driven the allies otherwise back into the sea.
Often troops which the Americans had a hard time with in the area of the invasion, exactly because they couldnt use their airforces in that terrain like in the open, good and hard trained forces, were eliminated by the airforces while moving.

The USA and GB would have probably never made it without the air supremacy and in the East, on the large open grounds the airforces were highly valuable too. Again the Germans lost so much in the West, whereas the Soviets could produce much more with the help of their Allies...

[SwordoftheVistula]

However, back in 1944-1945 despite really massive bomb raids (as opposed to much more modest employment of Luftwaffe in 1940-1942) Germany only increased (and significantly so) its production of military equipment.

German military production rose until 1944 because it was so low before, since they did not begin to move towards full war production until partway through the war.


As for Kursk not being a disaster... Were not Germans running non-stop after Kursk...That's why Nazi idiots decided to continue the war by advancing to Northern Caucasus in 1942...

With the ability to produce more tanks and aircraft and air superiority, they could have regained their footing from the disasters in the of 1943 and stabilized the front, much like the USSR was able to use its rear-echelon resources to stabilize after their losses in 1941.

[Guapo]

I heard that 85% of the German army was fighting on the Russian front so that pretty close.


Yes and also their cronies from other east european countries on the Russian front, that is why there were absurd waffen-SS units such as the Indian Legion fighting in France.

[Lenny]

Yes and also their cronies from other east european countries on the Russian front, that is why there were absurd waffen-SS units such as the Indian Legion fighting in France.
I don't think "fighting" is the right word for the Free India legion.

I'm pretty sure they never did any actual fighting.

The purpose of that unit was for propaganda and incitement of the Hindu People against British rule (and in favor of Hindu-nationalist S.C.Bose's Free-India movement along the lines of the rights of self-determination of peoples) / thus weakening the British war effort. The purpose of the Free Arabia Corps was similar, though there was of course actual action in North Africa (an arm of Arabia defacto).

[Guapo]

I don't think "fighting" is the right word for the Free India legion.

I'm pretty sure they never did any actual fighting.

They did against French resistance fighters.

[Brännvin]

Germany lost the war in Stalingrad, it stated by Hermann Göring in the Nuremberg trials.

Stalingrad battle was the turning point of the second war after Hitler’s success. It's important to note that Hitler forbade the 6th army from retreating from Stalingrad while it was being encircled by the Russians. The result was the loss of the entire German 6th army.

After Stalingrad there was no chance of victory for Germany, at least they had developed the atomic bomb before of 1945.

[SwordoftheVistula]

Germany lost the war in Stalingrad, it stated by Hermann Göring in the Nuremberg trials.

Stalingrad battle was the turning point of the second war after Hitler’s success. It's important to note that Hitler forbade the 6th army from retreating from Stalingrad while it was being encircled by the Russians. The result was the loss of the entire German 6th army.

After Stalingrad there was no chance of victory for Germany, at least they had developed the atomic bomb before of 1945.

That's because they were pushing their luck trying to score a knockout blow against the USSR. Although they had knocked France out of the war, they had failed to take Britain out of the war with a combined air and sea campaign, failed in the north and then in the South to score a decisive victory against the Soviets, and failed to gain control of North Africa. By the time Stalingrad ended, the Americans had crushed the Japanese at Midway, invaded North Africa and were preparing to invade southern Europe, and begun aerial bombardment of Germany and German occupied territories, in addition to the materials help to Britain and the USSR.

If the US was not in the fight, and the Germans were not worried about having to face another multi-front war, they would likely have done things differently, and had more resources to recover from any defeats.

[Agrippa]

Germany lost the war in Stalingrad, it stated by Hermann Göring in the Nuremberg trials.

Stalingrad battle was the turning point of the second war after Hitler’s success. It's important to note that Hitler forbade the 6th army from retreating from Stalingrad while it was being encircled by the Russians. The result was the loss of the entire German 6th army.

After Stalingrad there was no chance of victory for Germany, at least they had developed the atomic bomb before of 1945.

Stalingrad was nothing compared to the battle of Kursk, which was really decisive. The battle of Kursk was an intelligence disaster, because the Soviets knew all details of the plan and had various good structured lines of defence which they could build up without any problems.

AND STILL the German, though they were trapped managed to break through various lines and made it a par! The only reason why this was a loss was that the Soviets could outproduce the Germans and the Germans had no ressources for a second trial like that. Which leads again to the ressource problem...

My opinion is however, that Germany had the first serious problems not just in Stalingrad, but already 1941. In the winter of 1941 more Germans, including well trained elite troops, died or material being lost due to the weather than because of fighting!
Additionally, as already mentioned, the Siberian divisions caused high losses as well and pushed the Germans back, which were shortly before Moscow. They were almost able to fire the first cannons, when the combination out of weather, supply lines and size of the front, as well as the Siberian divisions turned the tide.

This book might be quite interesting for the issue:

Suffering a staggering loss of over 2 million troops by September 1941, Soviet forces were faced with the prospect of Hitler victoriously re-directing his powerful German armies toward the heart of Soviet Russia - Moscow. However, the season was late and the Germans found themselves in a race to launch a final decisive attack before the arrival of the dreaded Russian winter. Stalin desperately sought to play for time by mustering all available military resources to save his capital. This book is the story of Operation Typhoon, the largest German operational attack of the war and Hitler's desperate attempt to seize Moscow. With expert knowledge of the subject, author Robert A. Forczyk successfully manages to bring to life the battle which saw the most horrific losses for the Soviet defending forces and marked the first defeat of the Wehrmacht.

http://www.ospreypublishing.com/store/Moscow-1941_9781846030178/

They should have stopped the offensive and making the troops "winterfest", ready for the harsh climate rather than trying to conquer the city immediately. But afterwards you are always clever, as was Napoleon.

There were various trials of European nations to conquer Russia and mostly stopped by the huge land and its climate. Of these three, it was said they probably had the finest army of their time:
Sweden under Charles XII.
France under Napoleon I.
Germany under Hitler

Actually the three cases are quite similar, they both underestimated the climate as well as the Russian capabilities.

Interestingly they had reason to, at least if its for the Russian army, because they showed their best performance always if its about the defence of the Russian heartlands, while being rather "second or third class" before, so that a meaningful estimation was hard to make.

Read for Charles XII:

After the Battle of Narva in 1700, one of the first battles of the Great Northern War, the Russian army was so severely decimated that Sweden had an open chance to invade Russia. However, Charles did not pursue the Russian army — instead turning against Poland-Lithuania and defeating the Polish king Augustus II and his Saxon allies at the Battle of Kliszow in 1702. This gave the Russian Tsar time to rebuild and modernize his army. After the success of invading Poland Charles decided to make an invasion attempt of Russia which ended in a decisive Russian victory at the Battle of Poltava in 1709. After a long march exposed to cossack raids, the Russian Tsar Peter the Great's scorched-earth techniques and the cold Russian climate, the Swedes stood weakened with a shattered morale, and enormously outnumbered against the Russian army at Poltava. The defeat meant the beginning of the end for the Swedish empire.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden

If you read the story in detail, there was no real Swedish army left like it existed at start of the campaign in Poltava, but just a weak rest.

[Loki]

At the end of the day, it's conjecture wishful thinking on "what could have happened" if this or that did not happen. At this point we are only speculating. The facts are that the Red Army was too much for the Wehrmacht. Germany had bitten off more than it could chew, too soon. Barbarossa was a critical mistake on the part of Hitler, and badly timed. Hitler's aggression cemented the strength of the Soviet Union in the end.

[Hors]

Yes and also their cronies from other east european countries on the Russian front, that is why there were absurd waffen-SS units such as the Indian Legion fighting in France.

Good point. Almost all Germany's European allies/satellites forces were used in the East. And it was a considerable force. I believe more than 25% of the Axis casualties were non-German.

[Hors]

That's because they were pushing their luck trying to score a knockout blow against the USSR. Although they had knocked France out of the war, they had failed to take Britain out of the war with a combined air and sea campaign, failed in the north and then in the South to score a decisive victory against the Soviets,

Really, it was a miracle they were not defeated in the first weeks of the war, in other words, they're incredibly lucky. As for knocking the USSR out of war, it was impossible even in theory, miracle or not.


and failed to gain control of North Africa. By the time Stalingrad ended, the Americans had crushed the Japanese at Midway,

Lucky Americans. It was an unexpected victory for them. At least, not determined by their superiority, as they had none.


invaded North Africa and were preparing to invade southern Europe, and begun aerial bombardment of Germany and German occupied territories, in addition to the materials help to Britain and the USSR.

I don't know about Britain, but the lend-lease made up only 4% of the military expenditures of the USSR.


If the US was not in the fight, and the Germans were not worried about having to face another multi-front war, they would likely have done things differently, and had more resources to recover from any defeats.

They obviously were not worried much. Perhaps they were realizing that the real interests of the US did not allow it to engage in the war too early...

[SwordoftheVistula]

Without US intervention the Germans still would have faced years (pass 1945) of guerrilla warfare that would have made the last few years in Iraq look like Disneyland

Unlikely for two reasons:

Firstly, Germany was not handicapped by domestic political opposition to harsh measures used against guerrillas, as the US is in Iraq and even Vietnam.

Also, the guerrilla warfare seemed to appear only when there was a chance of a foreign army on the horizon: for example, the Warsaw uprising began when the Red Army was approaching, and the surge in French resistance activity prior to Normandy. Guerrilla warfare was sparse in areas far from the front, for example Scandinavia, the low countries, and France for most of the war. Partisan activity in Italy only began in earnest in 1943 when British and American forces were invading.


Good point. Almost all Germany's European allies/satellites forces were used in the East. And it was a considerable force. I believe more than 25% of the Axis casualties were non-German.

Ok, but what relevance does that have to the initial question?


Really, it was a miracle they were not defeated in the first weeks of the war, in other words, they're incredibly lucky.

That's why Germany attacked when they did, to catch the USSR by surprise, and before the USSR could launch its own planned offensive.


As for knocking the USSR out of war, it was impossible even in theory, miracle or not.

Complete conquest all the way to Vladivostok, possibly not, but at some point its resources would have been exhausted, if nothing else by 1953 when the fanatical Stalin died.


Lucky Americans. It was an unexpected victory for them. At least, not determined by their superiority, as they had none.

Unexpected by the Japanese. It was an intelligence victory since the Americans had the Japanese codes and could read their every move, and thus avoid the Japanese ambush and set one of their own.

Luck or not, at any rate, the Japanese took losses they could not replace, in carriers and pilots. After this it was obvious that Germany was on the wrong side of the US-Japan matchup, and contributed to the feeling of desperation in Germany.



I don't know about Britain, but the lend-lease made up only 4% of the military expenditures of the USSR.


That's not quite the picture shown by these figures:

http://www.theapricity.com/forum/showpost.php?p=58769&postcount=11

The railroads and once Germany's were bombed to pieces the country's economy ceased to function, production dropped, and the war ended.


They obviously were not worried much. Perhaps they were realizing that the real interests of the US did not allow it to engage in the war too early...

There was a huge difference between leadership and popular opinion. The leadership (FDR administration) was very pro-Soviet and wanted a war with Germany and tried to direct as much as possible against Germany, but due to the Pearl Harbor attack the 'masses' saw Japan as the primary enemy, thus significant action against Japan could not be avoided if FDR wanted to win reelection.

Here's a lengthy, but comprehensive analysis of the effects of the bombing on Germany's war effort:

Of particular note are the description of the attacks on railroads which completely took apart the Germany economy, and thus military production, viewed in combination with the earlier source of 92% of USSR railroad production coming from lend-lease.

The loss of oil and fuel also made the German war machine completely inoperable, for example the mass of 1200 tanks against the Soviets which was rendered completely ineffective and overrun because they had no fuel.

http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs2.htm

The seeming paradox of the attack on the aircraft plants is that, although production recovered quickly, the German air force after the attacks was not again a serious threat to Allied air superiority. The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.

German air generals responsible for operations in France stated under interrogation that on D-day the Luftwaffe had only 80 operational planes with which to oppose the invasion. At no time between D-day and the breakthrough at St. Lo did reinforcements offset losses and increase the size of this force.

German fighter production continued to increase during the summer of 1944, and acceptances reached a peak of 3,375 in September. Although it has studied the problem with considerable care, the Survey has no clear answer as to what happened to these planes; the differences of opinion between German air generals, it might be added, are at least as great as between those who have searched for the explanation. Certainly only a minority of the planes appeared in combat. Possibly the remainder were lost in transit from factory to combat bases, destroyed on the fields, or grounded because of a shortage of gasoline or pilots. Conceivably some are part of an inflation of German production figures. The answer is not clear.

After September, German aircraft production declined gradually until December, when 3,155 planes were accepted, and in January 1945, because of the shortage of gasoline, production of all except jet types was virtually discontinued. The jet planes, especially the ME-262, were the most modern planes which any belligerent had in general operation at the end of the war. According to manufacturers and other competent observers, their production was delayed because of the failure of the Luftwaffe to recognize in time the advantages of the type. It was also delayed because Hitler intervened in 1944 with an ill-timed order to convert the ME-262 to a fighter-bomber. Virtually every manufacturer, production official, and air force general interrogated by the Survey, including Goering himself, claimed to have been appalled by this order. By May 1945, 1,400 jets had been produced. Had these planes been available six months earlier with good quality pilots, though they might not have altered the course of the war, they would have sharply increased the losses of the attacking forces.

With the reduction of German air power, oil became the priority target in the German economy. The bomber force for several months had been adequate for the task. A preliminary attack was launched on May 12, 1944, followed by another on May 28; the main blow was not struck, however, until after D-day. In the months before D-day and for a shorter period immediately following, all available air power based on England was devoted to insuring the success of the invasion.

Virtually complete records of the German oil industry were taken by the Survey. In addition, major plants that were subject to attack and their records were studied in detail.

The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production. The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar.

As in the case of ball-bearings and aircraft, the Germans took the most energetic steps to repair and reconstruct the oil plants. Another czar was appointed, this time Edmund Geilenberg, and again an overriding priority on men and materials was issued. Geilenberg used as many as 350,000 men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed plants and for new underground construction. The synthetic oil plants were vast complex structures and could not be easily broken up and dispersed. The programs of dispersal and underground construction that were undertaken were incomplete when the war ended.

The synthetic oil plants were brought back into partial production and in remarkably short time. But unlike the ball-bearing plants, as soon as they were brought back they were attacked again. The story of Leuna is illustrative. Leuna was the largest of the synthetic plants and protected by a highly effective smoke screen and the heaviest flak concentration in Europe. Air crews viewed a mission to Leuna as the most dangerous and difficult assignment of the air war. Leuna was hit on May 12 and put out of production. However, investigation of plant records and interrogation of Leuna's officials established that a force of several thousand men had it in partial operation in about 10 days. It was again hit on May 28 but resumed partial production on June 3 and reached 75 percent of capacity in early July. It was hit again on July 7 and again shut down but production started 2 days later and reached 53 percent of capacity on July 19. An attack on July 20 shut the plant down again but only for three days; by July 27 production was back to 35 percent of capacity. Attacks on July 28 and 29 closed the plant and further attacks on August 24, September 11, September 13, September 28 and October 7 kept it closed down. However, Leuna got started again on October 14 and although production was interrupted by a small raid on November 2, it reached 28 percent of capacity by November 20. Although there were 6 more heavy attacks in November and December (largely ineffective because of adverse weather), production was brought up to 15 percent of capacity in January and was maintained at that level until nearly the end of the war. From the first attack to the end, production at Leuna averaged 9 percent of capacity. There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF. Due to the urgency of keeping this plant out of production, many of these missions mere dispatched in difficult bombing weather. Consequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna was not high as compared with other targets. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.

Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from two hours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation. They counted on capturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, many panzer units were lost when they ran out of gasoline. In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun.

The attack on the synthetic oil plants was also found to have cost Germany its synthetic nitrogen and methanol supply and a considerable part of its rubber supply.

Germany, like other industrial countries, relied on synthesis for its supply of nitrogen and the synthetic oil plants were by far the largest producers. Sixty percent of the nitrogen production and 40 percent of the methanol production came from two synthetic plants. Monthly output of synthetic nitrogen in early 1944, before the synthetic plants were attacked, was about 75,000 tons. It had been reduced by the end of the year to about 20,000 tons.

Nitrogen, besides being indispensable for explosives, is heavily used in German agriculture. Allocation for the 1943-44 crop year was 54 percent of the total supply; allocation for 1944-45 was first planned at 25 percent and later eliminated altogether. Nitrogen for munitions was maintained by reducing the allocation to agriculture, but by the end of 1944 this cushion had been substantially exhausted. The supply of explosives then declined with the reduction in supply of nitrogen. It became necessary to fill shells with a mixture of explosives and non-explosive rock salt extender. There was a general shortage of ammunition on all fronts at the end of the war. There was an equally serious shortage of flak ammunition; units manning flak guns were instructed not to fire on planes unless they were attacking the installations which the guns were specifically designated to protect and unless "they were sure of hitting the planes!"

It is of some interest that a few weeks before the close of hostilities the Germans reallocated nitrogen to agriculture at the expense of ammunition. This was the result, according to Production Minister Speer, of an independent decision of his own that the war was lost and the next year's crop should be protected.

Methanol production, necessary among other things for TNT, hexogen and other high explosives, was as severely affected as nitrogen production. Allocations to the principal consumers was heavily cut, and eventually the production of hexogen was abandoned. The loss of methanol coupled with the reduction in nitrogen was followed by a precipitate decline in production of explosives.

The synthetic rubber industry also suffered from the attack on oil. Official German records on raw material supplies show that stockpiles of rubber were small at the beginning of the war -- at the most sufficient for only two or three months' consumption. Imports through the blockade were unimportant. The supply came from four synthetic plants, one of which was a small pilot plant; and two additional plants were under construction during the war. One of the major plants, located at Huels, was attacked as a primary target by the Eighth Air Force in June 1943 and closed for a month; it required three months to get back to 72 percent of capacity and seven months to get back to full production. However, it operated on gas from synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr; when these were knocked out in the summer of 1944, production was again reduced substantially. Production at Schkopau, the largest of the synthetic rubber plants, was lost because it was dependent on hydrogen from Leuna. Investigation of the two remaining plants revealed that production was largely eliminated because of attacks on oil plants of which they were a part. By the end of 1944 over-all statistics for the industry show that production of synthetic rubber had been reduced to 2,000 tons a month or about one-sixth the wartime peak. Had the war continued, Germany's rubber position would have become critical. No indication was found, however, that the rubber shortage had become a limiting factor on German war production or the movement of the German army before the war ended.

Except for oil and associated nitrogen, methanol, and rubber production, no parts of the German chemical industry were a priority target of the Combined Bomber Offensive.

During the course of the air war, and particularly during 1944 and 1945, a number of other German industries were attacked, some of them in force and others merely as secondary targets, or as targets of opportunity when the main objective could not be reached or found. The Survey has examined each of these industries. Individual plants and records were examined and analyzed in conjunction with over-all industry data which were also located.

Plants producing tanks and armored vehicles were attacked occasionaly in 1943 and early 1944. They were attacked more strongly in August, September and October 1944 in an effort to provide direct support to ground operations. Between October 1943 and July 1944, the period of the first attacks, the industry produced 14,000 tanks and related vehicles. Analysis of production schedules suggests that these attacks cost the Germans several hundred units. By the time of the heavier attacks, production, especially production of engines and components, had been considerably expanded and dispersed. The effect again may have been to cause the industry to fall short of achievable production. Production dropped from 1,616 in August to 1,552 in September. However, it rose to 1,612 in October and to 1,770 in November, and reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when 1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced. This industry continued to have relatively high production through February 1945.

In the last half of 1944 German truck production was attacked. Three plants produced most of Germany's truck supply. One of these, Opel at Brandenburg, was knocked out completely in one raid on August 6, 1944, and did not recover. Daimler Benz was similarly eliminated by attacks in September and October. Ford at Cologne, the third large producer, was not attacked but records show that production was sharply curtailed during the same period by destruction of component suppliers and the bombing of its power supply. By December of 1944, production of trucks was only about 35 percent of the average for the first half of 1944.

In November of 1944, the Allied air forces returned to an attack on the submarine building yards. In the months that had elapsed since the spring of 1943, the Germans had put into production the new Types 21 and 23 designed to operate for long periods without surfacing and so escape radar equipped aircraft patrols as well as surface attack. And an ambitious effort had been made to prefabricate submarine hulls and turn the slipways into mere points of final assembly. The program was not working smoothly. Though nearly two hundred had been produced, difficulties with the new type, together with the time required for training crews, had prevented all but eight from becoming operational. These delays cannot be attributed to the air attack.

The attacks during the late winter and early spring of 1945 did close, or all but close, five of the major yards, including the great Blohm and Voss plant at Hamburg. Had the war continued, these attacks, coupled with the attack on transportation, would have removed the threat of further production of the new submarine.

Many more German industries were hit mostly in the course of the city attacks of the RAF, but some as secondary targets of daylight attacks, or in spill-overs from the primary target. Industries so attacked included optical plants, power plants, plants making electrical equipment, machine tool plants, and a large number of civilian industries. There were also special enterprises. The bombing of the launching sites being prepared for the V weapons delayed the use of V-l appreciably. The attacks on the V-weapon experimental station at Peenemunde, however, were not effective; V-l was already in production near Kassel and V-2 had also been moved to an underground plant. The breaking of the Mohne and the Eder dams, though the cost was small, also had limited effect. Certain of the attacks -- as for example the Berlin raids that cost the Germans a good half of their clothing industry -- caused the Germans manifest discomfort and may have delayed war production. Also, in the aggregate, they caused some diversion of resources from essential war production, although this effect was minimized by the substantial cushion in Germany's war economy until the closing months of the war.

The attack on transportation was the decisive blow that completely disorganized the German economy. It reduced war production in all categories and made it difficult to move what was produced to the front. The attack also limited the tactical mobility of the German army.

The Survey made a careful examination of the German railway system, beginning as soon as substantial portions were in Allied hands. While certain important records were destroyed or lost during the battle of Germany, enough were located so that together with interrogation of many German railroad officials, it was possible to construct an accurate picture of the decline and collapse of the system.

Germany entered the war with an excellent railway System; it had general overcapacity in both lines and yards (built partly in anticipation of military requirements), and, popular supposition to the contrary, the system was not undermaintained.

Standards of maintenance were higher than those general in the United States. The railway system was supplemented by a strong inland waterways system connecting the important rivers of northern Germany, crisscrossing the Ruhr and connecting it with Berlin. The waterways carried from 21 to 26 percent of the total freight movement. Commercial highway transport of freight was insignificant; it accounted for less than three percent of the total.

Although the investigation shows that the railroad system was under strain -- especially during the winter campaign in Russia in 1941-42 when there was a serious shortage of cars and locomotives -- it was generally adequate for the demands placed upon it until the spring of 1944. New construction and appropriation of equipment of occupied counties remedied the locomotive and car shortage. The Reichsbahn had taken no important steps to prepare itself for air attack.

The attack on German transportation was intimately woven with the development of ground operations. In support of the invasion a major assignment of the air forces had been the disruption of rail traffic between Germany and the French coast through bombing of marshalling yards in northern France. At the time of the invasion itself a systematic and large-scale attempt was made to interdict all traffic to the Normandy beachhead. These latter operations were notably successful; as the front moved to the German border the attack was extended to the railroads of the Reich proper. Heavy and medium bombers and fighters all participated.

Although prior to September 1944, there had been sporadic attacks on the German transportation system, no serious deterioration in its ability to handle traffic was identified by the Survey. The vastly heavier attacks in September and October 1944 on marshalling yards, bridges, lines, and on train movements, produced a serious disruption in traffic over all of western Germany. Freight car loadings, which were approximately 900,000 cars for the Reich as a whole in the week ending August 19 fell to 700,000 cars in the last week of October. There was some recovery in early November, but thereafter they declined erratically to 550,000 cars in the week ending December 23 and to 214,000 cars during the week ending March 3. Thereafter the disorganization was so great that no useful statistics were kept.

The attack on the waterways paralleled that on the railways; the investigation shows that it was even more successful. On September 23, 1944, the Dortmund-Ems and Mittelland canals were interdicted stopping all through water traffic between the Ruhr and points on the north coast and in central Germany. By October 14, traffic on the Rhine had been interdicted by a bomb that detonated a German demolition charge on a bridge at Cologne. Traffic in the Ruhr dropped sharply and all water movement of coal to south Germany ceased.

The effect of this progressive traffic tie-up was found, as might be expected, to have first affected commodities normally shipped in less-than-trainload lots -- finished and semi-finished manufactured goods, components, perishable consumer goods and the less bulky raw materials. Cars loaded with these commodities had to be handled through the marshalling yards and after the September and October attacks this became increasingly difficult or impossible. Although output of many industries reached a peak in late summer and declined thereafter, total output of the economy was on the whole well- maintained through November. Beginning in December there was a sharp fall in production in nearly all industries; week by week the decline continued until the end of the war.

Although coal traffic (about 40 percent of all the traffic carried by the German railways) held up better than miscellaneous commercial traffic, the decline was both more easily traceable and more dramatic. The September raids reduced coal-car placements in the Essen Division of the Reichsbahn (the originator of most of the coal traffic of the Ruhr) to an average of 12,000 cars daily as compared with 21,400 at the beginning of the year. Most of this was for consumption within the Ruhr. By January, placements in the Ruhr were down to 9,000 cars a day and in February virtually complete interdiction of the Ruhr District was achieved. Such coal as was loaded was subject to confiscation by the railroads to fuel their locomotives; even with this supply, coal stocks of the Reichsbahn itself were reduced from 18 days' supply in October 1944 to 4½ days' supply in February 1945. By March some divisions in southern Germany had less than a day's supply on hand, and locomotives were idle because of lack of coal.

The German economy was powered by coal; except in limited areas, the coal supply had been eliminated.

Military (Wehrmacht) traffic had top priority over all other traffic. During the period of attack this traffic came to account for an ever-increasing proportion of the declining movement. Through 1944 the air attack did not prevent the army from originating such movements although the time of arrival or even the arrival of units and equipment became increasingly uncertain. Couriers accompanied detachments and even shipments of tanks and other weapons; their task was to get off the train when it was delayed and report where it could be found. After the turn of the year even military movements became increasingly difficult. The Ardennes counter-offensive, the troops and equipment for which were marshalled over the railroads, was probably the last such effort of which the Reichsbahn would have been capable in the west.

The German power system, except for isolated raids, was never a target during the air war. An attack was extensively debated during the course of the war. It was not undertaken partly because it was believed that the German power grid was highly developed and that losses in one area could be compensated by switching power from another. This assumption, detailed investigation by the Survey has established, was incorrect.

The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country. The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.

Generating and distributing facilities were relatively vulnerable and their recuperation was difficult and time consuming. Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production.

A word should perhaps be added on the effect of the air war on the German civilian and on the civilian economy. Germany began the war after several years of full employment and after the civilian standard of living had reached its highest level in German history. In the early years of the war -- the soft war period for Germany -- civilian consumption remained high. Germans continued to try for both guns and butter. The German people entered the period of the air war well stocked with clothing and other consumer goods. Although most consumer goods became increasingly difficult to obtain, Survey studies show that fairly adequate supplies of clothing were available for those who had been bombed out until the last stages of disorganization. Food, though strictly rationed, was in nutritionally adequate supply throughout the war. The Germans' diet had about the same calories as the British.

German civilian defense was examined by Survey representatives familiar with U. S. and British defenses. The German system had been devised as protection against relatively small and isolated attacks. The organization had to be substantially revised when the attacks grew to saturation proportions. In particular, arrangements were made by which a heavily bombed community might call on the fire-fighting and other defensive resources of surrounding communities and, as a final resort, on mobile reserves deployed by the central government through the more vulnerable areas. In the attacks on German cities incendiary bombs, ton for ton, were found to have been between four and five times as destructive as high explosive. German fire defenses lacked adequate static and other water reserves replenished by mains independent of the more vulnerable central water supply. However, in the more serious fire raids, any fire-fighting equipment was found to have been of little avail. Fire storms occurred, the widespread fires generating a violent hurricane-like draft, which fed other fires and made all attempts at control hopeless.

German shelters, so far as they were available, were excellent. In England the policy was to build a large number of shelters which protected those taking refuge from bombs falling in the area and from falling and flying debris but which were not secure against a direct hit. The Germans, by contrast, built concrete bunkers, some of enormous size, both above and below ground, designed to protect those taking shelter even against a direct hit. One such shelter in Hamburg, named the "Holy Ghost" for its location on Holy Ghost Plaza, sheltered as many as 60,000 people. There were not, however, enough such shelters; at the close of the war shelter accommodation was available for only about eight million people. The remainder sheltered in basements, and casualties in these places of refuge were heavy. After raids the Germans did not attempt systematic recovery of all bodies or even of all trapped persons. Those that could not readily be removed were left.

Official German statistics place total casualties from air attack -- including German civilians, foreigners, and members of the armed forces in cities that were being attacked -- at 250,253 killed for the period from January 1, 1943, to January 31, 1945, and 305,455 wounded badly enough to require hospitalization, during the period from October 1, 1943, to January 31, 1945. A careful examination of these data, together with checks against the records of individual cities that were attacked, indicates that they are too low. A revised estimate prepared by the Survey (which is also a minimum) places total casualties for the entire period of the war at 305,000 killed and 780,000 wounded. More reliable statistics are available on damage to housing. According to these, 485,000 residential buildings were totally destroyed by air attack and 415,000 were heavily damaged, making a total of 20 percent of all dwelling units in Germany. In some 50 cities that were primary targets of the air attack, the proportion of destroyed or heavily damaged dwelling units is about 40 percent. The result of all these attacks was to render homeless some 7,500,000 German civilians.

It is interesting to note some of the effects of air attack upon medical care and military casualties during the war. The aerial warfare against Germany forced the German military and civilian authorities to recognize that national health and medical problems were a joint responsibility. The destruction of hospital equipment, pharmaceutical production, and medical supplies, incident to area raids, forced a dispersal of medical supply installations and the removal of hospitals from city to suburban and country sites. This program came in late 1943 at a time when air raids on cities were causing increased casualties among civilians and resulted in shortages in ether, plasters, serums, textiles, and other medical supplies. At the same time the increased tempo of tactical air action was having an effect on military casualty rates, and is reflected in the fact that, according to German reports, war casualties from aerial weapons moved from third place in 1942 to first place in late 1943, 1944, and 1945, followed in order by artillery fire and infantry weapons. The casualty effects of air action are shown by the fact that the proportion of wounded to killed shifted from a ratio of eight to one in 1940 and 1941 to a ratio of three to one in 1944 and 1945. Personnel wounded by air action suffered as a rule multiple wounds and shock, resulting in longer periods of hospitalization and convalescence, and in a decided reduction in the number of patients who could be returned to either full or limited military duty

[Hors]

Ok, but what relevance does that have to the initial question?

Is not the initial question about the Axis, not Germany alone? We just point out that the Axis' resources were not limited to Germany's formations only, and as German Allies' forces were used almost entirely in the East, it appears that significantly more than 85% of the Axis' formations were destroyed on the Eastern front (85% is only for Germany), thus making any theory about the decisive or even significant role of the US in WWII even less plausible.


That's why Germany attacked when they did, to catch the USSR by surprise, and before the USSR could launch its own planned offensive.

There was little if any surprise about the attack. The USSR had obvious overwhelming superiority. The surprise was a very low morale of Western Belarussian and Western Ukrainian conscripts who, constituting the first echelon of the Red Army, deserted/surrendered en masse (Ukrainian and Belarussian POWs were liberated by Germans almost immediately).

As for the planned offensive, it is only propaganda.


Complete conquest all the way to Vladivostok, possibly not, but at some point its resources would have been exhausted, if nothing else by 1953 when the fanatical Stalin died.

It was a miracle and incredible luck Germans made it to Moscow and Stalingrad. They did not even consider advancing much further. However, the Russian military industry was in the Urals regions and kept producing superior armaments in incredible amounts, while the Eastern front already became "overstretched" in 1942-1943.


Unexpected by the Japanese. It was an intelligence victory since the Americans had the Japanese codes and could read their every move, and thus avoid the Japanese ambush and set one of their own.

Luck or not, at any rate, the Japanese took losses they could not replace, in carriers and pilots. After this it was obvious that Germany was on the wrong side of the US-Japan matchup, and contributed to the feeling of desperation in Germany.

Luck. Not that big as Germans had, but still luck.



That's not quite the picture shown by these figures:

http://www.theapricity.com/forum/sho...9&postcount=11

Where do you see a contradiction?

And, by the way, another point: the land-lease programm was approved only in February of 1942, and shipments in any material amounts started to arrive only in 1943. By that time Nazi Germany was history.

[Finsterer Streiter]

If the allies had not landed in France in 1944, the USSR may have pushed Germany back anyways, though at much greater expense.

Doubtful. The declaration of war against the USA was only the last epic mistake in a long list of wrong decisions made by the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) and Hitler himself. After the victory over France Hitler better should have kept his mouth shut on tactical and strategical decisions. He was below average as a military strategist and military leader, and most of his capable generals knew it. But no one had the guts to chime in.

The mess started at Dünkirchen already. Allowing the British expeditionary corps to escape was a strategic grasp right into the toilet. Little time later some of the same soldiers played a crucial role in the battle for Britain. At the time of the battle for Britain we should have used all military and economic ressources and all troops for the decisive battle in the West, not for prowling around at the Balkans to comfort Mussolinis weired needs. Britain, as an island, was always an extreme hard nut in history and it requires full attention to crack that nut. Hitler underestimated their position like he underestimated nearly everything during the war.

After finishing Britain in a hard battle the USA wouldn´t have joined the war without any remaining capable ally in Europe. And after Pearl Harbour the Americans had enough to do with the Japs, the declaration of war was senseless and the next epic failure. There was no need to fight the USA and the USA wasn´t anxious to enter the European warzone either.

See, after the possible victory over Britain and after not venturing the war against the USA there would have been no remaining opponent in the west. Now all resources were available for the war in the east against Russia. War against Russia was inevitable, the only open question was "Who starts the fire?". Stalin scheduled to break the Hitler-Stalin-pact around 1944 or `45 to gain more influence in Eastern Europe.
Operation Barbarossa started some month too late in the year due to too much messing around in the Balkans, Greece and Africa. It was postponed more than once.

Anyhow, the fact remains that Russia couldn´t have a stand against an united and fully German offensive, an offensive with all possible support and without the need to split the military power between the Westfront and the Ostfront. Russia is large but Moscow and the Crimea peninsula were the important objectives to take. Take the cremlin and achieve victory. Siberian troops are useless when the political and military leadership is done, the communication channels cut and the main breadbasket of the nation in your hands.

Having said that I want to notice that I respect the Russian nation and the Russian people. I fully understand their pride and respect their kind of living. Talking about achieving military success isn´t equivalent to extinction and massmurder of Russians. Military confrontation is one thing, an issue of the respective leadership and the national elite. The other thing is the relationship between the people itself. I despise the war crimes done by German forces on Russians as much as I despise the Russian war crimes on Germans and other inhabitants of the Eastern European hemisphere.

Even war has rules. Breaking the rules brings forth the evil.

[Hors]

Anyhow, the fact remains that Russia couldn´t have a stand against an united and fully German offensive, an offensive with all possible support and without the need to split the military power between the Westfront and the Ostfront.

Do you realize how much military power the USSR had in 1941?

The Eastern front, 1941:

Red Army ----- Wehrmacht
Divisions 190 166 1,1 : 1
Personnel 3 289 851 4 306 800 1 : 1,3
Artillery 59 787 42 601 1,4 : 1
Tanks and self-propelled guns 15 687 4 171 3,8 : 1
Planes 10 743 4 846 2,2 : 1

And Russians had superior weapons. For example, Germans had no middle and heavy tanks, while Russians had 1392 of them!

[Jarl]

For example, Germans had no middle and heavy tanks, while Russians had 1392 of them!

That is incorrect. Germans had medium tanks (like Panzerkampfwagen III and IV) at that time and did use them in Operation Barbarossa, in 1941.

[Hors]

Panzerkampfwagen III = BT series, and BT tanks were considered light in the USSR
Panzerkampfwagen IV - most of them were as lightly blinded as tanks of the III-rd series and had inadequate 75 mm cannons, some Soviet BT tanks had 76 mm cannons

but, ok, PzIV can be considered as a middle tank, if you like, but Germans had only 200 of them

[RoyBatty]

I don't mean to be funny, but I'd just love to see Japanese fighting Russians in Siberia :D

There was a significant (but not very widely discussed) battle in Mongolia where the Soviets routed the Japanese. It was known as the Battle of Khalkin Gol.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khalkhin_Gol

[SwordoftheVistula]

Last night I watched a new documentary examining the effects of the lend-lease on the USSR, Soviet soldiers of the time who were interviewed said they couldn't have survived without it.

One aspect of this was the supply route through Iran:

http://www.foxnews.com/images/540635/0_21_450_lend.jpg

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,527583,00.html

By the end of 1941, Adolf Hitler had every reason to believe he would win the war in Europe and the Third Reich would rule for a thousand years. His invasion of the Soviet Union had that country on the verge of defeat. The U.S. and Great Britain — itself under siege — were desperate to save their unlikely ally and its leader Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin. To do so, President Roosevelt sent emissaries to Moscow to offer him wartime aid through the "Lend Lease" program.

"Once Stalin understands what's happening to his Red Army and Soviet state, there is a realization on his part that he must have allies wherever he can achieve it," explained Col. David Glantz, an historian retired from the U.S. Army. "Therefore he welcomes Roosevelt's emissaries. He welcomes the offers for Lend Lease."

The Lend Lease program provided material aid to America's Allies and aid soon began to flow to the Eastern Front. In addition to air and sea routes to Siberia and Russia's far north, one of the key routes was through Iran, situated on the Soviet Union's southern border.

Iran, however, was not always a friend of the Allied powers. When World War II began, the country, under the leadership of its king, Reza Shah, had strong German sympathies. The British and Soviets understood this danger and in September 1941 took control of the country. They deposed the reigning Shah and established his 21-year-old son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, on the throne (Reza Pahlavi would reign for almost 50 years until deposed in the 1979 revolution.) The young Shah signed an agreement to work with the Allies and provide logistical support in moving Lend Lease aid to the Soviet Union.

"The first shipments come in the fall, September, October, 1942," said Glantz. "They don't begin in large numbers until November and December on the great land route through Tehran."

Known as the "Persian Corridor," U.S. ships sailed into the Persian Gulf and docked at various ports on Iran's southern coast. From there, the material –- including armaments, trucks and Studebakers — was loaded onto train transports heading north. Thousands of Iranian civilians played a role in the war effort from laborers for road building and driving to skilled mechanics at the truck assembly plants. The highways and Iranian State Railway became a vital life line for goods produced in American factories to the Soviet frontlines.

Known as the "Persian Corridor," U.S. ships sailed into the Persian Gulf and docked at various ports on Iran's southern coast. From there, the material –- including armaments, trucks and Studebakers — was loaded onto train transports heading north. Thousands of Iranian civilians played a role in the war effort from laborers for road building and driving to skilled mechanics at the truck assembly plants. The highways and Iranian State Railway became a vital life line for goods produced in American factories to the Soviet frontlines.

In 1943, Tehran was chosen as the site of the first of two meetings between the big three -– Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. Zoya Zarubina worked for the Soviet Delegation as one of Stalin's translators at the Tehran Conference. She remembers the high drama surrounding the visit: "The city was filled with German spies and all that, and there were rumors that they might be getting some ideas about a conspiracy."

"First of all there was a complete black out," said Zarubina. "So the people in Iran were very frightened because for three days there was nothing, no news."

For four days the British, American and Soviet leaders met secretively at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. "It was an old aristocratic mansion and I was translating the war bulletins from Russian into English," said Zarubina.

The decisions made at the Tehran conference affected the outcome of the war and the post-war landscape for decades, including the opening of a second front into Western Europe in 1944 and the establishment of an organization of United Nations after the war.

In all, the "Persian Corridor" was the route for 4,159,117 tons of cargo delivered to the Soviet Union during the War. After Germany was defeated, Iran under the Shah remained an ally of the U.S. and Great Britain for decades, until he was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and replaced as Iranian leader by Ayatollah Khomeini.

[Tony]

What would have constituted a win by the Axis powers?


The situation before Dec. 07, 1941 between Germany & America could not have been any worst then that between America & Cuba 1961- or America & Iran 1979 -. It took the bombing of Pearl Harbor for Roosevelt to get Congress to declare war on Japan. Congress had not declared war on Germany in spite of the sinking of US ships in the North Atlanitc by German u-boats.
Could the US intervention have been avoided?
after all the Americans were cautious and entered the war only after:
1)Having realized the Italian Army were more a burden to the Germans than a useful ally , checks the Greek front.
2)After the failure of the Battle of Britain that showed the persistant superiority of British airforce over the German one.
3)After the Nazi opened a second front against the Russians.

If one of more of these facts above weren't happened maybe USA wouldn't never had the spirit (aka balls) to enter the conflict.

[Thorum]

I would have to say no, they still would not have won. Take away USSR, and even against the US I believe Germany would have won.

[Zardoz]

I think Germany would have been defeated just as Napoleon had been defeated; the Nazis were arrogant in their belief that they could just "kick in the door" and conquer Russia in six weeks. By the spring of 1942, the Russians had moved most of their heavy industry east of the Urals and were producing large quantities of T-34s and JS II tanks. These tanks were not engineered to German standards but they were rugged, effective machines.

The war in Europe would have taken longer and Russian loses would have been higher, but given the immense distances involved and the resilience of Russian civilians and soldiers, the outcome would have been the same. Britain, Canada, the Free French and the Poles would have invaded Western Europe eventually, Italy would have switched sides putting more pressure on Germany.

Would post-war Europe have looked different without U.S. participation? Yes, but it was really Stalin and Churchill who agreed on spheres of influence in Europe. The U.S. naively believed that holding democratic elections would secure a free Europe; Britain had been playing the grand game for a lot longer and knew that the Russians needed something in return for their 25 million dead as well as a buffer zone from Germany. With or without the U.S., spheres of influence in Europe would have been agreed upon by Britain and Russia.

[Loyalist]

Yes, and I don't believe some academic and/or long-winded explanation is necessary, either. Even with American intervention, and with the Germans effectively fighting alone on Eastern, Southern, and Western fronts, the Soviets only prevailed by the skin of their teeth. Furthermore, the latter was only due to Hitler's constant interference and tactical incompetence. Without US involvement, Britain would have either been defeated on the battlefield or starved into submission, allowing Germany to throw the full weight of its forces against Stalin, which itself could compensate for any German tactical blunders. The United States was also key to the North Africa and Italy campaigns, without which Mussolini would not have been toppled. A single-front war such as this would allow Germany and forces from its European fascist allies (Italy, Finland, Croatia, Romania, Hungary, Spanish Blue Division, etc.) to concentrate all resources against the Soviets.

It should be noted that I am not implying the United States scored any sort of single-handed victory in World War II, as is the prevailing attitude in Hollywood and the like, but it was a team effort.

[Zardoz]

Yeah, I don't like academic explanations either, they always clog things up with all those facts.

It's not just a question of who had the most tank or the most planes, it's also a question of political motives. Hitler never seriously considered Operation Sea Lion because he knew that the German Army would have ended up on the bottom of the English Channel, he also didn't consider the English to be Germany's "natural" enemy. Germany and Britain probably would have reached a compromise which would have allowed Britain time to catch its breath.
The German Army didn't even issue winter clothing to its men and Hitler lost his advantage of speed and encirclement by trying to capture Stalingrad.

North Africa was a sideshow, Hitler went there to rescue Mussolini.

Germany's allies in Operation Barbarossa were lackluster - Romania, Hungary, Italy. They didn't see the same need to invade Russia that Hitler did (living space), their soldiers weren't motivated and they lacked nifty things like anti-tank guns.
Finland just wanted to win back the territory she lost to Russia in 1940 and had no further ambitions.

Russia was in a fight for its life and would have won without the Western allies. It was a team effort, but without Russia, Germany would have won, without the USA, Germany would have lost. The map of post-war Europe would just look a lot different.

[Loyalist]

Yeah, I don't like academic explanations either, they always clog things up with all those facts.

:rolleyes2:


It's not just a question of who had the most tank or the most planes, it's also a question of political motives. Hitler never seriously considered Operation Sea Lion because he knew that the German Army would have ended up on the bottom of the English Channel, he also didn't consider the English to be Germany's "natural" enemy. Germany and Britain probably would have reached a compromise which would have allowed Britain time to catch its breath.

The time for Britain and Germany to agree to peace was before the war. Churchill nullified any chance of that happening under any condition, whether out of some pathological hatred of Germany, the fact that he was on a Jewish payroll, or some combination of those, I don't know. Hitler gave Churchill time to pull out of the war, the so-called "Phony War", but we all know how that went. The only other (unrealistic) alternative for Anglo-German peace would entail Oswald Mosley and the BUF seizing power in the 1930s.

On what basis do you make this claim that Operation Sea Lion was never intended to be put into action? Most reliable historians would disagree with that. Of course, there's also the facts; the Luftwaffe was mandated with destroying the RAF to allow for a seaborne invasion, ground forces were massed in France and the Low Countries for implementation of said invasion, even a list of individuals in the UK to be arrested up by the Gestapo was prepared.

Operation Sea Lion was entirely feasible, and the question was not of the ability of the Kriegsmarine to capture and seal off the English Channel; that was the easy part. The issue is whether or not German ground forces could prevail over the British Army once on land, as well as the various militia and guerilla units which were created to resist such an invasion.


The German Army didn't even issue winter clothing to its men and Hitler lost his advantage of speed and encirclement by trying to capture Stalingrad.

I did specify that Hitler's errors, as demonstrated in this post, cost Germany the war in the East, not some non-existent invincibility of the Soviet Union. By not gambling on Stalingrad, and instead concentrating forces to either capture Moscow or the Caucasian oil fields, a fatal blow would have been dealt to the Russians.


North Africa was a sideshow, Hitler went there to rescue Mussolini.

A victory in North Africa would place the Axis in control of the Suez, open up Middle Eastern oil fields for the Germans, and stop the Allied invasion of Sicily and Italy before it started. Given the consequences of each of the aforementioned, the North African threatre does not sound like a "sideshow" to me.


Germany's allies in Operation Barbarossa were lackluster - Romania, Hungary, Italy. They didn't see the same need to invade Russia that Hitler did (living space), their soldiers weren't motivated and they lacked nifty things like anti-tank guns.

Motivation aside, the involvement of other European fascist powers provided additional men and material, and thus additional pressure, on the Soviets. That said, there were European volunteers who did have that "fighting spirit"; anti-communists from Spain, the Blue Division, many of them veterans of the Spanish Civil War. Then there were those recruited from the USSR itself; Ukrainians, Balts, Cossacks, all of whom were motivated by the promise of liberation from Stalin and Soviet rule.


Finland just wanted to win back the territory she lost to Russia in 1940 and had no further ambitions.

Whether Mannerheim only wanted retribution for the Winter War, or if he could have been presuaded to assist the Axis further on the Eastern Front, is largely inconsequential. The Finns proved themselves to be some of the most effective fighters of the entire conflict, and their presence provided additional pressure that the Soviets could not withstand while resisting the brunt of the Axis attack to the South. Greater Finnish involvement might have turned the tide in Leningrad as well, freeing up additional Axis forces.


Russia was in a fight for its life and would have won without the Western allies. It was a team effort, but without Russia, Germany would have won, without the USA, Germany would have lost. The map of post-war Europe would just look a lot different.

Russia would not have won without the Western Allies. Even with the Americans, British, and other Allied countries putting pressure on Hitler from all sides, it was still entirely possible for Germany to defeat the Soviets on the battlefield. They failed due to Hitler's incompetence, not due to a scientific inabilty of Germany to defeat the USSR. Given that this discussion is about what would have happened had the Americans not even been a factor, nothing but a decisive German victory is the answer.

[Zardoz]

:rolleyes2:



The time for Britain and Germany to agree to peace was before the war. Churchill nullified any chance of that happening under any condition, whether out of some pathological hatred of Germany, the fact that he was on a Jewish payroll, or some combination of those, I don't know. Hitler gave Churchill time to pull out of the war, the so-called "Phony War", but we all know how that went. The only other (unrealistic) alternative for Anglo-German peace would entail Oswald Mosley and the BUF seizing power in the 1930s.

Okay, Churchill was on "a Jewish payroll", I think I understand you better now.
Anyway, Churchill was quite happy to let the Germans and the Russians beat each others' brains out; from a purely political point of view, this was logical. Neither Nazism nor Stalinism were appealing political ideologies.



On what basis do you make this claim that Operation Sea Lion was never intended to be put into action? Most reliable historians would disagree with that. Of course, there's also the facts; the Luftwaffe was mandated with destroying the RAF to allow for a seaborne invasion, ground forces were massed in France and the Low Countries for implementation of said invasion, even a list of individuals in the UK to be arrested up by the Gestapo was prepared.

Operation Sea Lion was entirely feasible, and the question was not of the ability of the Kriegsmarine to capture and seal off the English Channel; that was the easy part. The issue is whether or not German ground forces could prevail over the British Army once on land, as well as the various militia and guerilla units which were created to resist such an invasion.


Operation Sea Lion, was not a viable operation, the Germans had to scrounge barges from around occupied Europe, the German Navy would not have been able to protect the invasion force as it crossed the Channel and the Gestapo had lists for everything just in case Hitler decided on trying something stupid. Which he often did.



I did specify that Hitler's errors, as demonstrated in this post, cost Germany the war in the East, not some non-existent invincibility of the Soviet Union. By not gambling on Stalingrad, and instead concentrating forces to either capture Moscow or the Caucasian oil fields, a fatal blow would have been dealt to the Russians.


Seems almost like you're agreeing with me here. I would add that if Hitler had a choice of either capturing Moscow or the Caucasian oil fields. Tough choice! At any rate, he got the Sixth Army bogged down in urban warfare and it was at Stalingrad that Hitler lost the war.
I never said that the Soviet Union was invincible. The Russians won because they were fighting for their Motherland, not for the Bolsheviks. Stalin played up on Russian patriotism throughout the war because he knew that the average Russian soldier would fight damn hard for Mother Russia, but might not feel the need to fight so hard for the Bolshevik regime. The Russians were not invincible, neither were the Germans, but the Russians were fighting for their soil.



A victory in North Africa would place the Axis in control of the Suez, open up Middle Eastern oil fields for the Germans, and stop the Allied invasion of Sicily and Italy before it started. Given the consequences of each of the aforementioned, the North African threatre does not sound like a "sideshow" to me.


The Germans could have gained access to the Mid-East oil fields through Iran. If the Allies hadn't invaded in Sicily, they would have chosen another place, another time. The British Army had the Italians in North Africa on the run and that was why Hitler had to divert resources to save his ally.
Hitler's three worst enemies were (in no particular order):
-himself
-Mussolini
-the Russians



Motivation aside, the involvement of other European fascist powers provided additional men and material, and thus additional pressure, on the Soviets. That said, there were European volunteers who did have that "fighting spirit"; anti-communists from Spain, the Blue Division, many of them veterans of the Spanish Civil War. Then there were those recruited from the USSR itself; Ukrainians, Balts, Cossacks, all of whom were motivated by the promise of liberation from Stalin and Soviet rule.



Whether Mannerheim only wanted retribution for the Winter War, or if he could have been presuaded to assist the Axis further on the Eastern Front, is largely inconsequential. The Finns proved themselves to be some of the most effective fighters of the entire conflict, and their presence provided additional pressure that the Soviets could not withstand while resisting the brunt of the Axis attack to the South. Greater Finnish involvement might have turned the tide in Leningrad as well, freeing up additional Axis forces.


The number of troops who volunteered to fight on the Eastern Front alongside the Germans was relatively small in number and many were too late to turn the tide.
You can't just dismiss motivation, the Russians knew where the weak units were (e.g. Romanian units during the encirclement of Stalingrad) and attacked there. The Germans had to prop up their allies thus further diluting their own strength.
As I said, the Finns just wanted to get their own soil back. That's what motivation is all about: fighting for your own soil. Even the Germans, who after years of propaganda about Teutonic superiority and their right to living space, soon found themselves with a morale problem. Why? Because they weren't defending their soil; once they were defending their soil, they were too weak to resist the Red Army.



Russia would not have won without the Western Allies. Even with the Americans, British, and other Allied countries putting pressure on Hitler from all sides, it was still entirely possible for Germany to defeat the Soviets on the battlefield. They failed due to Hitler's incompetence, not due to a scientific inabilty of Germany to defeat the USSR. Given that this discussion is about what would have happened had the Americans not even been a factor, nothing but a decisive German victory is the answer.

Nothing but further speculation is the only result of a question such as this. Hitler should have learned from history (Napoleon) and not have fallen for his own propaganda about an invincible German Army.
I believe that Russia would have won without the Western allies. I believe that the main reason Operation Overlord took place was to prevent Red Army tanks from rolling through the streets of Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam...

Thanks for the debate, Loyalist! It's good to see someone your age who knows something of history. :)
At any rate, I have work tomorrow, so have a good night!

[SwordoftheVistula]

By the spring of 1942, the Russians had moved most of their heavy industry east of the Urals and were producing large quantities of T-34s and JS II tanks.

But could they have focused on producing these tanks in such large numbers if lend-lease had not provided all the other military equipment for them?

As regards the Luftwaffe vs the RAF, the Luftwaffe had far more planes, at least equal pilots, and was winning the 'Battle of Britain' as long as they focused on targeting Britain's air force, once they switched to attacking industrial targets instead, despite lacking a heavy bomber, the British air force was able to recover and drive them back. The invention of 'RADAR' also helped the British out big time, at one point the Germans actually managed to knock out the British radar operations, but were unaware of this, and shortly thereafter switched over to the 'strategic bombing without strategic bombers' plan.

[Hors]

But could they have focused on producing these tanks in such large numbers if lend-lease had not provided all the other military equipment for them?

Yes. And, anyway, had it? The lend-lease help started to arrive in any material amounts only in 1943.

[Finsterer Streiter]

I think Germany would have been defeated just as Napoleon had been defeated; the Nazis were arrogant in their belief that they could just "kick in the door" and conquer Russia in six weeks. By the spring of 1942, the Russians had moved most of their heavy industry east of the Urals and were producing large quantities of T-34s and JS II tanks. These tanks were not engineered to German standards but they were rugged, effective machines.
Sorry, but nonsense. The Germans were well aware of the faults of Napoleon. Operation Barbarossa started some weeks too late but the war was winnable - quite easily apropos - with adequate tactics. The first weeks were running as scheduled but Hitler interfered too often with the opinions of his generals later. Read my post above for further informations. Hitler mixed up primary and secondary goals.

From a modern perspective of warfare his primary targets weren´t that wrong, like seizing the breadbasket of Russia ( Crimea peninsula) first. Yet it was not the proper approach to bring down the Russian bear. The Russian bear was of an other class and quality than the French froggie. You can hit the bear in the leg but he can kill you with his paws nonetheless. You must aim on the head and the heart to prevent any counterattack. The head and the heart of Russia is not the Crimea peninsula but the political, economic and military leadership and nerve centre in Moscow. Marshing with all forces the middle way to Moscow would have given the Russians no time to reorganize their remaining troops in the east. Moscow is the city to take, everything what makes Russia Russian was and is boundled there. Russian morals was already shrinking and with the German flag waving over the Kremlin any further motivation to fight would´ve choked off instantly.

Hors is right that Russian tanks were heavier but German tanks were more mobile and precise. Yet he shouldn´t forget that Germany had new technical evolutions to be in the ready.

Russian soldiers were superior in quantity and inferior in quality to German troops. Once again I don´t say that in a respectless way, it´s just the hard truth.

Without US involvement, Britain would have either been defeated on the battlefield or starved into submission, allowing Germany to throw the full weight of its forces against Stalin, which itself could compensate for any German tactical blunders.
Yes, and let´s not forget about the persistent blackmailing and threatening of Churchill to lead the Americans to join the war and support them with marine units.

It´s time to mind "Operation Catapult" here. British naval troops attacked their own allies, the French, to sink or overtake their ships. More than 1.300 french soldiers where killed in that cowardly act, the french ships were trapped in the harbour and British airforce mined the gateway to prevent any escape some minutes before the massive attack. It was like skeet shooting.

This should´ve shown the Americans the warmongering nature of Churchill, but the opposite was the case: After Operation catapult they supported the British fleet with destroyers, carriers and corvettes. It was, virtually, the entrance of the USA into the war.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Mers-el-K%C3%A9bir