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Marxist Philosophical Materialism
a) Materialist
Contrary to Idealism, which regards the word as the embodiment of an "absolute idea", a "universal spirit", "consciousness", Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature material, that the multi-fold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena as established by the dialectical method, are a law of the development of moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a "universal spirit".
"The materialistic outlook on nature", says Engels, "means no more than simply conceiving nature just as it exists, without any foreign admixture (Marx and Engels, Vol. XIV, p.651.)
b) Objective Reality
Contrary to Idealism, which asserts at only our consciousness really exists, and that the material world, being nature, exists only in our consciousness in our sensations, ideas and perceptions, the Marxist philosophical materialism holds that matter, nature, being is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our consciousness that matter is primary since it is the source of sensations, ideas, consciousness, and that consciousness is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter , a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought, and that therefore one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error. Engels says:
"The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature is the paramount question of the whole of philosophy. The answers which the philosophers gave to this question spit them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature... comprised the camp of 'idealism'. The others who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism." (Marx, Selected Works, Vol I, p.329.)
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