Do you believe in destiny?

[Lutiferre]

Fatalism is not inherent in determinism and has nothing to do with science at all. Fatalism is a reaction to the belief in determinism; it is a mode of thought, not a system, much like optimism or pessimism.

I was not using it in that specific sense, but to describe the attitude of strict determinists, causalists or predeterminists.

[Lutiferre]

Yeah, I don't think we're going to come to terms here at all.

Actually, whether we are going to "come to terms" is completely irrelevant. I pointed out an assumption implicit in your own stance (incompatibilism), to the detriment of your claim to be "assumptionless". What a delusion. That is the myth of neutrality.

[Psychonaut]

I pointed out an assumption implicit in your own stance (incompatibilism), to the detriment of your claim to be "assumptionless". What a delusion. That is the myth of neutrality.

OK, if you wish to consider my belief in the veracity of physics and logic to be assumptions, sure. My stance is implicitly incompatibilistic because compatibilism has not, IMO, been demonstrated in a manner that is a). logically sound, b). free from religious insertions about souls and c). in keeping with physics. Many of the compatibilist formulations I've read fulfill one or two of these criteria, but not all three.

[Lutiferre]

OK, if you wish to consider my belief in the veracity of physics and logic to be assumptions, sure. My stance is implicitly incompatibilistic because compatibilism has not, IMO, been demonstrated in a manner that is a). logically sound, b). free from religious insertions about souls and c). in keeping with physics. Many of the compatibilist formulations I've read fulfill one or two of these criteria, but not all three.

Incompatibilism and compatibilism are not, first of all, evidential claims about whether free will actually exists, but much more so, what free will entails if it does exist; what its metaphysical implications are. Therefore, it makes much more sense to say that it has a lot to do with what metaphysical categories one operates with in defining free will. Nevertheless, since the fatalistic stance of strong determinism/causalism has been thoroughly falsified by scientific evidence (and hence, no process at all could be subject to it, including human autonomy), and since it's perfectly hypothetically feasible to operate with either metaphysical stance, the question of such stances is a non-issue, and the question becomes at best a weak one, and at worst an irrelevant one.

[Psychonaut]

Incompatibilism and compatibilism are not, first of all, evidential claims about whether free will actually exists, but much more so, what free will entails if it does exist; what its metaphysical implications are. Therefore, it makes much more sense to say that it has a lot to do with what metaphysical categories one operates with in defining free will. Nevertheless, since the fatalistic stance of strong determinism/causalism has been thoroughly falsified by scientific evidence, and since it's perfectly feasible to operate with either metaphysical stance, the question of such stances is a non-issue, and the question becomes at best a weak one, and at worst an irrelevant one.

Let's try again...

We do not know what consciousness is. We do not know how it arises from the brain. We do not know the decision making process's origin. In the absence of direct knowledge of a subject, we can inductively extrapolate a possible conclusion from what we do know. We know that neural processes are electro-chemical in nature. We know that electro-chemical reactions can be predicted by our formulas. We do not currently have any physical or chemical theories that could account for free will. Combining all of these together, we are led in the direction of our actions being determined. I do not believe this to be the case (nor does any scientifically thinking person), but it currently appears to be most in keeping with the data we've currently collected. A mechanism for free will may be discovered tomorrow. If that's the case, then that's the case. But as it stands now, there is not even a theorized mechanism that's been put up for testing.

[Lutiferre]

we can inductively extrapolate a possible conclusion from what we do know.

The first thing anyone knows, is something like "I am", and our personal experience. Any inductions are, in the end, much more speculative than this foundational knowledge.

We do not currently have any physical or chemical theories that could account for free will.

That assumes that any physical or chemical "theory" needs to "account" for free will. Rather, a great stream of enlightened atheists philosophers of mind (and neurologists) will agree that consciousness and free will are emergent properties, which is a "whole" that is irreducible to any isolated part in-itself, that is, take the physical or chemical components of the brain away from the whole and they do not, on their own, lead to it. The funny thing is that this makes it necessarily a matter of substantial form (of the neurobiological structure), and not of matter (any one neuron or constituent itself). Substantial form is what happens to be an immaterial or abstract quality which is not a piece of matter but the form, structure and constitution the emergent quality depends upon. We understand the coming-about of this substantial form through the "seed" that brings it about in DNA.

Combining all of these together, we are led in the direction of our actions being determined.

The exercise of will is equal to determination toward an action. We generally exercise this will with the capability of mind to weigh several options for will, and should choose what seems most beneficient and protagonistic to survival, though we can also choose the opposite. Unless you believe we are being forced by someone with a gun to our neck to act like we do, then the freedom of the will is a biological fact.

[Psychonaut]

The first thing anyone knows, is something like "I am", and our personal experience. Any inductions are, in the end, much more speculative than this foundational knowledge.

You don't need to go off into ontology to counter my point. We can have a different thread for that.

That assumes that any physical or chemical "theory" needs to "account" for free will.

Physical theories (imperfectly at present) account for the motions of all physical objects. Our neural processes are physical and are thus governed by the same category of theories. If you're supposing that a physical object is capable of doing something that cannot be demonstrated (mental processes, being noetic, cannot be demonstrated), you must, in the scientific world, provide a theory to account for said behavior. That's scientific method 101; every hypothesis must account for its prediction by means of a theory.

Rather, a great stream of enlightened atheists philosophers of mind will agree that consciousness and free will are emergent properties, which is a "whole" that is irreducible to any isolated part in-itself, that is, take the physical or chemical components of the brain away from the whole and they do not, on their own, lead to it.

Your use of the future tense shows me just how great of a prophet you are! I'm quite amazed that you already know the course of the future of not only neurobiology, but also philosophy as well!

Unless you believe we are being forced by someone with a gun to our neck to act like we do, then the freedom of the will is a biological fact.

An amazing strawman too! Does someone hold a gun to your head to make your skin white? Does someone hold a gun to your head to make you grow old? Most of our bodily functions are either involuntary or instinctual. If we are determined beings rather than free agents. Our "self determined" behaviors would likely be something akin to a higher order of involuntary action that we're unaware of (as we are of most involuntary processes).

[Mesrine]

Destiny is another invention of the human mind.

[Piparskeggr]

Regardless of the philosophical discussions, I like this thread. It's given me cause to refer to my dictionary to finds words I haven't seen before.

Pip

[Lutiferre]

Your use of the future tense shows me just how great of a prophet you are!

I meant obviously that they do agree. Those atheist philosophers, I meant such fine examples as Daniel Dennett. Read about emergentism.

Does someone hold a gun to your head to make you grow old?

No. But you cannot choose between a) grow old b) don't grow old. It's a necessary condition due to the corruptibility of matter and organisms. You can choose between a) eat at McDonalds and b) eat chinese.