3
Maoism
"Mao’s position after the end of the ‘Great Leap’ in 1960–1 resembled Stalin’s after the ‘Great Break’ in 1931–3. He realized that his vaulting ambitions and populism had caused chaos. He also accepted that ‘retreat’ from Radicalism towards a more technocratic form of Communism was necessary. The Great Leap was abandoned."
[...]
"In some ways, then, Mao was (unconsciously) following Stalin’s path in the 1930s. Having led disastrous economic ‘leaps’, both had been forced to restore order, which in turn entrenched officials and other leaders. Both then tried to increase their power over the party, by undermining any potential rivals in the leadership. At the same time they launched ideological campaigns, purging non-believers or ‘rightists’ from the bureaucracy – Stalin in the Terror and Mao in the Cultural Revolution. Both campaigns also rapidly escalated out of control. But Mao was much more radical in his methods and goals. Stalin preserved hierarchy, and relied on the secret police; Mao returned to the guerrilla socialism of Yan’an and mobilized the masses in the hope of creating the new socialist man. Mao, then, was not merely imposing his will on the party; he was launching, as he saw it, a Communist revolution within a Communist state – a revolution that in effect became, uniquely, a civil war within the Communist Party, and amongst the population as a whole" and managed to be responsible for the death of 70 million people."
4
"Following the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s, meanwhile, the Chinese provided stiff competition to Moscow in its quest for Third World influence. In the early 1960s, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi crisscrossed Africa and Asia, and visited large numbers of non-aligned leaders from Burma to Egypt, from Algeria to Ethiopia. The Chinese now presented themselves as a radical alternative to the Soviets and strong opponents of the policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the West. In 1965, Lin Biao, the radical military leader, argued that Chinese guerrilla experience was much more suited to freedom struggles in agrarian societies than the Soviet model."
[...]
"The Indonesian party was one of the main allies of the Chinese, but Beijing also funded the Vietnamese and a number of African and Middle Eastern non-Communist regimes and independence movements."
5
"The Chinese message was an appealing one for many Third World Communists. As the head of the powerful Indonesian Communist Party, Dipa Aidit, told a foreign Communist delegation, Communist regimes like the Soviet one would inevitably become ‘“rich fat cats” at the expense of backward countries and will lose their revolutionary spirit’. He was particularly exercised by the fact that he had paid much more for a shirt in Moscow than in New York, and even then the quality had been distinctly inferior – proof-positive that the Russians were even more money-grubbing than the Americans."
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