DONALD TRUMP'S SPEECH FOR THE AGES

[GreatRace (Mahājāti)]

Trump just gave a speech or address for the ages, and the sound of that mighty voice will reverberate through the States and echo over those vast plains and prairies. The address will reverberate through all levels of the American system, not far short of a revolution. And I predict that it will reverberate across this great and beautiful land and throughout the length and breadth of history. It will, to use the words of Schiller (1929), reverberate in other heads, and perpetually incite to further efforts. And I think I can, using the words of the Grand Lodge of the State of New York or of the book "Proceedings of the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the State of New York" (1893), go so far as to say that it will reverberate throughout endless space until time sball cease and shall be trodden under foot by the mighty tread of the Lion of that tribe which shall then be triumphant. 'Father Time', or God or the Creator, is ever and is surely growing old, yet always eager, young, and capable; tyrannical and unrelenting in the havoc, pain and suffering made or brought or inflicted upon human life and all things mortal and corruptible. Time bears on his shoulders the weighty burden of the years that are forever his own—and nobody else's. Be they for good or for evil, they can never be redeemed or "called" as they roll on into eternal space. The sun has risen and set upon the mighty and ordered array of generations and geographies since creation's dawn, and it will continue its diurnal (daily) journey across the sky until it shall be blotted or erased from the heavens, and we shall be entitled to that 'light' that emanates from divine revelation or derives from a "more redemptive" revelation and realization through the power of the Beast of that tribe or race or caste, when we will need no further light.

However, it needs to be remembered that there may be times of "devolution" in which history, as Sloane (2011) notes, moves toward a less redemptive outcome. But Sloane, citing expert opinion, suggests that it doesn't take away from the fact that there is a redemptive-historical movement both within the biblical canon and in its relationship to extra-biblical history and culture. This redemptive movement is especially evident in the transition between the Old Testament and the New Testament, although Sloane cites William Webb in his discussion of the data and notes that there also can be "movement" within a single testament (e.g., the oft-claimed development from the Law to the Prophets). Nevertheless, the writer says that he — William Webb — appears confident that God's governance of history is redemptive and thus generally moves toward a more redemptive direction en route to a glorious eschaton. This "redemptive movement", moreover, is progressive (not static nor regressive) in a twofold sense, and, yes, it concerns both revelation and realization.

History basically serves the same function and precisely the same mode of operation as Revelation, but also supports a specific prognosis or diagnosis (which generally carries a specific prognosis). In ethical or moral terms, we can say that history fulfills pretty much the same function as traditional revelation fulfills in the White or European areas, and that it serves pretty much the same function that revelation did in the West, or that it serves pretty much the same function as did the "revelations" or "apocalypses" in earlier times, providing, as Dale (2004) notes, didactic models and principles to be studied and, perhaps even more importantly, embodying those ideals in concrete human figures to whom one could trace one's lineage directly and thereby be assured of the possibility of return. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that history may also be understood as a product of revelation. History, as Haught (2009) explains, is constituted as such by God's gift of a future that pulls us out of the safety of nature and into a mysterious openness accessible only to hope. Revelation is promise, and without our response of hope neither revelation nor history can become an actuality. Moreover, "revelation" means the disclosing to us of a new forum for our existing, namely, the sphere of a promise of fulfillment that makes history possible. And Conradie (2005) similarly notes that God is not revealed in an "epiphany of eternal presence", but in the "apocalypse of the promised future of the truth" and in the history that is marked by this promise. But, as Olson (2013) shows, even their historical fulfillments do not exhaust God's promises. In every fulfillment the promise, and what is still contained in it, does not yet become wholly congruent with reality and thus there always remains an overspill.

UNBELIEVABLE TRUMP ADDRESS

[GreatRace (Mahājāti)]

Very IMPRESSIVE Presentation from TED Cruz

[Gotterdammerung]

A TIK TOK HEARING THAT RESONATES

[Baphomet]

EU DECLARES TRADE WAR AGAINST US

[Baphomet]

Donald Trump Rakes up Russia Ukraine War In His New Year Speech

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EF0b...nel=CNN-News18

[Great Satan]

Ask: How can this be?

Political expert weighs in on impasse over House speaker

Remarks by President Biden Before Air Force One Departure

THE PRESIDENT: Well, obviously, I am. In terms of –-

I’ll put my hat on here.

For two reasons. One, it’s embarrassing for the country. I mean, literally. Now, I’m not making a (inaudible). It’s just the reality is that, you know, to be able — have a Congress that can’t function is just embarrassing. We’re the greatest nation in the world. How can that be?

This is one of the most important stories of our time

[Great Satan]

Certainly long-term pressures have been building against the institutional establishment in general, as Brueggemann (2010) notes in the book "Rich, Free, and Miserable: The Failure of Success in America". The protest movements were diverse and complex and in many cases poorly defined, despite the truncating view of hindsight that tempts us to lump them all together even though they had nearly or almost opposite causes. As Brueggemann keenly observes, the modernizing society had promised much to its citizens that it withheld from some groups, such as African Americans and Native Americans. It promoted its defining value of individualism while also dictating to women that they had limited individuality. It celebrated inclusive government in contrast to totalitarian regimes abroad while marginalizing those outside the political center at home. In addition, the credibility of the establishment, Samuel Huntington suggests, was greatly weakened, and the system of governance was fractured and changed considerably. In the words of Samuel Huntington, who was by no means an uncritical supporter or proponent, the essence of the democratic surge of the Sixties was a general challenge to existing systems of authority, public and private, and people no longer felt the same compulsion to obey those whom they had previously considered superior to themselves in age, rank, status, expertise, character, or talents. Critical in all this, Zinn (2003) rightly says, was the decline in the authority of the President. As the Trilateral Commission (1975) noted in its report on the governability of democracies, the United States, to the extent that it was governed by anyone during the decades after World War II, was governed by the President acting with the support and cooperation of key individuals and groups in the Executive Office, the federal bureaucracy, Congress, and the more important businesses, banks, law firms, foundations, and media, which constitute the private sector's Establishment. Howard Zinn thinks that this was probably the frankest statement ever made by an Establishment adviser. According to Zinn, Huntington further said that the President, to win the election, needed the support of a broad coalition of people.

Samuel P. Huntington observes, as cited in Wright and Kaplan (2002), that winning an election is "almost irrelevant" to the ability to govern. "What counts then is his [the president's] ability to mobilize support from the leaders of the key institutions in society and government." Further, according to Huntington, the president has to constitute a broad governing coalition of strategically located supporters who can furnish him with the information, talent, expertise, manpower, publicity, arguments, and political support which he needs to develop a program, to embody it in legislation, and to see it effectively implemented. This coalition must include key people in Congress, the executive branch, and the private-sector "Establishment." The governing coalition need have little relation to the electoral colation. Furthermore, as stated by Eulau and ‎Czudnowski (1976), there is more to a presidential governing coalition than the executive elite. It might include dependable congressional leaders, perhaps some state governors and big city mayors, and actors outside government, such as media elites, interest group leaders, and depending on the content of the presidential program, some mixture of corporate and labor leaders.

As Zinn (2003) stated in his book "A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present", what worried Huntington was the loss in governmental authority. Huntington moreover saw the possible end of that quarter century when "the United States was the hegemonic power in a system of world order." However, it should not be forgotten that Huntington was reporting all this to an organization that was very important to the future of the United States. The Trilateral Commission was organized in early 1973 by David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Rockefeller was an official of the Chase Manhattan Bank and a powerful financial figure in the United States and the world; Brzezinski, a Columbia University professor, specialized in international relations and was a consultant to the State Department. In other words, the "global economy" that is now so widely accepted was planned and organized beginning in 1973, as Ewen (1998) rightly says in his aptly named book Social Stratification and Power in America: A View from Below. Kefale (2013) says that according to Huntington, under a dominant party system, there will be 'one broad based party that has a wide appeal to a number of groups', regularly wins elections and more or less continuously controls the government. Such a system also allows for the inclusion of smaller parties which may reflect particular ethnic, regional, or ideological interests. Nevertheless, opposition parties could neither control the legislature, nor the executive. Perhaps most importantly, the presence of smaller opposition political parties that compete in elections, but can never form a government either individually or collectively, provide democratic legitimacy or a democratic platform and facilitate the flow of foreign direct investment or foreign aid. According to Tecola Hagos, as cited in the Journal of Oromo Studies (1997), "... Huntington ('s) ... advice to the Ethiopian government is fascism, no matter how it is cleverly camouflaged in democratic sounding words and phrases" (p. 88).

Huntington's rule of thumb, Soe (1995) explains, is that a democratic form of government can be considered to have become stable when a country has had at least two successive peaceful turnovers of power. Such a development may take a generation or longer to complete, even under fortunate circumstances. There may, however, be important cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic, geographic or racial obstacles to democratization, according to Huntington, who like most observers sees extreme poverty as a principal obstacle to successful democratization. Finally, a number of scholars and researchers have been studying and writing along similar lines. Along the same lines, Stokke and Tostensen (2001) observed that the two most important challenges to human rights today are the increasing income inequality and widespread extreme poverty in a world which is richer than ever before, and the proliferation of local armed conflicts with devastating consequences for the enjoyment of economic and social rights. Economic globalisation, as was also noted by Schuerkens (2010), has been characterised by the ascending power of financial capital, an acceleration of foreign direct investment (FDI), high enterprise mobility and offshore production on a global scale and the rise of transnational corporations (TNCs) have characterized this process. Another important thing to remember is that corporations have long played a central role in the international food system. Clapp (2020) explains in great detail that agrifood TNCs have not only grown in size, but also in scope, with many firms engaged in a wide range of activities. Even more importantly, as the scale and reach of these corporations has expanded, corporate activity in the world food economy has become much more concentrated as well as more segmented, with relatively few global firms dominating large subsectors of the system. With this plethora of often-simultaneous activities, corporations have become major political actors in the global governance of agriculture and food, and thus with the dramatic expansion of this political role of corporations and, in particular, of private governance institutions, the study of its implications for society, as Clapp and ‎Fuchs (2009) remind us, is extremely important. At the same time, phenomenal growth in the financialisation of the global food economy has provided capital for accelerated food industry expansion.

Furthermore, as Lawrence ‎and Friel (2019) explain, these globalisation processes have helped facilitate an unprecedented increase in the number, size and reach of transnational food corporations (TFCs) and in turn the expansion of cross-border food production and supply chain networks. Or as Harris (2022) also says, global corporations are particularly significant because of their size and their ability to dominate markets, and the scale of some firms means that their business decisions have an enormous impact on national economies. Interestingly, Eide et al. (2001) also addressed these three interrelated issues, namely the increasing inequality in income and the widespread occurrence of extreme poverty in a world which is richer than ever before, the ascending power of transnational corporations in comparison to that of the states, and the proliferation of local armed conflicts with devastating consequences for the enjoyment of economic and social rights. Indeed, it is commonplace and, in fact, one of the truest of commonplaces is that the power of the nation-state is declining in relation to the ascending power of private international corporations. Vogelmann (2020) cites neoliberals and global governance scholars who have found an increase in the relative political power of TNCs vis-à-vis the state and civil society, and (internally in the power of TNCs) vis-à-vis small- and medium-sized firms. Perhaps most importantly, as Graz and Nölke (2007) note, if one adopts a power-theoretic perspective on TPG, the political implications of the growing extent of TPG become much more visible. Moreover, such an approach reveals developments in business political role that are frequently not considered in analyses of TPG but are crucial parallel and interactive trends in business participation in governance. But perhaps we have been asking the wrong questions. We all ask questions, and we should. It is more dangerous, as Burger (2018) rightly says, if we do not. Perhaps the question we should be asking is: What is power in the world system/international political economy? And who has it? As Singer (2021) states in "Ecosystem Crises Interactions: Human Health and the Changing Environment." As such, any answer will need to assess the power of corporations to "influence the elements of justice and freedom" within nation-states. This also means that we have to emphasize this consciously, and have to take pains to play this up. Let us ensure that it is heard, and is constantly repeated in order to emphasize conspicuously, consistently, eloquently, evidentially, ruthlessly and undeniably.

[Great Satan]

Is He A Fed?

[Great Satan]

TRUMP CLINCHED IT FOR MCCARTHY

[Eurasian Adam]

Around 10 classified documents, the Post Millennial notes, were found at the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement, many of which were US Intelligence briefings and memos related to Ukraine, Iran, and the United Kingdom. Shortly after the conclusion of Wednesday's press conference, a second batch of classified documents were found at another Biden office. In an article titled "White House won't say why it didn't disclose earlier that records were found", CNBC reported that the White House Counsel's Office would not answer why it failed for more than two months to publicly disclose that classified government documents had been found in a private office in Washington, D.C., that had been used by President Joe Biden before his election in 2020. Biden, during a meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the North American Leaders' Summit in Mexico, did not respond to a question from reporters about the documents, which were found by personal lawyers. CNBC goes on to note that President Donald Trump suggested on Tuesday that the Justice Department kept quiet about the documents' discovery in order not to affect the outcome of November's congressional elections when his fellow Republican candidates underperformed expectations.

Warning issued over Biden's classified document discovery

GOP'S STINGING ATTACK ON BIDEN