A Theory of the 20th Century

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We of European descent are in a very strange place today, sociopolitically. Sometimes our heads spin when we try to make sense of it. Herein it will be explained how we got to where we are by looking at the history of the past century with the benefit of hindsight and unconstrained by P.C.

The 20th Century will be remembered as a massive three-way Kulturkampf within the European and European-derived world for ideological supremacy and ultimately political control. The "real" dates for the "20th century" [ala this article] in this sense are 1918-1991.

Here is how it went:

- 1800s-1914: The Old Order dominates the globe. Various philosophers and theorists (most notably Marx) begin to lay the foundations for the ideologies that burst onto the scene after 1918.
- 1914-1918: A tremendously-stupid war is engaged in between European countries with no prior disputes. The cavalry calls of late-summer 1914 turn out to be the death knell of most of the governments that began the war, and all of Europe [even neutrals] is thrown into disarray thereafter. Thus, the sociopolitical vacuum created by the collapse of the “old sociopolitical order” after November 1918 sets the stage. The play comes in three acts: 1918-1939, 1939-1945, and 1945-1991.

- Late 1918-1991: The great three-way struggle for sociopolitical supremacy in Europe and the European-derived world is fought. The contenders for power are:
1. Capitalist-Liberal-Democracy,
2. Soviet-Communism/Socialism,
3. Nationalism/"Blood'and'Honor-ism" [the latter says that the defining and animating sociopolitical impulse of a society should be national-survival and health, rather than personal-freedom, equality, or anything about economics: It champions blood integrity and a semblance of traditional morality/community-spirit; the ultimate in Gemeinschaft over Gesellschaft].

--- 1918-1939: All European and European-derived countries see all three forces present in their populations to some extent, pulling their societies and political-discourses in all directions. (Though the USSR simply killed or imprisoned most open advocates of #1 and #3). Even Britain had a #3 presence (as in Oswald Mosley; whose men had regular streetfights with #2-Britons), and even Germany had a strong #2 in the KPD until 1933. The 1924 Immigration Law represented a temporary triumph of #3 in the USA, but the USA remained firmly #1 (hence the 'Invisible Empire', rather than a visible one). The Spanish Civil War was very clearly a microcosm of it all, with representatives of all three from across Europe and further afield slugging it out militarily for control of Spain (American #2s even formed the John Brown brigade and other units to go across the sea and fight for a communist Spain). Ultimately, #3 under Franco defeated the republicans (#1) and communists (#2). During the first stages of this era, many Europeans were so apprehensive about the uncertainty and social disarray predominating, that bizarre and cynical art movements like Dada arose, and outright pornography began to spread. This "degenerate art" was not really aligned to any ideology, but #3 took advantage by positioning itself against it. By 1939, within Europe itself #3 had displaced most of the weak post-1918 #1 governments (very few states succeeded in imposing a #2 from within). Most states in Europe had governments that embraced #3 to varying degrees, most conspicuously Germany.
--- 1939-1945: The war saw #3 ultimately killed on the fields of battle by the allied forces of #1 and #2. To prevent its re-arising, #1 and #2 have perpetually demonized the corpse of #3 ever since, with an unprecedented level of paranoid hysteria, including ridiculous and groundless claims about large-scale atrocities and genocide.

--- 1945-1991: After #3's throat was slit on the battlefields of eastern and central Europe, the two men left standing (#1 and #2) continued the fight, glad to be rid of their erstwhile competitor. To prevent #3 from re-arising, #1 and #2 continued to perpetually demonize the corpse of #3 without letting up, with an unprecedented level of paranoid hysteria, including ridiculous and groundless claims about large-scale atrocities and genocide. (The grotesquely-inflated atrocity propaganda meant to discredit #3 is still remarkably strong as of this writing).
Early in this era, the Kultukampf started spilling over globally. #2 was clearly losing by the 1970s, and finally died a natural death in the late 1980s (With the USSR officially dissolving itself on Christmas of 1991).

- 1991-???: The so-called "End Of History" era, in which #1 was the last man standing, with no serious competition from any other ideology. Socialist-Farleft parties and Nationalistic-patriotic parties [the remnants of the defeated #2 and #3, respectively] had no real prospects for power in any European or European-derived country, with the latter [neo-#3s] even being banned in some countries; advocates thereof jailed. To the extent that post-1991 European statesmen or even regular people have any sympathies in the directions of either #2 or #3, they have had to subordinate those views to the reality of #1-supremacy.

--- In the 1960s, countries within the #1 world began to drive forward in-earnest towards globalization of the Capitalist-Liberal-Democracy variety, partly to edge ahead of the still-feared #2, but mostly because globalization is the logical endgame of a pure #1 society. Markets, economies of scale, free trade, cheap labor. This is why all #1s began taking in nonwhite immigrants and promoting one-world-ism. THIS IS WHERE OBAMA FITS IN. Obama represents nothing new at all. He is rather the logical continuation of the victorious #1 ideology. Everything about him represents that sort of globalization.
---Thus, the author [of this article's] final sentence: <<Barack Obama will have as free a hand as history ever allows to chart a new course and to define a new era>>, is a pathetic joke. Obama represents the continued forward-march of #1, NO DIFFERENT from any of the real trends within the USA (and its fellow European and European-derived #1s) for the past 40 years at least. That white people are afraid to mouth their opposition to Nonwhite Rule in their own country, in the form of Obama, shows just how successfully the demonization of #3 has been since 1945.


To resummarize, he three listed Weltanschauungs that slugged it out for supremacy in the 20th century being-
1. Capitalist-Liberal-Democracy
2. Soviet-Communism/Socialism
3. Nationalism/"Blood-and-Honor-ism"

- There is another Weltanschauung that did not get much play during the 20th Century: Theocracy. This can be seen as a #4 within the framework of the above model, but which was mostly irrelevant to European and European-derived power politics through 1991 as described at length above. The only religion on Earth with any appreciable number of persons whose animating sociopolitical impulse today is theocracy (#4s), is Islam. The beginning of #4 being a force on the modern world stage can be said to be 1979 with the toppling of the Shah of Iran. A nascent #4 contributed somewhat to the fall of #2, with its bitter resistance to the USSR in 1980s Afghanistan. (#4 presence among Afghan rebels in the 1980s can be overstated: In truth the rebels were largely local ethnotribal fighters and the actual Islamist mujahadeen presence is somewhat exaggerated in modern retellings... Also, Afghanistan of late has seen all five Weltanschauungs (see below).
---In the past 20 years, #4 has made strident progress and is a major force in the Islamic world. It remains quite weak globally, but many in the #1 world, especially European-derived Christians, are panicking at various trends favorable to #4's longterm prospects. The "Clash of Civilizations"-esque conflict between #1 [led by the USA along with the Globalizing World in tow] and #4 via Islamism is very real, but trying to connect it to the 1,400-year-old Islamic-Christian conflict is tenuous at best.

- The concepts of the 'left wing' and 'right wing', of 'liberal' and 'conservative' are EXTREMELY subjective, and differ depending on which # the society is; in the USA the Left and Right are both well within the bounds of #1, hence the oft-heard criticism that the parties are "the same". Conversely, any society with various wings of various Weltanschauungs will tend towards being highly unstable (see 1918-1930s Europe; esp. the chaos of 1930s Spain... Also see Afghanistan 1970s-Present. The point is that what matters most is the Weltanschauung—the animating sociopolitical impulse—not specific beliefs, political or otherwise.).

- #1 and #2 believe in equality, #2 and #3 tend toward authoritarianism, #1 believes in personal-freedom and individualism (things rejected by #2 and #3), #3 believes in group-integrity above all (something downplayed by #1 and #2), #2 believes in inherent economic-levelling, to provide for everyone's needs. To some extent the three can be synthesized, but only so far. There are irreconcilable differences between them, which is why the 20th Century was so geopolitically turbulent.

- No one ideology has a monopoly on "evil", and it is indeed quite childish to think that one does. The question of genocide is a bludgeon used against #3, but history shows us that 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 (and the long-past Weltanschauungen as well, unnumbered for our purposes) have all committed genocides. Ironically, an enlightened #3 is perhaps the least 'genocidal' of the three, since its "animating sociopolitical impulse" is explicity the continuity of the various ethnocultural groupings of Mankind-- the preservation of the noble differences of Man rather than tossing everyone into a hardline #1 "common market".

THE 1,2,3,4 MODEL
- The basic theory proposed is that three broad Weltanschauungs competed for political control [#4, theocracy, came later and is largely irrelevant] after history was ripped wide open in November 1918. (By 1991, #1 was the uncontested victor, prompting "the end of history" to be proclaimed.) As foolish and pointless a war as the 1914-1918 war was, by destroying the old order, it opened sociopolitics up to the widest they have ever been, allowing the raw essence of the human soul to pour out, the good and the bad. As such, this model can perhaps be said to still apply today, since they each represent some form of human idealism that people tend to aspire towards. However, those today with real sympathies today for #2 or #3 (or #4) will tend towards fatalism and a reactionary mentality, when faced with the reality of #1 supremacy. Since the bearers of the #1 standards now have near-total control of the process of information-dissemination and socialization across the European-derived world, they have convinced all but the hardliner holdouts that not only will #1 always be as omnipotent as it is today, but that any alternatives to #1 range from miserable failures at best to inhuman nightmares at worst.


Viewed from a longterm perspective, it is clear that European and European-derived nations and people(s) are presently on the sharp decline worldwide. While globalization may end up melting away all nations and all ethnocultural groups on Earth in the long run, we can say that--at very least--it does seem destined to "melt away" the European racial stock as a cohesive unit, and all the nations thereof. Given sufficient time. Just when the "alea iacta est" point precisely will be, no one can know for sure. But not more than several more generations now.

The only way to stop this would be to have a semblance of #3 re-arise among Europeans. #3 is laughably weak in the European-derived world today for reasons explained at length above. Even opposition to the genuine longterm-threat of #4 (Islamic 'radicals'/theocrats) within the European-derived world is usually of the universalist "let's preserve liberal values using force" variety (i.e., a hawkish #1). Rarely does one see anti-#4ism with an obvious and starkly European-revivalist (#3) message. If anything, the postmodern anti-#4s actually try to conflate past #3s and today's #4, using tenuous ties like the "Muslim SS battalion from Bosnia".

Being that #3 is effectively non-existent in the acceptable-mainstream of the European-derived world today, there is no hope for grand European revival or [if you'll pardon me being dramatic] for "white salvation" anytime soon. The 'World Order' and the animating Weltanschauung in the European-derived world must fundamentally realign if longterm European survival is to occur. This is not necessarily to say that "#1 must be replaced by #3", but rather that some semblance of #3 must rearise among Europeans, somehow.

Ultimately there are only two developments, broadly defined, that realistically allow for European survival. I will outline them here. ("Survival" meaning secure nationhood(s) and secure future(s); Fourth World Amerindian-status [i.e. very low pure numbers and in isolated spots, reservations] qualifies as "barely clinging to life", and not really "survival"):

- First Scenario. SLOW, SOFT REVIVAL. For any number of reasons, #1's grotesquely-inflated and total demonization of #3 begins to fade away on its own, slowly. Over a period of years, #3 is thus "allowed" to rearise among European-derived persons, at least to USA-pre-1960 levels. Successful #3 movements then arise, and secure European survival peacefully and magnanimously.
[This seems likely to happen to a small extent during the present century, but very unlikely to happen to a large enough extent to save Europeans from extinction. Many demoralized-#3s in Europe were predicting imminent #3-ish revivals after the fall of #2 in 1989. 'Why would #1 continue its demonization of its long-gone enemy #3 now than #2 is also gone?' Needless to say, this did not happen; if anything, the demonization of #3 has increased since 1989. This is a curious phenomenon that is hard to explain; possible explanations will have to wait for another time.]

- Second Scenario. FAST, HARD REVIVAL. The fall of the United States of America. By this, I of course mean the fall of #1. If its flagship the USA hits early-1930s levels economically, it is possible that the dominance of #1 in the European-derived world would fall as well. Theoretically, then, a quick and blatant eclipse of #1 in the USA would create a new November1918-eqsue 'Zero Hour', allowing for a brand-new reemergence of #3, similar to that which occurred after 1918 across the European-derived world.
[The problem with this scenario is that #3 is so laughably weak and has been so totally demonized, that European-derived persons have mostly lost the sense that they are part of any ethnocultural unit(s) at all (leading to nihilism and cynicism in the past two or three generations of Western whites). Lacking actual ethnocultural feeling, it is hard to imagine even the chaos of another sociopolitical Zero Hour causing a serious reemergence of #3 in the European-derived world.]

--- The blunt problem with both possible scenarios that have been roughly sketched out above is well known to all by now. Frankly, by the time either one were to occur, demographic realities may simply preclude success. When nonwhites are over 50% of a formerly-racially-European nation-state (as in the USA in 30 years' time), it may be too late. [Secessionary solutions are possible even then, though; ugly ethnoreligious civil wars along the Yugoslav or Lebanese models are also possible.] In the event that even 35% of a European country's voters are of foreign origin, #3 would have to win nearly four-fifths of the native vote, which seems impossible. It is for this reason that a solution at the ballot box is highly unlikely. Incidentally, this has been the source of hostility among many modern thinkers to democracy. Voting patterns change after the Weltanschauung changes, NOT before. Voting patterns thus simply reflect the Weltanschauung, and are therefore essentially worthless. Control socialization and you control the ballot box, or at least you set the bounds for the range of possible outcomes therein.


The Competing Weltanschauungen of the 19th-20th Centuries relevant to European Mankind:
0. The "Old Order" (dead as of November 1918)
1. Capitalist-Liberal-Democracy
2. SovietCommunism/Socialism
3. "Blood-and-Honor"-ism
4. Theocracy (only a force in Islamic world)

- The Old Order [henceforth "#0"] is hard to define neatly; but it included arbitrary aristocracies and in many cases it included largely-arbitrary imperialism. Basically one can define #0 as the European Order post-Congress-of-Vienna. During its time, it attempted to stifle the boisterousness of all three rambunctious children (#1,2,3), and basically it succeeded in so doing through 1914. Note the various failed #1 and #2 revolutions during the 1815-1914 period, most notably that of 1848 (#1); note the rise of philosophical socialism (#2) with Marx and other thinkers and the rise of the labor movements (also #2); note the rise of the 19th century "nationalisms", unification movements, cultural revivalisms, artistic romanticism (all #3).
---The term 'conservative', in its political sense, emerged in the early 1800s during the Napoleonic era. It was coined to refer to largely-royalist opponents of Napoleon and of the French Revolution. If one understands the motivation and drive of the coiner(s) of that term, one is able to conceptually grasp #0. (That the term 'conservative' is a misnomer in modern discourse will not be addressed here).
---#0 dominated the globe in July 1914, but then four years of extremely-straining yet curiously-pointless war broke its back. The war and its millions of dead, besides just causing most of the belligerent governments to fall, shook the foundations of the European World, creating the above-discussed broad sociopolitical "Zero Hour" (hence the fitting numeral “#0”). Upon the death of #0 in November 1918, #1, #2, and #3 – previously constrained, ineffectual, and rather weak, at least in terms of power politics – burst forth and were ready to seize the day. All saw themselves as destined to remake the world into a better place for all. #1,2,3 were all ultimately very idealistic.
---All three new ideologies (#1,2,3) discarded the idea of [arbitrary-]aristocracy. (In a peripheral sense, the USA had ridden itself of arbitrary-aristocracy in its South from 1861-1865 by force of arms, but in so doing caused many more problems; the failure of black rule by 1875 and the rise of violent white revival movements and eventually JimCrowe-ism).

- The desire among people for #4 (i.e. theocracy, e.g. Islamic Sharia [government based on religion], and a Caliphate-esque superstate) was totally gone from the world stage by the 1800s. Religion was still relevant, and in some places clergy had high status and were powerful, but nowhere did "the church" actually RULE, nor were there serious movements to establish theocracy anywhere.
- The Vatican and the Orthodox Church are both #4s at heart, even to this day. Sociopolitical control had been the Vatican's and the Orthodox Church's long-desired goals in their domains in earlier times, and they often had it in medieval times. However, their peoples have not been serious #4s for many generations/centuries now, and thus both have given up on the goal of domination. (In other words, in terms of the above-discussed '20th-Century European Kulturkampf' model, #4 was never a contender any more than was the vaguely-defined #0 itself, a smattering of old-order monarchists in various countries notwithstanding).
--- After Lenin began closing churches and executing priests, the Orthodox Church sat out the remainder of the 20th Century. It only reemerged from its hiding place -- wearing tattered clothing, showing a haggard face, and with its ribcage exposed -- by the mid-1990s.
--- The Vatican - though it was [and is] a #4 at heart - deferred to anti-#2 forces during the 20th Century [as well as to pro-#0 forces during the 19th century], terrified at the specter of going the way of the eastern-Orthodox [Soviet] #4s, in the event that the very anti-religion #2 arose were to arise in Catholic states. Towards this end, note a Polish Pope from 1979.
--- Most Protestant churches have been explicitly non-#4 in theory and in practice, anti-#4ism being partly the purpose of their foundation. Luther's extensive preaching and writing on the need for separation of church and government were influential in German-speaking lands; the "nationalization" of the churches elsewhere (esp. Britain) also broke the back of serious supranational #4ism in the Protestant lands. This eventually spilled over even into Catholic-ruled lands.

- The three competing Weltanschauungen of the 20th Century -- #1,#2,#3 -- were/are neither "competing economic models" nor "competing political models" nor even a synthesis of the two. Rather, they are competing Weltanschauungen.
--- A dictionary definition of Weltanschauung: "A comprehensive conception or image of the universe and of humanity's relation to it." Another: "A view that creates an inner unity in all fields of life."
--- The concept of the "Weltanschauung" is one of the many loanwords that loses its intended higher meaning in translation. "Worldview" is a clumsy term that doesn't convey much emotion or any higher meaning in today's English above and beyond the phrase "opinion on things".
--- The phrase "animating-sociopolitical-impulse" was used earlier as a catch-all term to sketch out what is meant by the proposed numbers. This phrase serves well as an English equivalent of the rough philosophical concept intended.
--- A sociopolitical Weltanschauung, then, is the overall and overarching idea about the direction a society should have: its ideals, its aims; it delineates what is important as regards human beings on this planet. Specific political doctrines and specific economic models are almost irrelevant at that raw and wide of a level of analysis; only the whole picture matters.

--- A case example to help illustrate this concept: The King of Afghanistan can be said to have been a "primitive #1" (a #0 at heart), even though he only grudgingly held elections and granted expanded "rights". And it is unclear how developed his freemarketeer capitalism even was. How then was a he a #1 at all? Because, ultimately, he [passively] accepted the #1 Weltanschauung and the "Western [#1] way", to the extent that a deeply-impoverished 3rd world regent could. (cf. Jordan). The King was deposed in an ultimately-doomed #0-revolution in 1973, which itself fell to internal #2 forces a few years later. The Soviet intervention on behalf of its new #2 ally enraged the local primitive-#3s and ignited 30 years of civil war. Islamic #4s-- emboldened after 1979-- jumped onto the bandwagon to fight the USSR and by extension #2 as a wehole. Note the money and volunteers flowing from Arabia to Afghanistan during the 1980s. By mid-1996, #4 had taken over [90% of] Afghanistan. In late 2001, #4 in Afghanistan was replaced by a U.S.-installed #1. Armed rebellion against the #1 Karzai government by local primitive-#3s defines post-2001 Afghanistan. Western media like to present the rebellion as a resurgent Islamist-#4; and although #4s are present among the rebels, they are not the dominant strain: Pashtun #3 is. On the other hand, to what extent has Pashtun 'patriotism' been redefined into support for #4? (See immediately below).

- Just as the concepts of "left-wing" and "right-wing" are highly subjective (see the discussion on that topic far above), "patriotism" as a concept is clearly highly subjective as well, to the point of being meaningless as a stand-alone term. "Patriotism" in a given society is defined by the ruling Weltanschauung thereof. Patriotism in a given time and place is simply a reflection of the Weltanschauung of that time and place. This same critique may also apply to the term "nationalism" as it is often understood, which is why the neologistic "Blood-And-Honor-ism", the meaning of which is unmistakable, is probably a superior term to use. (Also because these are very wide and broad concepts, and #3 can include things like tribalism, which are certainly not "nationalist". "Blood-and-Honor-ism" is a catch-all that may or may not be 'nation'-based.)
--- "American patriotism" is generally held to be the holding dear of the best selling-points of #1, the cherishing thereof and the regard for them as the highest human virtue(s). The rhetoric of American patriotism uses words like 'democracy' and 'freedom' [esp. economic freedom] copiously. No Socialist can ever be an American patriot.
--- "Soviet patriotism" was nothing like American patriotism. A Soviet patriot was someone who believed in Socialism and equality; a good communist; someone who strived to be a New Soviet Man. No liberal-democrat could ever be a Soviet patriot.
--- Hardline #3s in the Soviet sphere until 1991 and in the American sphere today were/are likewise unable to be true "patriots". #3s hold the highest human virtue(s) to be ethnocultural continuity of the various ethnies, "races", and nations of man, their cultural distinctiveness, and the maintenance of their “honor” (morality, and the like). Thus, someone who supports pure-#1ist ideas about 'freedom' (including the freedom to undermine blood ties and to flaunt and insult the "honor" of the group) or who supports the radical equalitarianism of #2, could never be a patriot in a #3 society.
--- Moqtada Al-Sadr is usually cast as an "Iraqi patriot". This is bizarre, because he is a brazen #4; a theocrat; a cleric with political ambitions; not extremely dissimilar to bin-Laden himself. This is bizarre from the perspective of someone whose vantage point is that of a European-derived society of today. In fact, however, within a #4 setting, a "patriot" is one who is a zealous advocate of the religion in question, so the assertion about Sadr is not unfounded. [The irony in toppling of Saddam Hussein, as it is often commented, was that it greatly bolstered #4 in Iraq. Whereas before, #4s were a marginalized and persecuted group in Iraq, today #4s can be "patriots". Yet one of the ostensible purposes of the invasion was to weaken #4 in the Islamic world.]
--- Even more bizarre, Stalin is seen in some quarters as a "patriot". Two groups of people hold this view- a small number of hardline #2s scattered throughout the world, and a number of "Russian patriots" (often the elderly; their concept of patriotism is highly retrogressive and leftover from their socialization in the Stalin era itself). More discussion on the curious case of modern Russia follows below.
--- All sides are motivated to war by "patriotism", which as discussed above is simply a reflection of the Weltanschauung then prevailing. Americans always "fight for freedom/democracy", the Soviets in Afghanistan fought for the universal brotherhood of man under the enlightened humanitarian doctrine of Socialism. Both Soviet true-believers and American true-believers genuinely saw/see no problem in aggressive war or foreign interventionism, IF it is to spread their enlightened philosophies ("spread democracy"); to advance to the battle standards of their specific Weltanschauung(en). #3s, however, tend to fight more for the "defense of our own people's blood-and-soil" as the motivation (the "defense" being real or imagined), which could include aggressive war if it were to preempt enemies of #3. There could certainly also be a universalist war-drive among #3s, too, as it had/has designs on remaking the world into a world of #3 states. Indeed, all three ideologies were highly idealistic, and saw themselves making a better world order, one in which life for all was better and more meaningful under their system.

- Strange things can happen when a ruling class or a major ruling figure arises who embraces a different Weltanschauung than "their own" (than that mandated by their society and its founding-myths/self-propaganda). Ruling classes abandoning their "own" Weltanschauungen on their own initiative (i.e., absent some cataclysm), is a rare event to be sure. The 1500s European Reformation might be seen in this light [rulers across non-Orthodox Europe began throwing off all vestigial #4ism still emanating from the Roman See by seceding therefrom], but a clear recent example can be found in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev.
--- Gorbachev can probably best be seen as a leftist-#1 at heart, a 'Social-Democrat'. His dismantling of the Soviet Union can be understood in this light. A very common thing to be heard from those who were inside the eastern-bloc in the mid-late 1980s is how unexpected the Soviet collapse and the "end of communism" was to them at the time. When the German Democratic Republic was celebrating its 40th anniversery in the Spring of 1989, no one expected the communist system to collapse by year's end and for "the Wall to Fall" to come so soon. Ignoring the obvious economic impetuses, the "Wende" across the Central- and Eastern-European communist states in late 1989 was fundamentally a series of unpredictable and strange events unleashed by a ruler embracing (at heart) a different Weltanschauung than that mandated by his society.
--- Because the genuine defection of a ruling class on their own volition from one Weltanschauung to another is so rare, it is a so-called "Black Swan" event; totally unpredictable and likely to statistically "never happen". The typical way things change from the inside is, rather, a.) the discrediting of the ruling Weltanschauung in some manner or another allowing for its replacement, or b.) A major disaster or cataclysm precipitating a sociopolitical 'Zero Hour', e.g. November 1918 [also very rare but not as rare as ruling-class defection].

- The state of Russia post-1991 is a curious study. The defining aspects of sociopolitics and power in post-1991 Russia are: The so-called "Oligarchs", Statism (certainly after 2000), Soviet nostalgism, and the rather-shocking lack of respect for neighboring and domestic National Questions [a very anti-#3 attitude]. Putinism is ultimately a strange mixture of post-1991 #1 and traditional Russian statism and imperialism that stretches back centuries [perhaps it can be said that Putinist Russia, then, is a #1 with a hefty dose of #0 "at heart"].
--- Putinist Russia's increasingly belligerent attitude as regards the USA, can best be seen as simply jockeying for position within the #1 world on one hand, and simply retrograde statist imperialism -- not particularly motivated by any [currently relevant] Weltanschauung -- on the other.
--- Russian elections during the past nine years have been widely derided because Putin and his party have coasted to easy victory each time. As discussed far above, this is a sign that electoral results are simply a reflection of the ruling power and the society's Weltanschauung. [Given sufficient control of socialization and the opinion-shaping institutions over a sufficient period of time, and lacking serious hard-times, any given ideology or party can sail to easy victories. Even if North Korea held an election, Kim-Jong Il's communists would likewise sail to victory for this reason (possibly excluding during the height of the famines in the 1990s). The ballot box is a mirror of the Weltanschauung.]
--- Being that #3 is largely defined by ethnocultural preservationism; Russian hostility to its domestic #3 movements (quintessentially seen in the rage unleashed on Chechnya, the destruction of 90% of Grozny rather than the granting of Chechen independence; but also in the suppression of the ca. 30 other subnations within the Russian Federation) and Russian hostility to 'near-abroad' #3 movements (Georgia, Baltics, Finns, Ukraine, Poles, eastern-Germans [“Kaliningrad”], Kazaks, etc.) put the Russian state well outside the realm of #3 in general. It fundamentally does not respect the ideals of #3-- other than for Russians themselves-- and it is seemingly actively-hostile to #3 among half the peoples of Europe.
--- While there are legitimate #3s in Russia, they are nearly as weak as the #3s in Western Europe. There are plenty of "patriots" in Russia (see above re the nature of patriotism); Indeed, it is a highly patriotic society. But their patriotism is defined by a strange mixture of Putinism and Soviet-nostalgism. The latter was a superstate/empire which was decidedly and radically anti-#3 in principle and which suppressed countless #3 movements near and far, annexed entire nationalities, and wiped out others.

- Some demoralized European #3s have looked to Russia as a potential savior during the past 10 years. This has become a vogue viewpoint in many beleaguered #3-circles in Europe and even to some extent in the USA. But Russia's shocking and brazen lack of respect for 'near-abroad' and domestic "#3-Questions" reveals that Putinism is no #3 but an imperialistic #1 at best. Putinism perhaps appropriates -- to a certain extent -- underlying #3 sentiment among its own people (Russians), but it does not hold #3 values dear at all in general; similar to the Republican Party in the USA (see below).
--- During the past 10 years, some demoralized European #3s have looked with hope to #4 in the Islamic world -- if not as a potential savior then at least as something to turn over the #1 apple-cart. Both the "Look East [to Russia]" and the "Look South [to the Maghreb and Arabia]" phenomena among European and European-derived #3s are ultimately signs of how weak #3 really is in the European-derived world. (See far above for 'Why' it is so weak). Both phenomena represent the scraping of the bottom of the barrel in search of a Deus-Ex-Machina solution. Both are vaguely reminiscent of the fatalism in Germany during the final months of 1944 and into 1945 ('a miracle will save us'; Goebbels' "Endsieg").

- The Republican Party in the USA is very clearly a #1 party, as is the Democratic Party. At this very broad level of analysis, any differences between Republicans and Democrats can almost be ignored. It can be said that the Republican Party is a center-right #1 and the Democratic Party is a center-left #1 (see above for discussion of the "left wing/right wing" concept), to the extent that it matters.
--- After 1945, white-American #3 sentiment found only weak, scattered, and quickly-retreating voices in mainstream American sociopolitical discourse; by 1975 even those were totally gone from mainstream discourse.
--- From the mid-1960s onward, the reservoir of lingering [white-]American #3 sentiment was hijacked by the Republican Party.
--- Nonwhites in the USA, when not voting blatantly ethnically, tend to vote Democrat because of an assumed (but false) notion that "The Republican Party is a white-oriented #3 party at heart". Witness the nonCuban Hispanic vote going to Obama nearly 3-1 despite McCain--a speaker at LaRaza conferences no less--being perhaps the most pro-Hispanic politician ever seen on the U.S. political stage.

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  1. The Lawspeaker's Avatar
    Very interesting entry, Lenny.